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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: x86@kernel.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] x86, tls, ldt: Stop checking lm in LDT_empty
Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2015 11:27:58 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <72a059de55e86ad5e2935c80aa91880ddf19d07c.1421954363.git.luto@amacapital.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1421954363.git.luto@amacapital.net>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1421954363.git.luto@amacapital.net>

32-bit programs don't have an lm bit in their ABI, so they can't
reliably cause LDT_empty to return true without resorting to memset.
They shouldn't need to do this.

This should fix a longstanding, if minor, issue in all 64-bit kernels
as well as a potential regression in the TLS hardening code.

Fixes: 41bdc78544b8 x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h | 9 ++-------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h
index 50d033a8947d..fc237fd0259a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h
@@ -251,7 +251,8 @@ static inline void native_load_tls(struct thread_struct *t, unsigned int cpu)
 		gdt[GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + i] = t->tls_array[i];
 }
 
-#define _LDT_empty(info)				\
+/* This intentionally ignores lm, since 32-bit apps don't have that field. */
+#define LDT_empty(info)					\
 	((info)->base_addr		== 0	&&	\
 	 (info)->limit			== 0	&&	\
 	 (info)->contents		== 0	&&	\
@@ -261,12 +262,6 @@ static inline void native_load_tls(struct thread_struct *t, unsigned int cpu)
 	 (info)->seg_not_present	== 1	&&	\
 	 (info)->useable		== 0)
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-#define LDT_empty(info) (_LDT_empty(info) && ((info)->lm == 0))
-#else
-#define LDT_empty(info) (_LDT_empty(info))
-#endif
-
 static inline void clear_LDT(void)
 {
 	set_ldt(NULL, 0);
-- 
2.1.0


  reply	other threads:[~2015-01-22 19:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-01-22 19:27 [PATCH 0/2] x86: TLS regression fixes Andy Lutomirski
2015-01-22 19:27 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2015-01-22 20:13   ` [tip:x86/urgent] x86, tls, ldt: Stop checking lm in LDT_empty tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2015-01-22 19:27 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86, tls: Interpret an all-zero struct user_desc as "no segment" Andy Lutomirski
2015-01-22 19:47   ` Borislav Petkov
2015-01-22 20:12     ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-01-22 20:14   ` [tip:x86/urgent] x86, tls: Interpret an all-zero struct user_desc as %22no segment%22 tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2015-01-22 20:54   ` [tip:x86/urgent] x86, tls: Interpret an all-zero struct user_desc as "no segment" tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2015-01-22 19:56 ` [PATCH 0/2] x86: TLS regression fixes Linus Torvalds

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