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From: "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: "pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
	"Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"qemu-devel@nongnu.org" <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>,
	"ehabkost@redhat.com" <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 04/13] kvm: add support to sync the page encryption state bitmap
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2019 15:08:53 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <02d832d4-b6e9-6103-3a79-d277b5bfab55@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190716114448.GC2770@work-vm>



On 7/16/19 6:44 AM, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> * Singh, Brijesh (brijesh.singh@amd.com) wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 7/11/19 2:05 PM, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
>>> * Singh, Brijesh (brijesh.singh@amd.com) wrote:
>>>> The SEV VMs have concept of private and shared memory. The private memory
>>>> is encrypted with guest-specific key, while shared memory may be encrypted
>>>> with hyperivosr key. The KVM_GET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP can be used to get a
>>>> bitmap indicating whether the guest page is private or shared. A private
>>>> page must be transmitted using the SEV migration commands.
>>>>
>>>> Add a cpu_physical_memory_sync_encrypted_bitmap() which can be used to sync
>>>> the page encryption bitmap for a given memory region.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>    accel/kvm/kvm-all.c     |  38 ++++++++++
>>>>    include/exec/ram_addr.h | 161 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>>>    include/exec/ramlist.h  |   3 +-
>>>>    migration/ram.c         |  28 ++++++-
>>>>    4 files changed, 222 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
>>>> index 162a2d5085..c935e9366c 100644
>>>> --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
>>>> +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
>>>> @@ -504,6 +504,37 @@ static int kvm_get_dirty_pages_log_range(MemoryRegionSection *section,
>>>>    
>>>>    #define ALIGN(x, y)  (((x)+(y)-1) & ~((y)-1))
>>>>    
>>>> +/* sync page_enc bitmap */
>>>> +static int kvm_sync_page_enc_bitmap(KVMMemoryListener *kml,
>>>> +                                    MemoryRegionSection *section,
>>>> +                                    KVMSlot *mem)
>>>
>>> How AMD/SEV specific is this? i.e. should this be in a target/ specific
>>> place?
>>>
>>
>>
>> For now this is implemented in AMD/SEV specific kernel module.
>> But the interface exposed to userspace is a generic and can be
>> used by other vendors memory encryption feature. Because of this
>> I have added the syncing logic in generic kvm code.
> 
> Ok, I'm not sure if anyone else will have quite the same bitmap
> semantics; but we'll see.
> 
> <snip>
> 
>>>> diff --git a/include/exec/ram_addr.h b/include/exec/ram_addr.h
>>>> index f96777bb99..6fc6864194 100644
>>>> --- a/include/exec/ram_addr.h
>>>> +++ b/include/exec/ram_addr.h
>>>> @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ struct RAMBlock {
>>>>        unsigned long *unsentmap;
>>>>        /* bitmap of already received pages in postcopy */
>>>>        unsigned long *receivedmap;
>>>> +    /* bitmap of page encryption state for an encrypted guest */
>>>> +    unsigned long *encbmap;
>>>>    };
>>>>    
>>>>    static inline bool offset_in_ramblock(RAMBlock *b, ram_addr_t offset)
>>>> @@ -314,9 +316,41 @@ static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_range(ram_addr_t start,
>>>>    }
>>>>    
>>>>    #if !defined(_WIN32)
>>>> -static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_lebitmap(unsigned long *bitmap,
>>>> +
>>>> +static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_encrypted_range(ram_addr_t start,
>>>> +                                                           ram_addr_t length,
>>>> +                                                           unsigned long val)
>>>> +{
>>>> +    unsigned long end, page;
>>>> +    unsigned long * const *src;
>>>> +
>>>> +    if (length == 0) {
>>>> +        return;
>>>> +    }
>>>> +
>>>> +    end = TARGET_PAGE_ALIGN(start + length) >> TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
>>>> +    page = start >> TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
>>>> +
>>>> +    rcu_read_lock();
>>>> +
>>>> +    src = atomic_rcu_read(&ram_list.dirty_memory[DIRTY_MEMORY_ENCRYPTED])->blocks;
>>>> +
>>>> +    while (page < end) {
>>>> +        unsigned long idx = page / DIRTY_MEMORY_BLOCK_SIZE;
>>>> +        unsigned long offset = page % DIRTY_MEMORY_BLOCK_SIZE;
>>>> +        unsigned long num = MIN(end - page, DIRTY_MEMORY_BLOCK_SIZE - offset);
>>>> +
>>>> +        atomic_xchg(&src[idx][BIT_WORD(offset)], val);
>>>> +        page += num;
>>>> +    }
>>>> +
>>>> +    rcu_read_unlock();
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_enc_lebitmap(unsigned long *bitmap,
>>>>                                                              ram_addr_t start,
>>>> -                                                          ram_addr_t pages)
>>>> +                                                          ram_addr_t pages,
>>>> +                                                          bool enc_map)
>>>>    {
>>>>        unsigned long i, j;
>>>>        unsigned long page_number, c;
>>>> @@ -349,10 +383,14 @@ static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_lebitmap(unsigned long *bitmap,
>>>>                if (bitmap[k]) {
>>>>                    unsigned long temp = leul_to_cpu(bitmap[k]);
>>>>    
>>>> -                atomic_or(&blocks[DIRTY_MEMORY_MIGRATION][idx][offset], temp);
>>>> -                atomic_or(&blocks[DIRTY_MEMORY_VGA][idx][offset], temp);
>>>> -                if (tcg_enabled()) {
>>>> -                    atomic_or(&blocks[DIRTY_MEMORY_CODE][idx][offset], temp);
>>>> +                if (enc_map) {
>>>> +                    atomic_xchg(&blocks[DIRTY_MEMORY_ENCRYPTED][idx][offset], temp);
>>>
>>> It makes me nervous that this is almost but not exactly like the other
>>> bitmaps;  I *think* you're saying the bits here are purely a matter of
>>> state about whether the page is encrypted and not a matter of actually
>>> dirtyness; in particular a page that is encrypted and then becomes dirty
>>> doesn't reset or clear this flag.
>>
>>
>> Yes, the bits here are state of the page and they doesn't get reset or
>> cleared with this flag. I agree its not exactly same, initially I did
>> went down to the path of querying the bitmap outside the dirty tracking
>> infrastructure and it proved to be lot of work. This is mainly because
>> migration code works with RAM offset but the kernel tracks the gfn. So,
>> we do need to map from Memslot to offset. Dirty bitmap tracking
>> infrastructure has those mapping logic in-place so I ended up simply
>> reusing it.
> 
> Hmm OK; it could be too confusing - just make sure you add a comment;
> e.g. 'Note: not actually dirty flags, see ...' where appropriate.
> You may end up renaming/cloning a few functions for clarity.
> 

