From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
To: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>,
Kernel Team <kernel-team@meta.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 2/3] bpf: don't require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for getting NEXT_ID
Date: Wed, 24 May 2023 20:22:55 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAADnVQJ1UEDVH6L=CEjbAudgKmDbp26=-3AfU0sFA_j92Dhn7Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230524225421.1587859-3-andrii@kernel.org>
On Wed, May 24, 2023 at 3:55 PM Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> Getting ID of map/prog/btf/link doesn't give any access to underlying
> BPF objects, so there is no point in requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN for these
> commands.
I don't think it's a good idea to allow unpriv to figure out
all prog/map/btf/link IDs.
Since unpriv is typically disabled it's not a security issue,
but rather a concern over abuse of IDR logic and potential
for exploits in *get_next_id() code.
At least CAP_BPF is needed.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-05-25 3:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-05-24 22:54 [PATCH bpf-next 0/3] Relax checks for unprivileged bpf() commands Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-24 22:54 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/3] bpf: drop unnecessary bpf_capable() check in BPF_MAP_FREEZE command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-24 22:54 ` [PATCH bpf-next 2/3] bpf: don't require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for getting NEXT_ID Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-25 3:22 ` Alexei Starovoitov [this message]
2023-05-25 17:04 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-25 17:11 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-05-25 17:30 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-24 22:54 ` [PATCH bpf-next 3/3] bpf: don't require bpf_capable() for GET_INFO_BY_FD Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-25 13:13 ` Daniel Borkmann
2023-05-25 17:20 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-25 19:49 ` Daniel Borkmann
2023-05-25 17:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 0/3] Relax checks for unprivileged bpf() commands patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
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