All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com>,
	keescook@chromium.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] arm64: Support execute-only permissions with Enhanced PAN
Date: Fri, 27 Nov 2020 18:31:27 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201127183125.GA16839@gaia> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201119185205.GO6882@arm.com>

On Thu, Nov 19, 2020 at 06:52:05PM +0000, Dave P Martin wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 19, 2020 at 01:39:52PM +0000, Vladimir Murzin wrote:
> > Enhanced Privileged Access Never (EPAN) allows Privileged Access Never
> > to be used with Execute-only mappings.
> > 
> > Absence of such support was a reason for 24cecc377463 ("arm64: Revert
> > support for execute-only user mappings"). Thus now it can be revisited
> > and re-enabled.
> > 
> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/arm64/Kconfig                    | 17 +++++++++++++++++
> >  arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h      |  5 +++--
> >  arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h |  5 +++--
> >  arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h      | 14 +++++++++++++-
> >  arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h       |  1 +
> >  arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c        | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
> >  arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                 |  3 +++
> >  7 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> > 
> 
> [...]
> 
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
> > index 1ee9400..b93222e 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
> > @@ -467,6 +467,9 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
> >  	if (faulthandler_disabled() || !mm)
> >  		goto no_context;
> >  
> > +	if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_EPAN))
> > +		vm_flags &= ~VM_EXEC;
> > +
> 
> IIUC, this would be telling __do_page_fault() that the access would have
> succeeded with any kind of permissions except for write access, which
> doesn't seem right.

I always have trouble remembering what the vm_flags does. So
__do_page_fault() checks vma->vm_flags & vm_flags and returns an error
if the intersection is empty. We start with all rwx permission but
modify it further down in the in do_page_fault(): if it was an exec
fault, we set vm_flags to VM_EXEC only as that's what we want to check
against vma->vm_flags; similarly, if it was a write fault, we want to
check VM_WRITE only. If it's neither exec nor a write fault (i.e. a
read), we leave it as rwx since both write and exec (prior to EPAN)
imply read.

With the EPAN patches, exec no longer implies read, so if it's neither
an exec nor a write fault, we want vm_flags to be VM_READ|VM_WRITE since
only write now implies read.

> Also, isn't vm_flags just overwritten by the code after the hunk?
> 
> The logic in __do_page_fault() looks like might not have been written
> with the assumption that there might be more than a single set bit in
> vm_flags.

I think it was, it's checking the intersection. We could do with some
comments in this code, otherwise next time someone asks I'll spend
another 30 min reading the code ;).

-- 
Catalin

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

  reply	other threads:[~2020-11-27 18:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-11-19 13:39 [PATCH 0/2] arm64: Support Enhanced PAN Vladimir Murzin
2020-11-19 13:39 ` [PATCH 1/2] arm64: Support execute-only permissions with " Vladimir Murzin
2020-11-19 18:22   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-19 18:52   ` Dave Martin
2020-11-27 18:31     ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2020-12-02 18:23   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-12-08 11:41     ` Vladimir Murzin
2020-11-19 13:39 ` [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Introduce HWCAPS2_EXECONLY Vladimir Murzin
2020-12-08 16:36   ` Dave Martin
2020-12-08 17:34     ` Catalin Marinas

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20201127183125.GA16839@gaia \
    --to=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=Dave.Martin@arm.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=vladimir.murzin@arm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.