From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: rgb@redhat.com (Richard Guy Briggs) Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 06:12:55 -0400 Subject: [PATCH V3 04/10] capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org Introduce inline root_privileged() to make use of SECURE_NONROOT easier to read. Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs --- security/commoncap.c | 9 +++++---- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 028d4e4..36c38a1 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -481,13 +481,13 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_f return rc; } +static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); } + void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap, bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid) { const struct cred *old = current_cred(); struct cred *new = bprm->cred; - if (issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) - return; /* * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it @@ -544,7 +544,8 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0); - handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid); + if (root_privileged()) + handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid); /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ if (cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) @@ -612,7 +613,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) { if (!cap_full(effective, new) || !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) || - issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { + !root_privileged()) { ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); if (ret < 0) return ret; -- 1.7.1 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info@ http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Richard Guy Briggs Subject: [PATCH V3 04/10] capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 06:12:55 -0400 Message-ID: References: Return-path: In-Reply-To: In-Reply-To: References: Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com Cc: Richard Guy Briggs , Andy Lutomirski , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Kees Cook , James Morris , Eric Paris , Paul Moore , Steve Grubb List-Id: linux-audit@redhat.com Introduce inline root_privileged() to make use of SECURE_NONROOT easier to read. Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs --- security/commoncap.c | 9 +++++---- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 028d4e4..36c38a1 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -481,13 +481,13 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_f return rc; } +static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); } + void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap, bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid) { const struct cred *old = current_cred(); struct cred *new = bprm->cred; - if (issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) - return; /* * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it @@ -544,7 +544,8 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0); - handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid); + if (root_privileged()) + handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid); /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ if (cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) @@ -612,7 +613,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) { if (!cap_full(effective, new) || !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) || - issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { + !root_privileged()) { ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); if (ret < 0) return ret; -- 1.7.1