OK, I will rename some of those functions to avoid the confusion.


>>
>>>
>>>> +                } else {
>>>> +                    atomic_or(&blocks[DIRTY_MEMORY_MIGRATION][idx][offset], temp);
>>>> +                    atomic_or(&blocks[DIRTY_MEMORY_VGA][idx][offset], temp);
>>>> +                    if (tcg_enabled()) {
>>>> +                        atomic_or(&blocks[DIRTY_MEMORY_CODE][idx][offset], temp);
>>>> +                    }
>>>>                    }
>>>>                }
>>>>    
>>>> @@ -372,6 +410,17 @@ static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_lebitmap(unsigned long *bitmap,
>>>>             * especially when most of the memory is not dirty.
>>>>             */
>>>>            for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
>>>> +
>>>> +            /* If its encrypted bitmap update, then we need to copy the bitmap
>>>> +             * value as-is to the destination.
>>>> +             */
>>>> +            if (enc_map) {
>>>> +                cpu_physical_memory_set_encrypted_range(start + i * TARGET_PAGE_SIZE,
>>>> +                                                        TARGET_PAGE_SIZE * hpratio,
>>>> +                                                        leul_to_cpu(bitmap[i]));
>>>> +                continue;
>>>> +            }
>>>> +
>>>>                if (bitmap[i] != 0) {
>>>>                    c = leul_to_cpu(bitmap[i]);
>>>>                    do {
>>>> @@ -387,6 +436,21 @@ static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_lebitmap(unsigned long *bitmap,
>>>>            }
>>>>        }
>>>>    }
>>>> +
>>>> +static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_encrypted_lebitmap(unsigned long *bitmap,
>>>> +                                                              ram_addr_t start,
>>>> +                                                              ram_addr_t pages)
>>>> +{
>>>> +    return cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_enc_lebitmap(bitmap, start, pages, true);
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_lebitmap(unsigned long *bitmap,
>>>> +                                                          ram_addr_t start,
>>>> +                                                          ram_addr_t pages)
>>>> +{
>>>> +    return cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_enc_lebitmap(bitmap, start, pages, false);
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>>    #endif /* not _WIN32 */
>>>>    
>>>>    bool cpu_physical_memory_test_and_clear_dirty(ram_addr_t start,
>>>> @@ -406,6 +470,7 @@ static inline void cpu_physical_memory_clear_dirty_range(ram_addr_t start,
>>>>        cpu_physical_memory_test_and_clear_dirty(start, length, DIRTY_MEMORY_MIGRATION);
>>>>        cpu_physical_memory_test_and_clear_dirty(start, length, DIRTY_MEMORY_VGA);
>>>>        cpu_physical_memory_test_and_clear_dirty(start, length, DIRTY_MEMORY_CODE);
>>>> +    cpu_physical_memory_test_and_clear_dirty(start, length, DIRTY_MEMORY_ENCRYPTED);
>>>
>>> What are the ordering/consistency rules associated with this data.
>>> Specifically:
>>>
>>>     Consider a page that transitions from being shared to encrypted
>>> (does that happen?) - but we've just done the sync's so we know the page
>>> is dirty, but we don't know it's encrypted; so we transmit the page as
>>> unencrypted; what happens?
>>>
>>
>> When a page is transitioned from private to shared, one (or two) of
>> the following action will be taken by the guest OS
>>
>> a) update the pgtable memory
>>
>> and
>>
>> b) update the contents of the page
>>
>> #a is must, #b is optional. The #a will dirty the pgtable memory, so
>> its safe to assume that pgtable will be sync'ed with correct attribute.
>> Similarly if  #b is performed then page address will be dirty and it
>> will be re-transmitted with updated data. But #b is not performed by
>> the guest then its okay to send the page through encryption path
>> because the content of that page is encrypted.
> 
> What's the relationship between updating the pgtable memory and this
> bitmap you're syncing?
> 


