From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huaweicloud.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>, Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@chromium.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v3 00/11] Add check for bpf lsm return value
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2024 20:27:41 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240411122752.2873562-1-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com> (raw)
From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
A bpf prog returning positive number attached to file_alloc_security hook
will make kernel panic.
Here is a panic log:
[ 441.235774] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000009
[ 441.236748] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[ 441.237429] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[ 441.238119] PGD 800000000b02f067 P4D 800000000b02f067 PUD b031067 PMD 0
[ 441.238990] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 441.239546] CPU: 0 PID: 347 Comm: loader Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6-gafe0cbf23373 #22
[ 441.240496] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b4
[ 441.241933] RIP: 0010:alloc_file+0x4b/0x190
[ 441.242485] Code: 8b 04 25 c0 3c 1f 00 48 8b b0 30 0c 00 00 e8 9c fe ff ff 48 3d 00 f0 ff fb
[ 441.244820] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000c67c40 EFLAGS: 00010203
[ 441.245484] RAX: ffff888006a891a0 RBX: ffffffff8223bd00 RCX: 0000000035b08000
[ 441.246391] RDX: ffff88800b95f7b0 RSI: 00000000001fc110 RDI: f089cd0b8088ffff
[ 441.247294] RBP: ffffc90000c67c58 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 441.248209] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
[ 441.249108] R13: ffffc90000c67c78 R14: ffffffff8223bd00 R15: fffffffffffffff4
[ 441.250007] FS: 00000000005f3300(0000) GS:ffff88803ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 441.251053] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 441.251788] CR2: 00000000000001a9 CR3: 000000000bdc4003 CR4: 0000000000170ef0
[ 441.252688] Call Trace:
[ 441.253011] <TASK>
[ 441.253296] ? __die+0x24/0x70
[ 441.253702] ? page_fault_oops+0x15b/0x480
[ 441.254236] ? fixup_exception+0x26/0x330
[ 441.254750] ? exc_page_fault+0x6d/0x1c0
[ 441.255257] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
[ 441.255792] ? alloc_file+0x4b/0x190
[ 441.256257] alloc_file_pseudo+0x9f/0xf0
[ 441.256760] __anon_inode_getfile+0x87/0x190
[ 441.257311] ? lock_release+0x14e/0x3f0
[ 441.257808] bpf_link_prime+0xe8/0x1d0
[ 441.258315] bpf_tracing_prog_attach+0x311/0x570
[ 441.258916] ? __pfx_bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security+0x10/0x10
[ 441.259605] __sys_bpf+0x1bb7/0x2dc0
[ 441.260070] __x64_sys_bpf+0x20/0x30
[ 441.260533] do_syscall_64+0x72/0x140
[ 441.261004] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[ 441.261643] RIP: 0033:0x4b0349
[ 441.262045] Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 88
[ 441.264355] RSP: 002b:00007fff74daee38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
[ 441.265293] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fff74daef30 RCX: 00000000004b0349
[ 441.266187] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00007fff74daee50 RDI: 000000000000001c
[ 441.267114] RBP: 000000000000001b R08: 00000000005ef820 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 441.268018] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004
[ 441.268907] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00000000005ef018 R15: 00000000004004e8
The reason is that the positive number returned by bpf prog is not a
valid errno, and could not be filtered out with IS_ERR which is used by
the file system to check errors. As a result, the filesystem mistakenly
uses this random positive number as file pointer, causing panic.
To fix this issue, there are two schemes:
1. Modify the calling sites of file_alloc_security to take positive
return values as zero.
2. Make the bpf verifier to ensure no unpredicted value returned by
lsm bpf prog.
Considering that hook file_alloc_security never returned positive number
before bpf lsm was introduced, and other lsm hooks may have the same
problem, scheme 2 is more reasonable.
So this series adds lsm return value check in verifier to fix it.
v3:
1. Fix incorrect lsm hook return value ranges, and add disabled hook
list for bpf lsm, and merge two LSM_RET_INT patches. (KP Singh)
2. Avoid bpf lsm progs attached to different hooks to call each other
with tail call
3. Fix a CI failure caused by false rejection of AND operation
4. Add tests
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240325095653.1720123-1-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com/
fix bpf ci failure
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240316122359.1073787-1-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com/
Xu Kuohai (11):
bpf, lsm: Annotate lsm hook return value range
bpf, lsm: Add helper to read lsm hook return value range
bpf, lsm: Check bpf lsm hook return values in verifier
bpf, lsm: Add bpf lsm disabled hook list
bpf: Avoid progs for different hooks calling each other with tail call
bpf: Fix compare error in function retval_range_within
bpf: Fix a false rejection caused by AND operation
selftests/bpf: Avoid load failure for token_lsm.c
selftests/bpf: Add return value checks for failed tests
selftests/bpf: Add test for lsm tail call
selftests/bpf: Add verifier tests for bpf lsm
include/linux/bpf.h | 2 +
include/linux/bpf_lsm.h | 8 +
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 591 +++++++++---------
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 -
kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 84 ++-
kernel/bpf/btf.c | 5 +-
kernel/bpf/core.c | 22 +-
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 82 ++-
security/security.c | 1 +
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_lsm.c | 46 +-
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c | 3 +-
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/err.h | 10 +
.../selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_tailcall.c | 34 +
.../selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c | 4 +
.../bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c | 8 +-
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/token_lsm.c | 4 +-
.../bpf/progs/verifier_global_subprogs.c | 7 +-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_lsm.c | 155 +++++
18 files changed, 754 insertions(+), 318 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_tailcall.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_lsm.c
--
2.30.2
next reply other threads:[~2024-04-11 12:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-11 12:27 Xu Kuohai [this message]
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 01/11] bpf, lsm: Annotate lsm hook return value range Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 02/11] bpf, lsm: Add helper to read " Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 03/11] bpf, lsm: Check bpf lsm hook return values in verifier Xu Kuohai
2024-04-13 11:44 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 04/11] bpf, lsm: Add bpf lsm disabled hook list Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 05/11] bpf: Avoid progs for different hooks calling each other with tail call Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 06/11] bpf: Fix compare error in function retval_range_within Xu Kuohai
2024-04-12 8:53 ` Shung-Hsi Yu
2024-04-12 8:53 ` [Bpf] " Shung-Hsi Yu
2024-04-25 23:41 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-04-26 8:08 ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 07/11] bpf: Fix a false rejection caused by AND operation Xu Kuohai
2024-04-19 23:00 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-04-20 8:33 ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-23 21:55 ` Yonghong Song
2024-04-24 2:25 ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-24 22:06 ` Yonghong Song
2024-04-25 2:42 ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-25 16:28 ` Yonghong Song
2024-04-26 7:43 ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-26 20:36 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-04-28 15:15 ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-29 20:58 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-04-29 22:18 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-04-30 3:56 ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-30 3:54 ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-29 21:56 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 08/11] selftests/bpf: Avoid load failure for token_lsm.c Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 09/11] selftests/bpf: Add return value checks for failed tests Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 10/11] selftests/bpf: Add test for lsm tail call Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 11/11] selftests/bpf: Add verifier tests for bpf lsm Xu Kuohai
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