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From: David Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
To: <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
	Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>,
	Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>,
	Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 20/24] ARM: vfp: use __copy_from_user() when restoring VFP state
Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2018 11:32:14 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1539617538-22328-21-git-send-email-dave.long@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1539617538-22328-1-git-send-email-dave.long@linaro.org>

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit 42019fc50dfadb219f9e6ddf4c354f3837057d80 upstream.

__get_user_error() is used as a fast accessor to make copying structure
members in the signal handling path as efficient as possible.  However,
with software PAN and the recent Spectre variant 1, the efficiency is
reduced as these are no longer fast accessors.

In the case of software PAN, it has to switch the domain register around
each access, and with Spectre variant 1, it would have to repeat the
access_ok() check for each access.

Use __copy_from_user() rather than __get_user_err() for individual
members when restoring VFP state.

Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h |  4 ++--
 arch/arm/kernel/signal.c           | 20 ++++++++------------
 arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c           | 17 +++++++----------
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 776757d..57d2ad9 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -126,8 +126,8 @@ struct user_vfp_exc;
 
 extern int vfp_preserve_user_clear_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *,
 					   struct user_vfp_exc __user *);
-extern int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *,
-				    struct user_vfp_exc __user *);
+extern int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp *,
+				    struct user_vfp_exc *);
 #endif
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
index 80da0cd..cdfe52b 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
@@ -149,22 +149,18 @@ static int preserve_vfp_context(struct vfp_sigframe __user *frame)
 
 static int restore_vfp_context(char __user **auxp)
 {
-	struct vfp_sigframe __user *frame =
-		(struct vfp_sigframe __user *)*auxp;
-	unsigned long magic;
-	unsigned long size;
-	int err = 0;
-
-	__get_user_error(magic, &frame->magic, err);
-	__get_user_error(size, &frame->size, err);
+	struct vfp_sigframe frame;
+	int err;
 
+	err = __copy_from_user(&frame, *auxp, sizeof(frame));
 	if (err)
-		return -EFAULT;
-	if (magic != VFP_MAGIC || size != VFP_STORAGE_SIZE)
+		return err;
+
+	if (frame.magic != VFP_MAGIC || frame.size != VFP_STORAGE_SIZE)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	*auxp += size;
-	return vfp_restore_user_hwstate(&frame->ufp, &frame->ufp_exc);
+	*auxp += sizeof(frame);
+	return vfp_restore_user_hwstate(&frame.ufp, &frame.ufp_exc);
 }
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c b/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c
index aa7496b..6abcd4a 100644
--- a/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c
+++ b/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c
@@ -597,13 +597,11 @@ int vfp_preserve_user_clear_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *ufp,
 }
 
 /* Sanitise and restore the current VFP state from the provided structures. */
-int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *ufp,
-			     struct user_vfp_exc __user *ufp_exc)
+int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp *ufp, struct user_vfp_exc *ufp_exc)
 {
 	struct thread_info *thread = current_thread_info();
 	struct vfp_hard_struct *hwstate = &thread->vfpstate.hard;
 	unsigned long fpexc;
-	int err = 0;
 
 	/* Disable VFP to avoid corrupting the new thread state. */
 	vfp_flush_hwstate(thread);
@@ -612,17 +610,16 @@ int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *ufp,
 	 * Copy the floating point registers. There can be unused
 	 * registers see asm/hwcap.h for details.
 	 */
-	err |= __copy_from_user(&hwstate->fpregs, &ufp->fpregs,
-				sizeof(hwstate->fpregs));
+	memcpy(&hwstate->fpregs, &ufp->fpregs, sizeof(hwstate->fpregs));
 	/*
 	 * Copy the status and control register.
 	 */
-	__get_user_error(hwstate->fpscr, &ufp->fpscr, err);
+	hwstate->fpscr = ufp->fpscr;
 
 	/*
 	 * Sanitise and restore the exception registers.
 	 */
-	__get_user_error(fpexc, &ufp_exc->fpexc, err);
+	fpexc = ufp_exc->fpexc;
 
