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From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: kys@microsoft.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com,
	sthemmin@microsoft.com, wei.liu@kernel.org
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, vkuznets@redhat.com,
	mikelley@microsoft.com, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>,
	stable@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] x86/hyper-v: guard against cpu mask changes in hyperv_flush_tlb_others()
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2020 21:38:14 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201001013814.2435935-1-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)

cpumask can change underneath us, which is generally safe except when we
call into hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(): if cpumask ends up empty we pass
num_cpu_possible() into hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(), causing it to read
garbage. As reported by KASAN:

[   83.504763] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hyperv_flush_tlb_others (include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h:128 arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c:112)
[   83.908636] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888267c01370 by task kworker/u8:2/106
[   84.196669] CPU: 0 PID: 106 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Tainted: G        W         5.4.60 #1
[   84.196669] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS 090008  12/07/2018
[   84.196669] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-8:0)
[   84.196669] Call Trace:
[   84.196669] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:120)
[   84.196669] print_address_description.constprop.0 (mm/kasan/report.c:375)
[   84.196669] __kasan_report.cold (mm/kasan/report.c:507)
[   84.196669] kasan_report (arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h:71 mm/kasan/common.c:635)
[   84.196669] hyperv_flush_tlb_others (include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h:128 arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c:112)
[   84.196669] flush_tlb_mm_range (arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:68 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:798)
[   84.196669] ptep_clear_flush (arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h:586 mm/pgtable-generic.c:88)

Fixes: 0e4c88f37693 ("x86/hyper-v: Use cheaper HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_{LIST,SPACE} hypercalls when possible")
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c
index 5208ba49c89a9..b1d6afc5fc4a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c
@@ -109,7 +109,9 @@ static void hyperv_flush_tlb_others(const struct cpumask *cpus,
 		 * must. We will also check all VP numbers when walking the
 		 * supplied CPU set to remain correct in all cases.
 		 */
-		if (hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(cpumask_last(cpus)) >= 64)
+		int last = cpumask_last(cpus);
+
+		if (last < num_possible_cpus() && hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(last) >= 64)
 			goto do_ex_hypercall;
 
 		for_each_cpu(cpu, cpus) {
-- 
2.25.1


             reply	other threads:[~2020-10-01  1:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-10-01  1:38 Sasha Levin [this message]
2020-10-01  9:40 ` [PATCH] x86/hyper-v: guard against cpu mask changes in hyperv_flush_tlb_others() Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-10-01 11:53   ` Wei Liu
2020-10-01 13:04     ` Sasha Levin
2020-10-03 17:40       ` Michael Kelley
2020-10-05 14:58         ` Wei Liu
2021-01-05 16:59           ` Michael Kelley
2021-01-05 17:10             ` Wei Liu
2021-01-08 15:22             ` Sasha Levin
2020-10-01 13:10     ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2021-08-04 11:23 David Mozes
2021-08-05 18:08 ` Michael Kelley
     [not found] <CA+qYZY3a-FHfWNL2=na6O8TRJYu9kaeyp80VNDxaDTi2EBGoog@mail.gmail.com>
2021-08-06 10:43 ` Michael Kelley
2021-08-06 17:35   ` David Mozes
     [not found]     ` <CAHkVu0-ZCXDRZL92d_G3oKpPuKvmY=YEbu9nbx9vkZHnhHFD8Q@mail.gmail.com>
2021-08-06 21:51       ` Michael Kelley
2021-08-07  5:00         ` David Moses
2021-08-17  9:16           ` David Mozes
2021-08-17 11:29             ` Wei Liu
2021-08-19 11:05               ` David Mozes
     [not found]               ` <CA+qYZY1U04SkyHo7X+rDeE=nUy_X5nxLfShyuLJFzXnFp2A6uw@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]                 ` <VI1PR0401MB24153DEC767B0126B1030E07F1C09@VI1PR0401MB2415.eurprd04.prod.outlook.com>
2021-08-22 15:24                   ` Wei Liu
2021-08-22 16:25                     ` David Mozes
2021-08-22 17:32                       ` Wei Liu

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