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From: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
To: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Cc: linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>,
	Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com>,
	Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
	Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
	Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@canonical.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] Implement /proc/pid/kill
Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2018 18:00:49 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAKOZuevrFxWLY1J1DVPNGaEy8UbkD1r_M9T9FQTOtSrqp-G0qw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181031175448.GC2180@cisco>

On Wed, Oct 31, 2018 at 5:54 PM, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> wrote:
> Why not just use an ioctl() like Jann suggested instead of this big
> security check? Then we avoid the whole setuid writer thing entirely,

Don't you think a system call would be better than a new ioctl? With
either an ioctl or a new system call, though, the shell would need a
helper program to use the facility, whereas with the existing
approach, the shell can use the new facility without any additional
binaries.

> and we can pass the fd around if we want to.

You can pass the FD around today --- specifically, you just pass the
/proc/pid directory FD, not the /proc/pid/kill FD. The /proc/pid
directory FD acts as a process handle. (It's literally a reference to
a struct pid.) Anyone who receives one of these process handle FDs and
who wants to use the corresponding kill file can open the kill fd with
openat(2). What you can't do is pass the /proc/pid/kill FD to another
security context and use it, but when would you ever want to do that?

  reply	other threads:[~2018-10-31 18:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-29 22:10 [RFC PATCH] Implement /proc/pid/kill Daniel Colascione
2018-10-30  3:21 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-30  8:50   ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-30 10:39     ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-30 10:40       ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-30 10:48         ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-30 11:04           ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-30 11:12             ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-30 11:19               ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-31  5:00                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-10-30 17:01     ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-30  5:00 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-30  9:05   ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-30 20:45     ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-30 21:42       ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-30 22:23         ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-30 22:33           ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-30 22:49             ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-31  0:42               ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-31  1:59                 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-30 23:10             ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-30 23:23               ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-30 23:55                 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31  2:56                 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-31  4:24                   ` Joel Fernandes
2018-11-01 20:40                     ` Joel Fernandes
2018-11-02  9:46                       ` Christian Brauner
2018-11-02 14:34                         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-10-31  0:57               ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-31  1:56                 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31  4:47   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-10-31  4:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-10-31 12:44   ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-10-31 13:27     ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 15:10       ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-10-31 15:16         ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 15:49           ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-11-01 11:53       ` David Laight
2018-11-01 15:50         ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 14:37 ` [PATCH v2] " Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 15:05   ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-31 17:33     ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-31 21:47       ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-31 15:59 ` [PATCH v3] " Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 17:54   ` Tycho Andersen
2018-10-31 18:00     ` Daniel Colascione [this message]
2018-10-31 18:17       ` Tycho Andersen
2018-10-31 19:33         ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 20:06           ` Tycho Andersen
2018-11-01 11:33           ` David Laight
2018-11-12  1:19             ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-10-31 16:22 ` [RFC PATCH] " Jann Horn
2018-11-01  4:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-12 23:13 ` Pavel Machek

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