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From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>,
	"joao@overdrivepizza.com" <joao@overdrivepizza.com>
Cc: "peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"keescook@chromium.org" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"hjl.tools@gmail.com" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	"Cooper, Andrew" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	"Poimboe, Josh" <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	"samitolvanen@google.com" <samitolvanen@google.com>,
	"mark.rutland@arm.com" <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"alyssa.milburn@linux.intel.com" <alyssa.milburn@linux.intel.com>,
	"gabriel.gomes@linux.intel.com" <gabriel.gomes@linux.intel.com>,
	"ndesaulniers@google.com" <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 00/11] Kernel FineIBT Support
Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2022 23:34:20 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e57e01bb682da9443d0ad6e29eeb69dac22e2ffa.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220420004241.2093-1-joao@overdrivepizza.com>

On Tue, 2022-04-19 at 17:42 -0700, joao@overdrivepizza.com wrote:
> A debatable point is the fact that on FineIBT the checks are made on
> the callee
> side. On a quick look, this seems to be cool because it allows strict
> reachability refinement of more security-critical functions (like
> hardware
> feature disabling ones) while still allowing other less critical
> functions to be
> relaxed/coarse-grained; under caller-side checks, if one single
> function is
> required to be relaxed, this leads into an indirect call instruction
> being
> relaxed, then becoming a branch capable of reaching all the functions
> in the
> executable address space, including those considered security-
> critical. Inputs
> and opinions on this are very welcome, as there are other
> perspectives about
> this I might be missing.

One minor point: In the course IBT implementation there are places in
the kernel where IBT is toggled because of missing endbranches (calling
into BIOS). So for caller checked solutions, these calls would probably
need to be annotated or something such that caller checks were not
generated.

I haven't been following kCFI, so apologies if this is already handled
somehow.

      parent reply	other threads:[~2022-04-20 23:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-20  0:42 [RFC PATCH 00/11] Kernel FineIBT Support joao
2022-04-20  0:42 ` [RFC PATCH 01/11] x86: kernel FineIBT joao
2022-04-29  1:37   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-05-02 17:17     ` Joao Moreira
2022-05-03 22:02       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-05-04  2:19         ` Joao Moreira
2022-05-04 10:20         ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-05-04 17:04           ` Peter Collingbourne
2022-05-04 18:16             ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-05-05  0:28               ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-05-05  7:36                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-05-08  8:29               ` Kees Cook
2022-05-09 11:22                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-04-20  0:42 ` [RFC PATCH 02/11] kbuild: Support FineIBT build joao
2022-04-20  0:42 ` [RFC PATCH 03/11] objtool: Support FineIBT offset fixes joao
2022-04-20  8:23   ` kernel test robot
2022-04-20  0:42 ` [RFC PATCH 04/11] x86/module: Support FineIBT in modules joao
2022-04-20  0:42 ` [RFC PATCH 05/11] x86/text-patching: Support FineIBT text-patching joao
2022-04-20  0:42 ` [RFC PATCH 06/11] x86/bpf: Support FineIBT joao
2022-04-20  0:42 ` [RFC PATCH 07/11] x86/lib: Prevent UACCESS call warning from objtool joao
2022-04-20  0:42 ` [RFC PATCH 08/11] x86/ibt: Add CET_TEST module for IBT testing joao
2022-04-20  0:42 ` [RFC PATCH 09/11] x86/FineIBT: Add FINEIBT_TEST module joao
2022-04-20  0:42 ` [RFC PATCH 10/11] linux/interrupt: Fix prototype matching property joao
2022-04-20  2:45   ` Kees Cook
2022-04-20 22:14     ` Joao Moreira
2022-04-20  0:42 ` [RFC PATCH 11/11] driver/int3400_thermal: Fix prototype matching joao
2022-04-20  2:55   ` Kees Cook
2022-04-20 22:28     ` Joao Moreira
2022-04-20 23:04       ` Kees Cook
2022-04-20 23:12         ` Joao Moreira
2022-04-20 23:25           ` Kees Cook
2022-04-21  0:28             ` Joao Moreira
2022-04-20  2:42 ` [RFC PATCH 00/11] Kernel FineIBT Support Kees Cook
2022-04-20 22:50   ` Joao Moreira
2022-04-20  7:40 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-04-20 15:17   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-04-20 17:12     ` Nick Desaulniers
2022-04-20 22:40       ` Joao Moreira
2022-04-21  7:49         ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-04-21 15:23           ` Joao Moreira
2022-04-21 15:35             ` H.J. Lu
2022-04-21 22:11               ` Fangrui Song
2022-04-21 22:26                 ` H.J. Lu
2022-04-20 23:34 ` Edgecombe, Rick P [this message]

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