From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
To: Yi He <clangllvm@126.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>, Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Add a sysctl option to disable bpf offensive helpers.
Date: Sat, 10 Jun 2023 08:37:28 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAADnVQLoDnBAhi+vOVL6+9KtLr30BLXptn0jtr3Sek2NmBTDww@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230610110518.123183-1-clangllvm@126.com>
On Sat, Jun 10, 2023 at 4:21 AM Yi He <clangllvm@126.com> wrote:
>
> Some eBPF helper functions have been long regarded as problematic[1].
> More than just used for powerful rootkit, these features can also be
> exploited to harm the containers by perform various attacks to the
> processes outside the container in the enrtire VM, such as process
> DoS, information theft, and container escape.
>
> When a container is granted to run eBPF tracing programs (which
> need CAP_SYS_ADMIN), it can use the eBPF KProbe programs to hijack the
> process outside the contianer and to escape the containers. This kind
> of risks is limited as privieleged containers are warned and can hardly
> be accessed by the attackers.
>
> Even without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, since Linux 5.6, programs with with CAP_BPF +
> CAP_PERFMON can use dangerous eBPF helpers such as bpf_read_user to steal
> sensitive data (e.g., sshd/nginx private key) in other containers.
You can do the same completely without BPF and with just CAP_PERFMON.
I'm not going to share how, because you'll write a "security paper"
about insecure linux just like last time:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230117151256.605977-1-clangllvm@126.com/
Note, our answers didn't change. Look for security glory somewhere else.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-10 15:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-10 11:05 [PATCH] Add a sysctl option to disable bpf offensive helpers Yi He
2023-06-10 15:07 ` Stephen Hemminger
2023-06-10 15:37 ` Alexei Starovoitov [this message]
2023-06-10 15:26 Yi He
2023-06-12 4:18 ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-06-12 15:01 ` KP Singh
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