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From: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
To: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.10] KVM: x86: Forcibly leave nested virt when SMM state is toggled
Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2022 18:45:30 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YfwUuiOPjiQ2/EH1@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220201230427.2311393-1-tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>

On Tue, Feb 01, 2022 at 03:04:27PM -0800, Tadeusz Struk wrote:
> From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> 
> Commit f7e570780efc5cec9b2ed1e0472a7da14e864fdb upstream.
> 
> Please apply it to 5.10.y. It fixes the following syzbot issue:
> Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=c46ee6f22a68171154cdd9217216b2a02cf4b71c
> 
> Forcibly leave nested virtualization operation if userspace toggles SMM
> state via KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS or KVM_SYNC_X86_EVENTS.  If userspace
> forces the vCPU out of SMM while it's post-VMXON and then injects an SMI,
> vmx_enter_smm() will overwrite vmx->nested.smm.vmxon and end up with both
> vmxon=false and smm.vmxon=false, but all other nVMX state allocated.
> 
> Don't attempt to gracefully handle the transition as (a) most transitions
> are nonsencial, e.g. forcing SMM while L2 is running, (b) there isn't
> sufficient information to handle all transitions, e.g. SVM wants access
> to the SMRAM save state, and (c) KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS must precede
> KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE during state restore as the latter disallows putting
> the vCPU into L2 if SMM is active, and disallows tagging the vCPU as
> being post-VMXON in SMM if SMM is not active.
> 
> Abuse of KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS manifests as a WARN and memory leak in nVMX
> due to failure to free vmcs01's shadow VMCS, but the bug goes far beyond
> just a memory leak, e.g. toggling SMM on while L2 is active puts the vCPU
> in an architecturally impossible state.
> 
>   WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3606 at free_loaded_vmcs arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2665 [inline]
>   WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3606 at free_loaded_vmcs+0x158/0x1a0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2656
>   Modules linked in:
>   CPU: 1 PID: 3606 Comm: syz-executor725 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
>   Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
>   RIP: 0010:free_loaded_vmcs arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2665 [inline]
>   RIP: 0010:free_loaded_vmcs+0x158/0x1a0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2656
>   Code: <0f> 0b eb b3 e8 8f 4d 9f 00 e9 f7 fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 92 4d 9f 00
>   Call Trace:
>    <TASK>
>    kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x72/0x2f0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11123
>    kvm_vcpu_destroy arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:441 [inline]
>    kvm_destroy_vcpus+0x11f/0x290 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:460
>    kvm_free_vcpus arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11564 [inline]
>    kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x2e8/0x470 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11676
>    kvm_destroy_vm arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1217 [inline]
>    kvm_put_kvm+0x4fa/0xb00 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1250
>    kvm_vm_release+0x3f/0x50 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1273
>    __fput+0x286/0x9f0 fs/file_table.c:311
>    task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164
>    exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:32 [inline]
>    do_exit+0xb29/0x2a30 kernel/exit.c:806
>    do_group_exit+0xd2/0x2f0 kernel/exit.c:935
>    get_signal+0x4b0/0x28c0 kernel/signal.c:2862
>    arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x2a9/0x1c40 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:868
>    handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:148 [inline]
>    exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:172 [inline]
>    exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x17d/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:207
>    __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:289 [inline]
>    syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:300
>    do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
>    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
>    </TASK>
> 
> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
> Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
> Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
> 
> Backported-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>

Nit, this should be "signed-off-by:" no need to make up new tags like
this.

thanks,

greg k-h

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-02-03 17:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-01 23:04 [PATCH 5.10] KVM: x86: Forcibly leave nested virt when SMM state is toggled Tadeusz Struk
2022-02-02  7:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-02-03 17:45 ` Greg KH [this message]
2022-02-03 18:05 Tadeusz Struk

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