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From: xiubli@redhat.com
To: idryomov@gmail.com, ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: vshankar@redhat.com, mchangir@redhat.com, Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v5 1/6] ceph: save the cap_auths in client when session being opened
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2024 22:20:14 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240418142019.133191-2-xiubli@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240418142019.133191-1-xiubli@redhat.com>

From: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>

Save the cap_auths, which have been parsed by the MDS, in the opened
session.

URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/61333
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
---
 fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 fs/ceph/mds_client.h |  21 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
index 8651d5a63dbb..0e26bc90457c 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
@@ -4140,10 +4140,13 @@ static void handle_session(struct ceph_mds_session *session,
 	void *p = msg->front.iov_base;
 	void *end = p + msg->front.iov_len;
 	struct ceph_mds_session_head *h;
-	u32 op;
+	struct ceph_mds_cap_auth *cap_auths = NULL;
+	u32 op, cap_auths_num = 0;
 	u64 seq, features = 0;
 	int wake = 0;
 	bool blocklisted = false;
+	u32 i;
+
 
 	/* decode */
 	ceph_decode_need(&p, end, sizeof(*h), bad);
@@ -4188,7 +4191,103 @@ static void handle_session(struct ceph_mds_session *session,
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (msg_version >= 6) {
+		ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, cap_auths_num, bad);
+		doutc(cl, "cap_auths_num %d\n", cap_auths_num);
+
+		if (cap_auths_num && op != CEPH_SESSION_OPEN) {
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(op != CEPH_SESSION_OPEN);
+			goto skip_cap_auths;
+		}
+
+		cap_auths = kcalloc(cap_auths_num,
+				    sizeof(struct ceph_mds_cap_auth),
+				    GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!cap_auths) {
+			pr_err_client(cl, "No memory for cap_auths\n");
+			return;
+		}
+
+		for (i = 0; i < cap_auths_num; i++) {
+			u32 _len, j;
+
+			/* struct_v, struct_compat, and struct_len in MDSCapAuth */
+			ceph_decode_skip_n(&p, end, 2 + sizeof(u32), bad);
+
+			/* struct_v, struct_compat, and struct_len in MDSCapMatch */
+			ceph_decode_skip_n(&p, end, 2 + sizeof(u32), bad);
+			ceph_decode_64_safe(&p, end, cap_auths[i].match.uid, bad);
+			ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, _len, bad);
+			if (_len) {
+				cap_auths[i].match.gids = kcalloc(_len, sizeof(int32_t),
+								  GFP_KERNEL);
+				if (!cap_auths[i].match.gids) {
+					pr_err_client(cl, "No memory for gids\n");
+					goto fail;
+				}
+
+				cap_auths[i].match.num_gids = _len;
+				for (j = 0; j < _len; j++)
+					ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end,
+							    cap_auths[i].match.gids[j],
+							    bad);
+			}
+
+			ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, _len, bad);
+			if (_len) {
+				cap_auths[i].match.path = kcalloc(_len + 1, sizeof(char),
+								  GFP_KERNEL);
+				if (!cap_auths[i].match.path) {
+					pr_err_client(cl, "No memory for path\n");
+					goto fail;
+				}
+				ceph_decode_copy(&p, cap_auths[i].match.path, _len);
+
+				/* Remove the tailing '/' */
+				while (_len && cap_auths[i].match.path[_len - 1] == '/') {
+					cap_auths[i].match.path[_len - 1] = '\0';
+					_len -= 1;
+				}
+			}
+
+			ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, _len, bad);
+			if (_len) {
+				cap_auths[i].match.fs_name = kcalloc(_len + 1, sizeof(char),
+								     GFP_KERNEL);
+				if (!cap_auths[i].match.fs_name) {
+					pr_err_client(cl, "No memory for fs_name\n");
+					goto fail;
+				}
+				ceph_decode_copy(&p, cap_auths[i].match.fs_name, _len);
+			}
+
+			ceph_decode_8_safe(&p, end, cap_auths[i].match.root_squash, bad);
+			ceph_decode_8_safe(&p, end, cap_auths[i].readable, bad);
+			ceph_decode_8_safe(&p, end, cap_auths[i].writeable, bad);
+			doutc(cl, "uid %lld, num_gids %d, path %s, fs_name %s,"
+			      " root_squash %d, readable %d, writeable %d\n",
+			      cap_auths[i].match.uid, cap_auths[i].match.num_gids,
+			      cap_auths[i].match.path, cap_auths[i].match.fs_name,
+			      cap_auths[i].match.root_squash,
+			      cap_auths[i].readable, cap_auths[i].writeable);
+		}
+
+	}
+
+skip_cap_auths:
 	mutex_lock(&mdsc->mutex);
+	if (op == CEPH_SESSION_OPEN) {
+		if (mdsc->s_cap_auths) {
+			for (i = 0; i < mdsc->s_cap_auths_num; i++) {
+				kfree(mdsc->s_cap_auths[i].match.gids);
+				kfree(mdsc->s_cap_auths[i].match.path);
+				kfree(mdsc->s_cap_auths[i].match.fs_name);
+			}
+			kfree(mdsc->s_cap_auths);
+		}
+		mdsc->s_cap_auths_num = cap_auths_num;
+		mdsc->s_cap_auths = cap_auths;
+	}
 	if (op == CEPH_SESSION_CLOSE) {
 		ceph_get_mds_session(session);
 		__unregister_session(mdsc, session);
@@ -4318,6 +4417,13 @@ static void handle_session(struct ceph_mds_session *session,
 	pr_err_client(cl, "corrupt message mds%d len %d\n", mds,
 		      (int)msg->front.iov_len);
 	ceph_msg_dump(msg);
+fail:
+	for (i = 0; i < cap_auths_num; i++) {
+		kfree(cap_auths[i].match.gids);
+		kfree(cap_auths[i].match.path);
+		kfree(cap_auths[i].match.fs_name);
+	}
+	kfree(cap_auths);
 	return;
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h
index b88e80415224..9e2fe310d0b4 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h
+++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h
@@ -71,6 +71,24 @@ enum ceph_feature_type {
 struct ceph_fs_client;
 struct ceph_cap;
 
