Re: [patch] perf tool buffer overflow in perf_header__read_build_ids

[Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>]

On Fri, 26 Jul 2019, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote:

> Em Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 04:42:30PM -0400, Vince Weaver escreveu:
> > my perf_tool_fuzzer has found another issue, this one a buffer overflow
> > in perf_header__read_build_ids.  The build id filename is read in with a 
> > filename length read from the perf.data file, but this can be longer than
> > PATH_MAX which will smash the stack.
> > 
> > This might not be the right fix, not sure if filename should be NUL
> > terminated or not.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
> > 
> > diff --git a/tools/perf/util/header.c b/tools/perf/util/header.c
> > index c24db7f4909c..9a893a26e678 100644
> > --- a/tools/perf/util/header.c
> > +++ b/tools/perf/util/header.c
> > @@ -2001,6 +2001,9 @@ static int perf_header__read_build_ids(struct perf_header *header,
> >  			perf_event_header__bswap(&bev.header);
> >  
> >  		len = bev.header.size - sizeof(bev);
> > +
> > +		if (len>PATH_MAX) len=PATH_MAX;
> > +
> 
> Humm, I wonder if we shouldn't just declare the whole file invalid like
> you did with the previous patch?
> 
> - Arnaldo
> 
> >  		if (readn(input, filename, len) != len)
> >  			goto out;
> >  		/*
 
did we ever decide how to fix this issue?  Or were you waiting on a 
followup patch from me?

This is actually an exploitable security bug if you can convince someone 
to run "perf" on an untrusted perf.data file.

Vince