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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "Kenneth R. Crudup" <kenny@panix.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>, Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>,
	Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Subject: [patch 1/2] x86,module: Detect VMX modules and disable Split-Lock-Detect
Date: Thu, 02 Apr 2020 14:32:59 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200402124205.242674296@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20200402123258.895628824@linutronix.de

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

It turns out that with Split-Lock-Detect enabled (default) any VMX
hypervisor needs at least a little modification in order to not blindly
inject the #AC into the guest without the guest being ready for it.

Since there is no telling which module implements a hypervisor, scan the
module text and look for the VMLAUNCH instruction. If found, the module is
assumed to be a hypervisor of some sort and SLD is disabled.

Hypervisors, which have been modified and are known to work correctly,
can add:

  MODULE_INFO(sld_safe, "Y");

to explicitly tell the module loader they're good.

NOTE: it is unfortunate that struct load_info is not available to the
      arch module code, this means CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL gunk is needed
      in generic code.

NOTE: while we can 'trivially' fix KVM, we're still stuck with stuff
      like VMware and VirtualBox doing their own thing.

Reported-by: "Kenneth R. Crudup" <kenny@panix.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h  |    2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c |   38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/module.c    |    6 ++++++
 include/linux/module.h      |    4 ++++
 kernel/module.c             |    5 +++++
 5 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ unsigned int x86_stepping(unsigned int s
 extern void __init cpu_set_core_cap_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 extern void switch_to_sld(unsigned long tifn);
 extern bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
+extern void split_lock_validate_module_text(struct module *me, void *text, void *text_end);
 #else
 static inline void __init cpu_set_core_cap_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {}
 static inline void switch_to_sld(unsigned long tifn) {}
@@ -51,5 +52,6 @@ static inline bool handle_user_split_loc
 {
 	return false;
 }
+static inline void split_lock_validate_module_text(struct module *me, void *text, void *text_end) {}
 #endif
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPU_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
 
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <asm/elf.h>
 #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 #include <asm/cmdline.h>
+#include <asm/insn.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 #include <linux/topology.h>
@@ -1055,12 +1057,46 @@ static void sld_update_msr(bool on)
 {
 	u64 test_ctrl_val = msr_test_ctrl_cache;
 
-	if (on)
+	if (on && (sld_state != sld_off))
 		test_ctrl_val |= MSR_TEST_CTRL_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT;
 
 	wrmsrl(MSR_TEST_CTRL, test_ctrl_val);
 }
 
+static void sld_remote_kill(void *arg)
+{
+	sld_update_msr(false);
+}
+
+void split_lock_validate_module_text(struct module *me, void *text, void *text_end)
+{
+	u8 vmlaunch[] = { 0x0f, 0x01, 0xc2 };
+	struct insn insn;
+
+	if (sld_state == sld_off)
+		return;
+
+	while (text < text_end) {
+		kernel_insn_init(&insn, text, text_end - text);
+		insn_get_length(&insn);
+
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!insn_complete(&insn)))
+			break;
+
+		if (insn.length == sizeof(vmlaunch) && !memcmp(text, vmlaunch, sizeof(vmlaunch)))
+			goto bad_module;
+
+		text += insn.length;
+	}
+
+	return;
+
+bad_module:
+	pr_warn("disabled due to VMLAUNCH in module: %s\n", me->name);
+	sld_state = sld_off;
+	on_each_cpu(sld_remote_kill, NULL, 1);
+}
+
 static void split_lock_init(void)
 {
 	split_lock_verify_msr(sld_state != sld_off);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
 #include <asm/unwind.h>
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
 
 #if 0
 #define DEBUGP(fmt, ...)				\
@@ -253,6 +254,11 @@ int module_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr,
 					    tseg, tseg + text->sh_size);
 	}
 
