[PATCH net 3/4] sctp: validate chunk size in __rcv_asconf_lookup

[Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>]

In one of the fallbacks that SCTP has for identifying an association for an
incoming packet, it looks for AddIp chunk (from ASCONF) and take a peek.
Thing is, at this stage nothing was validating that the chunk actually had
enough content for that, allowing the peek to happen over uninitialized
memory.

Similar check already exists in actual asconf handling in
sctp_verify_asconf().

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
---
 net/sctp/input.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/sctp/input.c b/net/sctp/input.c
index f72bff93745c44be0dbfa29e754f2872a7d874c2..96dea8097dbeb4e29d537292d31dde5f02188389 100644
--- a/net/sctp/input.c
+++ b/net/sctp/input.c
@@ -1168,6 +1168,9 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup(
 	union sctp_addr_param *param;
 	union sctp_addr paddr;
 
+	if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(*asconf) + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr))
+		return NULL;
+
 	/* Skip over the ADDIP header and find the Address parameter */
 	param = (union sctp_addr_param *)(asconf + 1);
 
-- 
2.31.1