When guest toggles the encryption attribute of a page in a pgtable
memory it issues a hypercall. The hypercall contains two information:
a) encryption state
b) gfn

KVM updates the bitmap with the page encryption state, we are syncing
this bitmap during the migration to get the gfn encryption state. If
gfn is private then use SEV command else fallback to standard migration
flow.



>>
>>
>>>     I *think* that means we should always sync the encryped bitmap before
>>> the dirty bitmap, so that if it flips we're guaranteed the dirty bitmap
>>> gets flipped again after the flip has happened; but my brain is starting
>>> to hurt....
>>>
>>>     But, even if we're guaranteed to have a dirty for the next time
>>> around, I think we're always at risk of transmitting a page that
>>> has just flipped; so we'll be sure to transmit it again correctly,
>>> but we might transmit an encrypted page to a non-encrypted dest or
>>> the reverse - is that OK?
>>>
>>>
>>
>> I don't think order matters much. If page was marked as shared in
>> pagetable but nobody has touched the contents of it then that page
>> will still contain encrypted data so its I think its OK to send as
>> encrypted.
> 
> So are we really saying that the transfer of the contents of guest RAM
> doesn't matter if it's encrypted or not - you could transfer all pages
> as if they were encrypted even if they're actually shared - as long
> as the bitmap is right at the end?
> 

That's not what I mean. I was trying to say the order of sync
does not effect the outcome if the page state is changed while we
are migrating the guest.

A flow should be:
a) Before migration, query the bitmap
b) Transfer the pages based on the bitmap state
c) If page state is changed during the migration, it will force dirty
   bitmap tracker to resync the bitmaps. This is because changing the
   page state will cause pgtable memory updates.
d) If contents of the page is not changed then dirty page tracker will
   not re-transmit the page hence we will not get chance to resend the
   page with updated state. This is OK.
e) If the content of the page is changed after guest updates the page
    state then dirty tracker will see that page is changed and attempt
    to re-trasmit the page based on re-sync'ed bitmap state.

-Brijesh

  reply	other threads:[~2019-07-16 15:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-07-10 20:22 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 00/13] Add SEV guest live migration support Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:22 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 01/13] linux-headers: update kernel header to include SEV migration commands Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 03/13] migration/ram: add support to send encrypted pages Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-11 17:34   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-11 19:43     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-12  9:27       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-12 15:46         ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 02/13] kvm: introduce high-level API to support encrypted page migration Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-11 17:47   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-11 19:46     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 05/13] doc: update AMD SEV API spec web link Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-11 18:06   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-12 13:31     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 04/13] kvm: add support to sync the page encryption state bitmap Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-11 19:05   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-12 14:57     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-16 11:44       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-16 15:08         ` Singh, Brijesh [this message]
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 06/13] doc: update AMD SEV to include Live migration flow Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-12 14:29   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-24 22:21   ` Venu Busireddy
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 07/13] target/i386: sev: do not create launch context for an incoming guest Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-12  9:51   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 08/13] misc.json: add migrate-set-sev-info command Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-12 10:00   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-12 10:09     ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2019-07-12 15:04       ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 09/13] target/i386: sev: add support to encrypt the outgoing page Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-12 10:43   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-12 15:19     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-12 15:24       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 10/13] target/i386: sev: add support to load incoming encrypted page Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-12 11:02   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-12 15:20     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 11/13] kvm: introduce high-level API to migrate the page encryption bitmap Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 12/13] migration: add support to migrate " Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-12 11:30   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-12 15:42     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-10 20:23 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 13/13] target/i386: sev: remove migration blocker Singh, Brijesh
2019-07-12 11:37   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-10 20:48 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 00/13] Add SEV guest live migration support no-reply
2019-07-10 20:54 ` no-reply
2019-07-11  9:59 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-07-11 19:44   ` Singh, Brijesh

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