All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "David Herrmann" <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>,
	"Willy Tarreau" <w@1wt.eu>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	netdev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Eric Dumazet" <edumazet@google.com>,
	"Марк Коренберг" <socketpair@gmail.com>,
	"Tetsuo Handa" <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	"Simon McVittie" <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2016 21:32:56 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <56B11278.8000805@stressinduktion.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFw2AwsWbvwp6f8H+eExt_CMfh7VA3od6hto_M0hg9z3Tg@mail.gmail.com>

On 02.02.2016 20:29, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 2, 2016 at 10:29 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa
> <hannes@stressinduktion.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> Anyway, can someone provide a high-level description of what exactly
>>> this patch is supposed to do? Which operation should be limited, who
>>> should inflight FDs be accounted on, and which rlimit should be used
>>> on each operation? I'm having a hard time auditing existing
>>> user-space, given just the scarce description of this commit.
>>
>> Yes, all your observations are true. I think we need to explicitly
>> need to refer to the sending socket while attaching the fds.
>
> I don't think that really helps. Maybe somebody passed a unix domain
> socket around, and now we're crediting the wrong socket again.

I was struggling a bit what you meant but I think you are referring to 
the following scenario:

process-1 opens up a unix socket and passes it to process-2 (this 
process has different credentials) via af-unix. Process-2 then sends 
multiple fds to another destination over this transferred unix-fd.

True, in this case we again account the fds to the wrong process, which 
is bad.

> So how about we actually add a "struct cred *" to the scm_cookie
> itself, and we initialize it to "get_current_cred()". And then always
> use that.

Unfortunately we never transfer a scm_cookie via the skbs but merely use 
it to initialize unix_skb_parms structure in skb->cb and destroy it 
afterwards.

But "struct pid *" in unix_skb_parms should be enough to get us to 
corresponding "struct cred *" so we can decrement the correct counter 
during skb destruction.

So:

We increment current task's unix_inflight and also check the current 
task's limit during attaching fds to skbs and decrement the inflight 
counter via "struct pid *". This looks like it should work.

> That way it's always the person who actually does the send (rather
> than the opener of the socket _or_ the opener of the file that gets
> passed around) that gets credited, and thanks to the cred pointer we
> can then de-credit them properly.

Exactly, I try to implement that. Thanks a lot!

Hannes

  reply	other threads:[~2016-02-02 20:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-01-10  6:54 [PATCH v2] unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets Willy Tarreau
2016-01-10  6:58 ` Willy Tarreau
2016-01-11  5:05 ` David Miller
2016-02-02 17:34 ` David Herrmann
2016-02-02 18:29   ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-02-02 19:29     ` Linus Torvalds
2016-02-02 20:32       ` Hannes Frederic Sowa [this message]
2016-02-02 20:39         ` Willy Tarreau
2016-02-02 21:55           ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
     [not found]             ` <CA+55aFzqdR80MKupCs+va8vtbTU67Jobax1QAbfWNktQCXFxpA@mail.gmail.com>
2016-02-03  0:57               ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-02-03  1:12                 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-02-02 20:44         ` Linus Torvalds
2016-02-02 20:49           ` Willy Tarreau
2016-02-02 20:53             ` Linus Torvalds
2016-02-02 20:58               ` Willy Tarreau
2016-02-02 20:56           ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-02-03 12:19           ` David Laight
2016-02-03 11:36   ` Simon McVittie
2016-02-03 11:56     ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-02-03 11:56     ` David Herrmann
2016-02-03 12:49       ` Simon McVittie
2016-02-03 14:07       ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-01-10  6:58 Willy Tarreau

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=56B11278.8000805@stressinduktion.org \
    --to=hannes@stressinduktion.org \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=dh.herrmann@gmail.com \
    --cc=edumazet@google.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp \
    --cc=simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk \
    --cc=socketpair@gmail.com \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=w@1wt.eu \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.