+	if (text && !me->sld_safe) {
+		void *tseg = (void *)text->sh_addr;
+		split_lock_validate_module_text(me, tseg, tseg + text->sh_size);
+	}
+
 	if (para) {
 		void *pseg = (void *)para->sh_addr;
 		apply_paravirt(pseg, pseg + para->sh_size);
--- a/include/linux/module.h
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
@@ -407,6 +407,10 @@ struct module {
 	bool sig_ok;
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	bool sld_safe;
+#endif
+
 	bool async_probe_requested;
 
 	/* symbols that will be GPL-only in the near future. */
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -3096,6 +3096,11 @@ static int check_modinfo(struct module *
 			"is unknown, you have been warned.\n", mod->name);
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	if (get_modinfo(info, "sld_safe"))
+		mod->sld_safe = true;
+#endif
+
 	err = check_modinfo_livepatch(mod, info);
 	if (err)
 		return err;


  reply	other threads:[~2020-04-02 13:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-02 12:32 [patch 0/2] x86: Prevent Split-Lock-Detection wreckage on VMX hypervisors Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 12:32 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2020-04-02 15:23   ` [patch v2 1/2] x86,module: Detect VMX modules and disable Split-Lock-Detect Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 16:20     ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-04-02 16:25       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 16:39         ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-02 16:41         ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-04-02 17:34           ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 17:51             ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 18:51               ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 20:23                 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 21:04                   ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 21:16                     ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-03  8:09     ` David Laight
2020-04-03 14:33       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 23:42   ` [patch " Rasmus Villemoes
2020-04-03 14:35     ` Jessica Yu
2020-04-03 15:21       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-03 16:01         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-03 16:12           ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-03 16:16             ` David Laight
2020-04-03 16:39               ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-03 16:25             ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-03 16:40               ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-03 16:48                 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-03 17:21                   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-03 18:53         ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-03 20:58           ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-04-03 21:49             ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-03 11:29   ` kbuild test robot
2020-04-03 11:29     ` [patch 1/2] x86, module: " kbuild test robot
2020-04-03 14:43   ` [patch 1/2] x86,module: " kbuild test robot
2020-04-03 14:43     ` [patch 1/2] x86, module: " kbuild test robot
2020-04-03 16:36   ` [patch 1/2] x86,module: " Sean Christopherson
2020-04-03 16:41     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-03 18:35       ` Jessica Yu
2020-04-06 12:23   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-06 14:40     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-06 15:18       ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-06 15:22         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-06 18:27           ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-02 12:33 ` [patch 2/2] x86/kvm/vmx: Prevent split lock detection induced #AC wreckage Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 15:30   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 15:44     ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-02 16:04       ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 16:56     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 15:55   ` [PATCH 0/3] x86: KVM: VMX: Add basic split-lock #AC handling Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 15:55     ` [PATCH 1/3] KVM: x86: Emulate split-lock access as a write in emulator Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 15:55     ` [PATCH 2/3] x86/split_lock: Refactor and export handle_user_split_lock() for KVM Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 17:01       ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 17:19         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 19:06           ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-10  4:39             ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-04-10 10:21               ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-02 15:55     ` [PATCH 3/3] KVM: VMX: Extend VMX's #AC interceptor to handle split lock #AC in guest Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 17:19       ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 17:40         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 20:07           ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 20:36             ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-04-02 20:48             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 20:51             ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 22:27               ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 22:40                 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-02 23:03                   ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 23:08                   ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-02 23:16                     ` Kenneth R. Crudup
2020-04-02 23:18                       ` Jim Mattson
2020-04-03 12:16                         ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-10 10:23     ` [PATCH 0/3] x86: KVM: VMX: Add basic split-lock #AC handling Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-10 11:14       ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 13:43 ` [patch 0/2] x86: Prevent Split-Lock-Detection wreckage on VMX hypervisors Kenneth R. Crudup
2020-04-02 14:32   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 14:41     ` Kenneth R. Crudup
2020-04-02 14:46       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 14:53         ` Kenneth R. Crudup
2020-04-02 14:37   ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 14:47     ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-02 15:11       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 14:53 [patch 1/2] x86,module: Detect VMX modules and disable Split-Lock-Detect Andy Lutomirski
2020-04-02 15:02 ` Kenneth R. Crudup
2020-04-02 16:46   ` Thomas Gleixner

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