All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	Bill Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
	"Dr . Greg Wettstein" <greg@enjellic.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting
Date: Mon, 8 Jul 2019 07:57:07 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190708145707.GC20433@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190620210324.GF15383@linux.intel.com>

On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 12:03:36AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 19, 2019 at 03:23:50PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > Using per-vma refcounting to track mm_structs associated with an enclave
> > requires hooking .vm_close(), which in turn prevents the mm from merging
> > vmas (precisely to allow refcounting).
> 
> Why having sgx_vma_close() prevents that? I do not understand the
> problem statement.

vmas that define .vm_close() cannot be merged.

  /*
   * If the vma has a ->close operation then the driver probably needs to release
   * per-vma resources, so we don't attempt to merge those.
   */
  static inline int is_mergeable_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
				struct file *file, unsigned long vm_flags,
				struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx vm_userfaultfd_ctx)
  {
	...

	if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->close)
		return 0;
	if (!is_mergeable_vm_userfaultfd_ctx(vma, vm_userfaultfd_ctx))
		return 0;
	return 1;
  }


> 
> > Avoid refcounting encl_mm altogether by registering an mmu_notifier at
> > .mmap(), removing the dying encl_mm at mmu_notifier.release() and
> > protecting mm_list during reclaim via a per-enclave SRCU.
> 
> Right, there is the potential collision with my changes:
> 
> 1. Your patch: enclave life-cycle equals life-cycle of all processes
>    that are associated with the enclave.
> 2. My (yet be sent) patch: enclave life-cycle equals the life cycle.
> 
> I won't rush with my patch. I rather merge neither at this point and
> you can review mine after you come back from your vacation.
> 
> > Removing refcounting/vm_close() allows merging of enclave vmas, at the
> > cost of delaying removal of encl_mm structs from mm_list, i.e. an mm is
> > disassociated from an enclave when the mm exits or the enclave dies, as
> > opposed to when the last vma (in a given mm) is closed.
> > 
> > The impact of delying encl_mm removal is its memory footprint and
> > whatever overhead is incurred during EPC reclaim (to walk an mm's vmas).
> > Practically speaking, a stale encl_mm will exist for a meaningful amount
> > of time if and only if the enclave is mapped in a long-lived process and
> > then passed off to another long-lived process.  It is expected that the
> > vast majority of use cases will not encounter this condition, e.g. even
> > using a daemon to build enclaves should not result in a stale encl_mm as
> > the builder should never need to mmap() the enclave.
> 
> This paragraph speaks only about "well behaving" software.

Malicious software isn't all that interesting as there are far easier ways
to waste system resources.  That being said, the encl_mm allocation can
use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT.

> > Even if there are scenarios that lead to defunct encl_mms, the cost is
> > likely far outweighed by the benefits of reducing the number of vmas
> > across all enclaves.
> > 
> > Note, using SRCU to protect mm_list is not strictly necessary, i.e. the
> > existing walker with encl_mm refcounting could be massaged to work with
> > mmu_notifier.release(), but the resulting code is subtle and fragile (I
> > never actually got it working).  The primary issue is that an encl_mm
> > can't be moved off the list until its refcount goes to zero, otherwise
> > the custom walker goes off into the weeds.  The refcount requirement
> > then prevents using mm_list to identify if an mmu_notifier.release()
> > has fired, i.e. another mechanism is needed to guard against races
> > between exit_mmap() and sgx_release().
> 
> Is it really impossible to send a separate SRCU patch?

I can split out the SRCU as a precursor.  It'll likely take me a few days
to get it sent.

> I fully agree with the SRCU whereas rest of this patch is still
> under debate.
> 
> If you could do that, I can merge it in no time. It is a small
> step into better direction.
> 
> > Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
> > Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> 
> Needs to be rebased because the master missing your earlier bug fix.

...

> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
> > index 9566eb72d417..c6436bbd4a68 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
> > @@ -132,103 +132,125 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> >  	return entry;
> >  }
> >  
> > -struct sgx_encl_mm *sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> > -				    struct mm_struct *mm)
> > +static void sgx_encl_mm_release_wq(struct work_struct *work)
> > +{
> > +	struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm =
> > +		container_of(work, struct sgx_encl_mm, release_work);
> > +
> > +	sgx_encl_mm_release(encl_mm);
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Being a call_srcu() callback, this needs to be short, and sgx_encl_release()
> > + * is anything but short.  Do the final freeing in yet another async callback.
> > + */
> > +static void sgx_encl_mm_release_delayed(struct rcu_head *rcu)
> 
> Would rename this either as *_tail() or *_deferred().

Deferred works for me.

> > +{
> > +	struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm =
> > +		container_of(rcu, struct sgx_encl_mm, rcu);
> > +
> > +	INIT_WORK(&encl_mm->release_work, sgx_encl_mm_release_wq);
> > +	schedule_work(&encl_mm->release_work);
> > +}
> > +

...

