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From: "Liang, Kan" <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [tip: perf/core] perf/x86: Reset the dirty counter to prevent the leak for an RDPMC task
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 2021 15:50:43 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2d470931-a077-5e45-479d-019061c11665@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YHm/M4za2LpRYePw@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>



On 4/16/2021 12:45 PM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 16, 2021 at 03:01:48PM -0000, tip-bot2 for Kan Liang wrote:
>> @@ -2331,6 +2367,9 @@ static void x86_pmu_event_unmapped(struct perf_event *event, struct mm_struct *m
>>   	if (!(event->hw.flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED))
>>   		return;
>>   
>> +	if (x86_pmu.sched_task && event->hw.target)
>> +		perf_sched_cb_dec(event->ctx->pmu);
>> +
>>   	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mm->context.perf_rdpmc_allowed))
>>   		on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(mm), cr4_update_pce, NULL, 1);
>>   }
> 
> 'perf test' on a kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT=y gives:
> 
> [  244.439538] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: perf/1771

If it's a preemptible env, I think we should disable the interrupts and 
preemption to protect the sched_cb_list.

Seems we don't need perf_ctx_lock() here. I don't think we touch the 
area in NMI. I think disabling the interrupts should be good enough to 
protect the cpuctx.

How about the below patch?

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/core.c b/arch/x86/events/core.c
index e34eb72..45630beed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/core.c
@@ -2333,6 +2333,8 @@ static void x86_pmu_clear_dirty_counters(void)

  static void x86_pmu_event_mapped(struct perf_event *event, struct 
mm_struct *mm)
  {
+	unsigned long flags;
+
  	if (!(event->hw.flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED))
  		return;

@@ -2341,8 +2343,10 @@ static void x86_pmu_event_mapped(struct 
perf_event *event, struct mm_struct *mm)
  	 * and clear the existing dirty counters.
  	 */
  	if (x86_pmu.sched_task && event->hw.target) {
+		local_irq_save(flags);
  		perf_sched_cb_inc(event->ctx->pmu);
  		x86_pmu_clear_dirty_counters();
+		local_irq_restore(flags);
  	}

  	/*
@@ -2363,12 +2367,16 @@ static void x86_pmu_event_mapped(struct 
perf_event *event, struct mm_struct *mm)

  static void x86_pmu_event_unmapped(struct perf_event *event, struct 
mm_struct *mm)
  {
+	unsigned long flags;

  	if (!(event->hw.flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED))
  		return;

-	if (x86_pmu.sched_task && event->hw.target)
+	if (x86_pmu.sched_task && event->hw.target) {
+		local_irq_save(flags);
  		perf_sched_cb_dec(event->ctx->pmu);
+		local_irq_restore(flags);
+	}

  	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mm->context.perf_rdpmc_allowed))
  		on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(mm), cr4_update_pce, NULL, 1);

Thanks,
Kan

  reply	other threads:[~2021-04-16 19:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-04-14 14:36 [PATCH V4 1/2] perf/x86: Move cpuc->running into P4 specific code kan.liang
2021-04-14 14:36 ` [PATCH V4 2/2] perf/x86: Reset the dirty counter to prevent the leak for an RDPMC task kan.liang
2021-04-16 15:01   ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Kan Liang
2021-04-16 16:45     ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-04-16 19:50       ` Liang, Kan [this message]
2021-04-16 15:01 ` [tip: perf/core] perf/x86: Move cpuc->running into P4 specific code tip-bot2 for Kan Liang
2021-06-14 17:59 [RESEND PATCH V8] perf/x86: Reset the dirty counter to prevent the leak for an RDPMC task kan.liang
2021-06-18  8:46 ` [tip: perf/core] " tip-bot2 for Kan Liang

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