 	/* Ensure the VFP is enabled. */
 	fpexc |= FPEXC_EN;
@@ -631,10 +628,10 @@ int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *ufp,
 	fpexc &= ~(FPEXC_EX | FPEXC_FP2V);
 	hwstate->fpexc = fpexc;
 
-	__get_user_error(hwstate->fpinst, &ufp_exc->fpinst, err);
-	__get_user_error(hwstate->fpinst2, &ufp_exc->fpinst2, err);
+	hwstate->fpinst = ufp_exc->fpinst;
+	hwstate->fpinst2 = ufp_exc->fpinst2;
 
-	return err ? -EFAULT : 0;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
-- 
2.5.0

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-10-15 23:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-15 15:31 [PATCH 4.14 00/24] V4.14 backport of 32-bit arm spectre patches David Long
2018-10-15 15:31 ` [PATCH 4.14 01/24] ARM: add more CPU part numbers for Cortex and Brahma B15 CPUs David Long
2018-10-15 15:31 ` [PATCH 4.14 02/24] ARM: bugs: prepare processor bug infrastructure David Long
2018-10-15 15:31 ` [PATCH 4.14 03/24] ARM: bugs: hook processor bug checking into SMP and suspend paths David Long
2018-10-15 15:31 ` [PATCH 4.14 04/24] ARM: bugs: add support for per-processor bug checking David Long
2018-10-15 15:31 ` [PATCH 4.14 05/24] ARM: spectre: add Kconfig symbol for CPUs vulnerable to Spectre David Long
2018-10-15 15:32 ` [PATCH 4.14 06/24] ARM: spectre-v2: harden branch predictor on context switches David Long
2018-10-15 15:32 ` [PATCH 4.14 07/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add Cortex A8 and A15 validation of the IBE bit David Long
2018-10-15 15:32 ` [PATCH 4.14 08/24] ARM: spectre-v2: harden user aborts in kernel space David Long
2018-10-15 15:32 ` [PATCH 4.14 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening David Long
2018-10-15 15:32 ` [PATCH 4.14 10/24] ARM: spectre-v2: warn about incorrect context switching functions David Long
2018-10-15 15:32 ` [PATCH 4.14 11/24] ARM: KVM: invalidate BTB on guest exit for Cortex-A12/A17 David Long
2018-10-15 15:32 ` [PATCH 4.14 12/24] ARM: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Cortex-A15 David Long
2018-10-15 15:32 ` [PATCH 4.14 13/24] ARM: spectre-v2: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Brahma B15 David Long
2018-10-15 15:32 ` [PATCH 4.14 14/24] ARM: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling David Long
2018-10-15 15:32 ` [PATCH 4.14 15/24] ARM: KVM: report support for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 David Long
2018-10-15 15:32 ` [PATCH 4.14 16/24] ARM: spectre-v1: add speculation barrier (csdb) macros David Long
2018-10-15 15:32 ` [PATCH 4.14 17/24] ARM: spectre-v1: add array_index_mask_nospec() implementation David Long
2018-10-15 15:32 ` [PATCH 4.14 18/24] ARM: spectre-v1: fix syscall entry David Long
2018-10-15 15:32 ` [PATCH 4.14 19/24] ARM: signal: copy registers using __copy_from_user() David Long
2018-10-15 15:32 ` David Long [this message]
2018-10-15 15:32 ` [PATCH 4.14 21/24] ARM: oabi-compat: copy semops " David Long
2018-10-15 15:32 ` [PATCH 4.14 22/24] ARM: use __inttype() in get_user() David Long
2018-10-15 15:32 ` [PATCH 4.14 23/24] ARM: spectre-v1: use get_user() for __get_user() David Long
2018-10-15 15:32 ` [PATCH 4.14 24/24] ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesses David Long
2018-10-16 16:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 00/24] V4.14 backport of 32-bit arm spectre patches Greg KH

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