> > @@ -118,11 +123,13 @@ void sgx_encl_destroy(struct sgx_encl *encl);
> >  void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref);
> >  pgoff_t sgx_encl_get_index(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *page);
> >  struct page *sgx_encl_get_backing_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, pgoff_t index);
> > -struct sgx_encl_mm *sgx_encl_next_mm(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> > -				     struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm, int *iter);
> > -struct sgx_encl_mm *sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> > -				    struct mm_struct *mm);
> > -void sgx_encl_mm_release(struct kref *ref);
> > +int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm);
> > +static inline void sgx_encl_mm_release(struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm)
> > +{
> > +	kref_put(&encl_mm->encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release);
> > +
> > +	kfree(encl_mm);
> > +}
> 
> Please just open code this to the two call sites. Makes the code hard to
> follow.

Heh, I waffled between a helper and open coding.  I chose poorly :-)

> Right now I did not find anything else questionable from the code
> changes. Repeating myself but if it is by any means possible before
> going away, can you construct a pure SRCU patch.
>
> I could then reconstruct my changes on top off that, which would
> make evalution of both heck a lot easier.
> 
> /Jarkko

  reply	other threads:[~2019-07-08 14:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 156+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-06-19 22:23 [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting Sean Christopherson
2019-06-20 21:03   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-08 14:57     ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2019-07-09 16:18       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address Sean Christopherson
2019-06-20 21:09   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-20 22:09     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack Sean Christopherson
2019-06-20 21:17   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21  1:07   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-21  1:16     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-21 16:42   ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-08 16:34     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-08 17:29       ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 18:00   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 19:22     ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21  1:26   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-07 19:03     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21  1:35   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21  2:28   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-21 16:54   ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-25 20:48     ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 20:29       ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-07 18:01         ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 17:09   ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-25 21:05     ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 20:26       ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-25 20:19   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-26 12:49     ` Dr. Greg
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 17:05   ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-25 21:01     ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-25 21:49       ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 19:38         ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 21:22   ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-25 21:09     ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 20:19       ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-28 16:16         ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-28 21:20           ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-29  1:15             ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-01 18:14               ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-29 23:41       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 17:46         ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 17:53           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 18:54             ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 19:03               ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 19:32               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 20:03                 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-07 18:46                   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-25 20:34   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-19 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/12] security/apparmor: " Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 17:18   ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-08 14:34     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21  1:32 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-27 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks Cedric Xing
2019-07-03 23:16   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-03 23:22     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-03 23:23       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-06  5:04     ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-08 14:46       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-07 23:41   ` [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] " Cedric Xing
2019-07-08 15:55     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-08 17:49       ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-08 18:49         ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-08 22:26           ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-07 23:41   ` [RFC PATCH v3 1/4] x86/sgx: Add " Cedric Xing
2019-07-07 23:41   ` [RFC PATCH v3 2/4] x86/64: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module Cedric Xing
2019-07-09  1:03     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-07 23:41   ` [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module Cedric Xing
2019-07-08 16:26     ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-08 17:16       ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-08 23:53         ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-09 22:13           ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10  0:10             ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-10  0:55               ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 21:14                 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-11 13:51                 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-11 15:12                   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-11 16:11                     ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-11 16:25                       ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-11 16:32                         ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-11 23:41                           ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-07 23:41   ` [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux Cedric Xing
2019-07-09  1:33     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 21:26       ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 15:49     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-10 16:08       ` Jethro Beekman
2019-07-10 18:16         ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 17:54       ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-27 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks Cedric Xing
2019-06-27 22:06   ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-27 22:52     ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-27 23:37       ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-28  0:47         ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-28 17:22           ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-28 22:29             ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-29  1:37             ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-29 21:35               ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-01 17:57                 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 19:53                   ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-01 21:45                     ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 23:11                       ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-02  7:42                         ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-02 15:44                           ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-03  9:46                             ` Dr. Greg
2019-07-03 15:32                               ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-07 13:30                                 ` Dr. Greg
2019-07-09  0:02                                   ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-09  1:52                                     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 21:16                                       ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-11 10:22                                     ` Dr. Greg
2019-07-15 22:23                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-28 16:37   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-28 21:53     ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-29  1:22       ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-01 18:02         ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-29 23:46   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 17:11     ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 17:58       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 18:31         ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 19:36           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 19:56             ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-02  2:29               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-02  6:35                 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-27 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] x86/sgx: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module Cedric Xing
2019-06-27 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux Cedric Xing
2019-07-05 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-08 17:29   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-08 17:33     ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-09 16:22     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-09 17:09       ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 20:41         ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-09 22:25           ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 23:11             ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 16:57               ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-10 20:19         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-10 20:31           ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-11  9:06             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-10 22:00           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-10 22:16         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-10 23:16           ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-11  9:26             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-11 14:32               ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-11 17:51                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-12  0:08                   ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10  1:28     ` Dr. Greg
2019-07-10  2:04       ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10  3:21     ` Jethro Beekman

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20190708145707.GC20433@linux.intel.com \
    --to=sean.j.christopherson@intel.com \
    --cc=casey.schaufler@intel.com \
    --cc=cedric.xing@intel.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=greg@enjellic.com \
    --cc=jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=jethro@fortanix.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=william.c.roberts@intel.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.