+#define MDS_AUTH_UID_ANY -1
+
+struct ceph_mds_cap_match {
+	int64_t uid; // MDS_AUTH_UID_ANY as default
+	uint32_t num_gids;
+	int32_t *gids;  // Use these GIDs
+	char *path;  // Require path to be child of this (may be "" or "/" for any)
+	char *fs_name;
+	u8 root_squash; // False as default
+};
+
+struct ceph_mds_cap_auth {
+	struct ceph_mds_cap_match match;
+	u8 readable;
+	u8 writeable;
+};
+
+
 /*
  * parsed info about a single inode.  pointers are into the encoded
  * on-wire structures within the mds reply message payload.
@@ -513,6 +531,9 @@ struct ceph_mds_client {
 	struct rw_semaphore     pool_perm_rwsem;
 	struct rb_root		pool_perm_tree;
 
+	u32			 s_cap_auths_num;
+	struct ceph_mds_cap_auth *s_cap_auths;
+
 	char nodename[__NEW_UTS_LEN + 1];
 };
 
-- 
2.43.0


  reply	other threads:[~2024-04-18 14:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-18 14:20 [PATCH v5 0/6] ceph: check the cephx mds auth access in client side xiubli
2024-04-18 14:20 ` xiubli [this message]
2024-04-18 14:20 ` [PATCH v5 2/6] ceph: add ceph_mds_check_access() helper support xiubli
2024-04-18 14:20 ` [PATCH v5 3/6] ceph: check the cephx mds auth access for setattr xiubli
2024-04-18 14:20 ` [PATCH v5 4/6] ceph: check the cephx mds auth access for open xiubli
2024-04-18 14:20 ` [PATCH v5 5/6] ceph: check the cephx mds auth access for async dirop xiubli
2024-04-18 14:20 ` [PATCH v5 6/6] ceph: add CEPHFS_FEATURE_MDS_AUTH_CAPS_CHECK feature bit xiubli

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