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From: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
	"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Thomas Garnier" <thgarnie@chromium.org>,
	"Michael Halcrow" <mhalcrow@google.com>,
	"Paul Turner" <pjt@google.com>,
	"Brendan Gregg" <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
	"Matthew Garrett" <mjg59@google.com>,
	"Christian Brauner" <christian@brauner.io>,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Florent Revest" <revest@chromium.org>,
	"Brendan Jackman" <jackmanb@chromium.org>,
	"Martin KaFai Lau" <kafai@fb.com>,
	"Song Liu" <songliubraving@fb.com>, "Yonghong Song" <yhs@fb.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Mauro Carvalho Chehab" <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Nicolas Ferre" <nicolas.ferre@microchip.com>,
	"Stanislav Fomichev" <sdf@google.com>,
	"Quentin Monnet" <quentin.monnet@netronome.com>,
	"Andrey Ignatov" <rdna@fb.com>, "Joe Stringer" <joe@wand.net.nz>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v1 04/13] bpf: lsm: Allow btf_id based attachment for LSM hooks
Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2019 16:41:59 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191220154208.15895-5-kpsingh@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191220154208.15895-1-kpsingh@chromium.org>

From: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>

Refactor and re-use most of the logic for BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING with a few
changes.

- The LSM hook BTF types are prefixed with "lsm_btf_"
- These types do not need the first (void *) pointer argument. The verifier
  only looks for this argument if prod->aux->attach_btf_trace is set.

Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
---
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c  |  1 +
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 5a773fc6f9f5..4fcaf6042c07 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -1642,6 +1642,7 @@ bpf_prog_load_check_attach(enum bpf_prog_type prog_type,
 {
 	switch (prog_type) {
 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
+	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
 		if (btf_id > BTF_MAX_TYPE)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		break;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index a0482e1c4a77..0d1231d9c1ef 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -9504,7 +9504,71 @@ static void print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		env->peak_states, env->longest_mark_read_walk);
 }
 
-static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+/*
+ * LSM hooks have a typedef associated with them. The BTF information for this
+ * type is used by the verifier to validate memory accesses made by the
+ * attached information.
+ *
+ * For example the:
+ *
+ *	int bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *brpm)
+ *
+ * has the following typedef:
+ *
+ *	typedef int (*lsm_btf_bprm_check_security)(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ */
+#define BTF_LSM_PREFIX "lsm_btf_"
+
+static inline int check_attach_btf_id_lsm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+{
+	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
+	u32 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id;
+	const struct btf_type *t;
+	const char *tname;
+
+	if (!btf_id) {
+		verbose(env, "LSM programs must provide btf_id\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, btf_id);
+	if (!t) {
+		verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u is invalid\n", btf_id);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off);
+	if (!tname) {
+		verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u doesn't have a name\n", btf_id);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!btf_type_is_typedef(t)) {
+		verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u is not a typedef\n", btf_id);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (strncmp(BTF_LSM_PREFIX, tname, sizeof(BTF_LSM_PREFIX) - 1)) {
+		verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u points to wrong type name %s\n",
+			btf_id, tname);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, t->type);
+	/* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */
+	if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, t->type);
+	/* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */
+	if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	tname += sizeof(BTF_LSM_PREFIX) - 1;
+	prog->aux->attach_func_name = tname;
+	prog->aux->attach_func_proto = t;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_attach_btf_id_tracing(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 {
 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
 	struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog = prog->aux->linked_prog;
@@ -9519,9 +9583,6 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	long addr;
 	u64 key;
 
-	if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING)
-		return 0;
-
 	if (!btf_id) {
 		verbose(env, "Tracing programs must provide btf_id\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -9659,6 +9720,20 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	}
 }
 
