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From: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>,
	Linux Security Module list 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 02/10] bpf: lsm: Add a skeleton and config options
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 13:52:56 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200116125256.GE240584@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <7b11f92b-259f-f2e1-924c-5c0518f49b3f@schaufler-ca.com>

On 15-Jan 23:04, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 1/15/2020 9:13 AM, KP Singh wrote:
> > From: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
> >
> > The LSM can be enabled by CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF.
> > Without CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF_ENFORCE, the LSM will run the
> > attached eBPF programs but not enforce MAC policy based
> > on the return value of the attached programs.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
> > ---
> >  MAINTAINERS           |  7 +++++++
> >  security/Kconfig      | 11 ++++++-----
> >  security/Makefile     |  2 ++
> >  security/bpf/Kconfig  | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  security/bpf/Makefile |  5 +++++
> >  security/bpf/lsm.c    | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  6 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> >  create mode 100644 security/bpf/Kconfig
> >  create mode 100644 security/bpf/Makefile
> >  create mode 100644 security/bpf/lsm.c
> >
> > diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
> > index 66a2e5e07117..0941f478cfa5 100644
> > --- a/MAINTAINERS
> > +++ b/MAINTAINERS
> > @@ -3203,6 +3203,13 @@ S:	Supported
> >  F:	arch/x86/net/
> >  X:	arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
> >  
> > +BPF SECURITY MODULE
> > +M:	KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>
> > +L:	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
> > +L:	bpf@vger.kernel.org
> > +S:	Maintained
> > +F:	security/bpf/
> > +
> >  BROADCOM B44 10/100 ETHERNET DRIVER
> >  M:	Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
> >  L:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
> > diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> > index 2a1a2d396228..6f1aab195e7d 100644
> > --- a/security/Kconfig
> > +++ b/security/Kconfig
> > @@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig"
> >  source "security/apparmor/Kconfig"
> >  source "security/loadpin/Kconfig"
> >  source "security/yama/Kconfig"
> > +source "security/bpf/Kconfig"
> >  source "security/safesetid/Kconfig"
> >  source "security/lockdown/Kconfig"
> >  
> > @@ -277,11 +278,11 @@ endchoice
> >  
> >  config LSM
> >  	string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
> > -	default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
> > -	default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
> > -	default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
> > -	default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
> > -	default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor"
> > +	default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
> > +	default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
> > +	default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
> > +	default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
> > +	default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf"
> >  	help
> >  	  A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
> >  	  Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be
> > diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
> > index be1dd9d2cb2f..50e6821dd7b7 100644
> > --- a/security/Makefile
> > +++ b/security/Makefile
> > @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)		+= yama
> >  subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN)	+= loadpin
> >  subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID)    += safesetid
> >  subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM)	+= lockdown
> > +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF)		+= bpf
> >  
> >  # always enable default capabilities
> >  obj-y					+= commoncap.o
> > @@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)		+= yama/
> >  obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN)		+= loadpin/
> >  obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID)       += safesetid/
> >  obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM)	+= lockdown/
> > +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF)		+= bpf/
> >  obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)		+= device_cgroup.o
> >  
> >  # Object integrity file lists
> > diff --git a/security/bpf/Kconfig b/security/bpf/Kconfig
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..a5f6c67ae526
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/security/bpf/Kconfig
> > @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
> > +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +#
> > +# Copyright 2019 Google LLC.
> > +
> > +config SECURITY_BPF
> > +	bool "BPF-based MAC and audit policy"
> > +	depends on SECURITY
> > +	depends on BPF_SYSCALL
> > +	help
> > +	  This enables instrumentation of the security hooks with
> > +	  eBPF programs.
> > +
> > +	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
> > +
> > +config SECURITY_BPF_ENFORCE
> > +	bool "Deny operations based on the evaluation of the attached programs"
> > +	depends on SECURITY_BPF
> > +	help
> > +	  eBPF programs attached to hooks can be used for both auditing and
> > +	  enforcement. Enabling enforcement implies that the evaluation result
> > +	  from the attached eBPF programs will allow or deny the operation
> > +	  guarded by the security hook.
> > diff --git a/security/bpf/Makefile b/security/bpf/Makefile
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..26a0ab6f99b7
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/security/bpf/Makefile
> > @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
> > +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +#
> > +# Copyright 2019 Google LLC.
> > +
> > +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF) := lsm.o
> > diff --git a/security/bpf/lsm.c b/security/bpf/lsm.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..5c5c14f990ce
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/security/bpf/lsm.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Copyright 2019 Google LLC.
> > + */
> > +
> > +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
> > +
> > +/* This is only for internal hooks, always statically shipped as part of the
> > + * BPF LSM. Statically defined hooks are appeneded to the security_hook_heads
> > + * which is common for LSMs and R/O after init.
> > + */
> > +static struct security_hook_list lsm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {};
> 
> s/lsm_hooks/bpf_hooks/
> 
> The lsm prefix is for the infrastructure. The way you have it is massively confusing.

Good point, I changed this to bpf_lsm_hooks as we prefix most types
with bpf_lsm_

> 
> > +
> > +static int __init lsm_init(void)
> 
> s/lsm_init/bpf_init/
> 
> Same reason. When I'm looking at several security modules at once I
> need to be able to tell them apart.

Changed to bpf_lsm_init.

> 
> > +{
> > +	security_add_hooks(lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lsm_hooks), "bpf");
> > +	pr_info("eBPF and LSM are friends now.\n");
> 
> Cute message, but not very informative if you haven't read the code.
> "LSM support for eBPF active\n" is more likely to be comprehensible.

Agreed, Updated :)

- KP

> 
> > +	return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +DEFINE_LSM(bpf) = {
> > +	.name = "bpf",
> > +	.init = lsm_init,
> > +};
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2020-01-16 12:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-01-15 17:13 [PATCH bpf-next v2 00/10] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI) KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:13 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 01/10] bpf: btf: Make some of the API visible outside BTF KP Singh
2020-01-18 12:44   ` kbuild test robot
2020-01-20 11:00     ` KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:13 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 02/10] bpf: lsm: Add a skeleton and config options KP Singh
2020-01-16  7:04   ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-16 12:52     ` KP Singh [this message]
2020-01-15 17:13 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 03/10] bpf: lsm: Introduce types for eBPF based LSM KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:13 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 04/10] bpf: lsm: Add mutable hooks list for the BPF LSM KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:30   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-16  9:48     ` KP Singh
2020-01-16  6:33   ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-16 10:19     ` KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:13 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 05/10] bpf: lsm: BTF API for LSM hooks KP Singh
2020-01-17  0:28   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-01-20 11:10     ` KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:13 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 06/10] bpf: lsm: Implement attach, detach and execution KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:24   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-01-16  9:45     ` KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:13 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 07/10] bpf: lsm: Make the allocated callback RO+X KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:13 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 08/10] tools/libbpf: Add support for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM KP Singh
2020-01-15 21:19   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-01-15 21:37     ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-01-16 12:49     ` KP Singh
2020-01-16 17:26       ` KP Singh
2020-01-16 19:10       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-01-17 22:16         ` KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:13 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 09/10] bpf: lsm: Add selftests " KP Singh
2020-01-15 17:13 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 10/10] bpf: lsm: Add Documentation KP Singh
2020-01-15 22:12 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 00/10] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI) Andrii Nakryiko
2020-01-20 11:12   ` KP Singh
2020-01-16 10:03 ` Brendan Jackman

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