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From: Andrew Cooper <amc96@srcf.net>
To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>, "Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>,
	Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/4] x86/altcall: Optimise away endbr64 instruction where possible
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2021 19:07:49 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4ee538d8-5063-1bf6-025a-62474be7ab0c@srcf.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3ca82514-2adf-2445-04d1-0020dde16019@suse.com>

On 01/12/2021 08:20, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 26.11.2021 22:22, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> With altcall, we convert indirect branches into direct ones.  With that
>> complete, none of the potential targets need an endbr64 instruction.
> Assuming that no other hooks remain which re-use the same function. I
> think this constraint wants at least mentioning explicitly.

Fair point, but I think it is entirely reasonable to expect logic not to
mix and match altcall on the same hook.

>
>> Furthermore, removing the endbr64 instructions is a security defence-in-depth
>> improvement, because it limits the options available to an attacker who has
>> managed to hijack a function pointer.
>>
>> Introduce a new .init.data.cf_clobber section.  Have _apply_alternatives()
>> walk over the entire section, looking for any pointers into .text, and clobber
>> an endbr64 instruction if found.  This is some minor structure (ab)use but it
>> works alarmingly well.
> Iirc you've said more than once that non-function-pointer data in
> those structures is fine; I'm not convinced. What if a sequence of
> sub-pointer-size fields has a value looking like a pointer into
> .text? This may not be very likely, but would result in corruption
> that may be hard to associate with anything. Of course, with the
> is_endbr64() check and with a build time check of there not being
> any stray ENDBR64 patterns in .text, that issue would disappear.
> But we aren't quite there yet.

I disagree with "not very likely" and put it firmly in the "not
plausible" category.

To cause a problem, you need an aligned something which isn't actually a
function pointer with a bit pattern forming [0xffff82d040200000,
ffff82d04039e1ba) which hits an ENDBR64 pattern.  Removing the stray
ENDBR64's doesn't prevent such a bit pattern pointing at a real (wrong)
function.

These structures are almost exclusively compile time generated.

So yes - it's not impossible, but it's also not going to happen
accidentally.


>
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/alternative.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/alternative.c
>> @@ -173,6 +173,9 @@ text_poke(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len)
>>      return memcpy(addr, opcode, len);
>>  }
>>  
>> +extern unsigned long __initdata_cf_clobber_start[];
>> +extern unsigned long __initdata_cf_clobber_end[];
> const please. I also would find it quite a bit better if these
> were suitably typed such that ...
>
>> @@ -329,6 +332,41 @@ static void init_or_livepatch _apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start,
>>          add_nops(buf + a->repl_len, total_len - a->repl_len);
>>          text_poke(orig, buf, total_len);
>>      }
>> +
>> +    /*
>> +     * Clobber endbr64 instructions now that altcall has finished optimised
>> +     * all indirect branches to direct ones.
>> +     */
>> +    if ( force && cpu_has_xen_ibt )
>> +    {
>> +        unsigned long *val;
>> +        unsigned int clobbered = 0;
>> +
>> +        /*
>> +         * This is some minor structure (ab)use.  We walk the entire contents
>> +         * of .init.data.cf_clobber as if it were an array of pointers.
>> +         *
>> +         * If the pointer points into .text, and has an endbr64 instruction,
>> +         * nop out the endbr64.  This causes the pointer to no longer be a
>> +         * legal indirect branch target under CET-IBT.  This is a
>> +         * defence-in-depth measure, to reduce the options available to an
>> +         * adversary who has managed to hijack a function pointer.
>> +         */
>> +        for ( val = __initdata_cf_clobber_start;
>> +              val < __initdata_cf_clobber_end;
>> +              val++ )
>> +        {
>> +            void *ptr = (void *)*val;
> ... no cast was needed here.

Unless you know what this type is, I already tried and am stuck. 
Everything else requires more horrible casts on val.

>
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
>> @@ -214,6 +214,11 @@ SECTIONS
>>         *(.initcall1.init)
>>         __initcall_end = .;
>>  
>> +       . = ALIGN(POINTER_ALIGN);
>> +        __initdata_cf_clobber_start = .;
>> +	*(.init.data.cf_clobber)
> Nit: hard tab slipped in here.

Will fix.

>
>> --- a/xen/include/xen/init.h
>> +++ b/xen/include/xen/init.h
>> @@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
>>  #define __init_call(lvl)  __used_section(".initcall" lvl ".init")
>>  #define __exit_call       __used_section(".exitcall.exit")
>>  
>> +#define __initdata_cf_clobber __section(".init.data.cf_clobber")
> Just to repeat what I've said elsewhere: I think we want a const
> version of this as well.

I can, but does it really matter?  initconst is merged into initdata and
not actually read-only to begin with.

~Andrew


  reply	other threads:[~2021-12-01 19:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-11-26 21:22 [PATCH 0/4] x86: Further harden function pointers Andrew Cooper
2021-11-26 21:22 ` [PATCH 1/4] x86/altcall: Check and optimise altcall targets Andrew Cooper
2021-12-01  8:10   ` Jan Beulich
2021-12-01 10:20     ` Andrew Cooper
2021-11-26 21:22 ` [PATCH 2/4] x86/altcall: Optimise away endbr64 instruction where possible Andrew Cooper
2021-12-01  8:20   ` Jan Beulich
2021-12-01 19:07     ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2021-12-02  8:01       ` Jan Beulich
2021-12-03 18:41         ` Andrew Cooper
2021-11-26 21:22 ` [PATCH 3/4] xen/xsm: Use __init_data_cf_clobber for xsm_ops Andrew Cooper
2021-12-01  8:21   ` Jan Beulich
2021-12-03 10:32   ` Daniel P. Smith
2021-11-26 21:22 ` [PATCH 4/4] x86/ucode: Use altcall, and __initdata_cf_clobber Andrew Cooper
2021-12-01  8:23   ` Jan Beulich
2021-12-01 19:12     ` Andrew Cooper
2021-11-29  8:51 ` [PATCH 0/4] x86: Further harden function pointers Jan Beulich

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