On 07/18/2017 07:48 AM, Vivek Goyal wrote: > On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 04:50:22PM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote: >> On 07/17/2017 02:58 PM, Vivek Goyal wrote: >>> On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 11:05:11AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote: >>> >>> [..] >>>> +/* >>>> + * xattr_list_userns_rewrite - Rewrite list of xattr names for user namespaces >>>> + * or determine needed size for attribute list >>>> + * in case size == 0 >>>> + * >>>> + * In a user namespace we do not present all extended attributes to the >>>> + * user. We filter out those that are in the list of userns supported xattr. >>>> + * Besides that we filter out those with @uid= when there is no mapping >>>> + * for that uid in the current user namespace. >>>> + * >>>> + * @list: list of 0-byte separated xattr names >>>> + * @size: the size of the list; may be 0 to determine needed list size >>>> + * @list_maxlen: allocated buffer size of list >>>> + */ >>>> +static ssize_t >>>> +xattr_list_userns_rewrite(char *list, ssize_t size, size_t list_maxlen) >>>> +{ >>>> + char *nlist = NULL; >>>> + size_t s_off, len, nlen; >>>> + ssize_t d_off; >>>> + char *name, *newname; >>>> + >>>> + if (!list || size < 0 || current_user_ns() == &init_user_ns) >>> size will never be less than 0 here. Only caller calls this function only >>> if size is >0. So can we remove this? >> Correct. >> >>> What about case of "!list". So if user space called listxattr(foo, NULL, >>> 0), we want to return the size of buffer as if all the xattrs will be >>> returned to user space. But in practice we probably will filter out some >>> xattrs so actually returned string will be smaller than size reported >>> previously. >> This case of size=0 is a problem in userns. Depending on the mapping of the >> userid's the list can expand. A security.foo@uid=100 can become >> security.foo@uid=100000, if the mapping is set up so that uid 100 on the >> host becomes uid 100000 inside the container. So for now we only have >> security.capability and the way I solved this is by allocating a 65k buffer >> when calling from a userns. In this buffer where we gather the xattr names >> and then walk them to determine the size that's needed for the buffer by >> simulating the rewriting. It's not nice but I don't know of any other >> solution. > Hi Stefan, > > For the case of size==0, why don't we iterate through all the xattr, > filter them, remap them and then return the size to process in user > namespace. That should fix this? I thought that's what For the size==0 we need a temp. buffer where the raw xattr names are written to so that the xattr_list_userns_rewrite() can actually rewrite what the filesystem drivers returned. Not knowing exactly how big that buffer should be, I allocate 65k for it. From what I read there is a 64k limit on the vfs layer for xattrs, probably including xattr values. So 65k would for sure be enough also if each one of the xattr names becomes bigger. @@ -922,10 +947,20 @@ vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size, bool rewrite) { struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); ssize_t error; + bool getsize = false; error = security_inode_listxattr(dentry); if (error) return error; + + if (!size) { + if (current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) { + size = 65 * 1024; + list = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + } + getsize = true; + } + if (inode->i_op->listxattr && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { error = -EOPNOTSUPP; error = inode->i_op->listxattr(dentry, list, size); @@ -937,6 +972,9 @@ vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size, bool rewrite) if (error > 0 && rewrite) error = xattr_list_userns_rewrite(list, error, size); + if (getsize) + kfree(list); + return error; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_listxattr); Stefan > xattr_list_userns_rewrite() was doing. But looks like this logic will not > kick in for the case of size==0 due to "!list" condition. > > Also we could probably replace "!list" with "!size" wheverever required. > Its little easy to read and understand. > > For the other case where some xattrs can get filtered out and we report > a buffer size bigger than actually needed, I am hoping that its acceptable > and none of the existing users are broken. > > Thanks > Vivek > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html >