+static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+{
+	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
+
+	switch (prog->type) {
+	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
+		return check_attach_btf_id_tracing(env);
+	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
+		return check_attach_btf_id_lsm(env);
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
 int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
 	      union bpf_attr __user *uattr)
 {
-- 
2.20.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-12-20 15:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-12-20 15:41 [PATCH bpf-next v1 00/13] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI) KP Singh
2019-12-20 15:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 01/13] bpf: Refactor BPF_EVENT context macros to its own header KP Singh
2019-12-20 20:10   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2019-12-20 20:26     ` KP Singh
2019-12-20 15:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 02/13] bpf: lsm: Add a skeleton and config options KP Singh
2020-01-07 21:13   ` James Morris
2019-12-20 15:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 03/13] bpf: lsm: Introduce types for eBPF based LSM KP Singh
2019-12-20 15:41 ` KP Singh [this message]
2019-12-23 23:54   ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 04/13] bpf: lsm: Allow btf_id based attachment for LSM hooks Andrii Nakryiko
2019-12-30 19:22     ` KP Singh
2019-12-20 15:42 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 05/13] tools/libbpf: Add support in libbpf for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM KP Singh
2019-12-24  0:07   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2019-12-24  0:09     ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-01-03 23:59     ` KP Singh
2019-12-20 15:42 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 06/13] bpf: lsm: Init Hooks and create files in securityfs KP Singh
2019-12-24  6:28   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2019-12-30 15:37     ` KP Singh
2019-12-30 18:52       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2019-12-30 19:20       ` Kees Cook
2020-01-03 23:53         ` KP Singh
2020-01-07 21:22   ` James Morris
2019-12-20 15:42 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 07/13] bpf: lsm: Implement attach, detach and execution KP Singh
2019-12-24  5:48   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-01-07 21:27   ` James Morris
2019-12-20 15:42 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 08/13] bpf: lsm: Show attached program names in hook read handler KP Singh
2020-01-07 21:28   ` James Morris
2019-12-20 15:42 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 09/13] bpf: lsm: Add a helper function bpf_lsm_event_output KP Singh
2019-12-24  6:36   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2019-12-30 15:11     ` KP Singh
2019-12-30 18:56       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2019-12-20 15:42 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 10/13] bpf: lsm: Handle attachment of the same program KP Singh
2019-12-24  6:38   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-01-08 18:21   ` James Morris
2019-12-20 15:42 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 11/13] tools/libbpf: Add bpf_program__attach_lsm KP Singh
2019-12-24  6:44   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-01-08 18:24   ` James Morris
2019-12-20 15:42 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 12/13] bpf: lsm: Add selftests for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM KP Singh
2019-12-24  6:49   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-01-04  0:09     ` KP Singh
2020-01-09 17:59       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-01-08 18:25   ` James Morris
2019-12-20 15:42 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 13/13] bpf: lsm: Add Documentation KP Singh
2019-12-20 17:17 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 00/13] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI) Casey Schaufler
2019-12-20 17:38   ` KP Singh
2019-12-30 19:15     ` Kees Cook
2020-01-08 15:25       ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-08 18:58         ` James Morris
2020-01-08 19:33           ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-09 18:11             ` James Morris
2020-01-09 18:23               ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-01-09 18:58               ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-09 19:07                 ` James Morris
2020-01-09 19:43                   ` KP Singh
2020-01-09 19:47                     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-10 15:27                       ` KP Singh
2020-01-10 17:48                         ` James Morris
2020-01-10 17:53                         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-01-14 16:54                           ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-14 17:42                             ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-15  2:48                               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-01-15 13:59                                 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-15 14:09                                   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-01-15 22:23                                     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-01-09 19:11               ` KP Singh
2020-01-08 18:27       ` James Morris
2019-12-20 22:46 ` Mickaël Salaün
2019-12-30 19:30   ` Kees Cook
2019-12-31 12:11     ` Mickaël Salaün
2019-12-22  1:27 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-12-30 14:58   ` KP Singh
2019-12-30 19:14     ` Andrii Nakryiko
2019-12-24  6:51 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2019-12-30 15:04   ` KP Singh
2019-12-30 18:58     ` Andrii Nakryiko

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