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From: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
To: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v5 19/19] ceph: add fscrypt ioctls
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 2021 19:04:59 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YGyiy1B+BaOQihrM@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <dc50279dba2d46921a200fbea8bd59702504adfc.camel@kernel.org>

On Tue, Apr 06, 2021 at 01:27:21PM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote:
<snip>
> > > > I've spent a few hours already looking at the bug I reported before, and I
> > > > can't really understand this code.  What does it mean to increment
> > > > ->i_shared_gen at this point?
> > > > 
> > > > The reason I'm asking is because it looks like the problem I'm seeing goes
> > > > away if I remove this code.  Here's what I'm doing/seeing:
> > > > 
> > > > # mount ...
> > > > # fscrypt unlock d
> > > > 
> > > >   -> 'd' dentry is eventually pruned at this point *if* ->i_shared_gen was
> > > >      incremented by the line above.
> > > > 
> > > > # cat d/f
> > > > 
> > > >   -> when ceph_fill_inode() is executed, 'd' isn't *not* set as encrypted
> > > >      because both ci->i_xattrs.version and info->xattr_version are both
> > > >      set to 0.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > Interesting. That sounds like it might be the bug right there. "d"
> > > should clearly have a fscrypt context in its xattrs at that point. If
> > > the MDS isn't passing that back, then that could be a problem.
> > > 
> > > I had a concern about that when I was developing this, and I *thought*
> > > Zheng had assured us that the MDS will always pass along the xattr blob
> > > in a trace. Maybe that's not correct?
> > 
> > Hmm, that's what I thought too.  I was hoping not having to go look at the
> > MDS, but seems like I'll have to :-)
> > 
> 
> That'd be good, if possible.
> 
> > > > cat: d/f: No such file or directory
> > > > 
> > > > I'm not sure anymore if the issue is on the client or on the MDS side.
> > > > Before digging deeper, I wonder if this ring any bell. ;-)
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > No, this is not something I've seen before.
> > > 
> > > Dentries that live in a directory have a copy of the i_shared_gen of the
> > > directory when they are instantiated. Bumping that value on a directory
> > > should basically ensure that its child dentries end up invalidated,
> > > which is what we want once we add the key to the directory. Once we add
> > > a key, any old dentries in that directory are no longer valid.
> > > 
> > > That said, I could certainly have missed some subtlety here.
> > 
> > Great, thanks for clarifying.  This should help me investigate a little
> > bit more.
> > 
> > [ And I'm also surprised you don't see this behaviour as it's very easy to
> >   reproduce. ]
> > 
> > 
> 
> It is odd... fwiw, I ran this for 5 mins or so and never saw a problem:
> 
>     $ while [ $? -eq 0 ]; do sudo umount /mnt/crypt; sudo mount /mnt/crypt; fscrypt unlock --key=/home/jlayton/fscrypt-keyfile /mnt/crypt/d; cat /mnt/crypt/d/f; done
>

TBH I only do this operation once and it almost always fails.  The only
difference I see is that I don't really use a keyfile, but a passphrase
instead.  Not sure if it makes any difference.  Also, it may be worth
adding a delay before the 'cat' to make sure the dentry is pruned.

> ...do I need some other operations in between? Also, the cluster in this
> case is Pacific. It's possible this is a result of changes since then if
> you're on a vstart cluster or something.
> 
> $ sudo ./cephadm version
> Using recent ceph image docker.io/ceph/ceph@sha256:9b04c0f15704c49591640a37c7adfd40ffad0a4b42fecb950c3407687cb4f29a
> ceph version 16.2.0 (0c2054e95bcd9b30fdd908a79ac1d8bbc3394442) pacific (stable)

I've re-compiled the cluster after hard-resetting it to commit
6a19e303187c which you mentioned in a previous email in this thread.  But
the result was the same.

Anyway, using a vstart cluster is also a huge difference I guess.  I'll
keep debugging.  Thanks!

Cheers,
--
Luís

  reply	other threads:[~2021-04-06 18:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-03-26 17:32 [RFC PATCH v5 00/19] ceph+fscrypt: context, filename and symlink support Jeff Layton
2021-03-26 17:32 ` [RFC PATCH v5 01/19] vfs: export new_inode_pseudo Jeff Layton
2021-04-08  1:08   ` Eric Biggers
2021-04-08 16:18     ` Jeff Layton
2021-03-26 17:32 ` [RFC PATCH v5 02/19] fscrypt: export fscrypt_base64_encode and fscrypt_base64_decode Jeff Layton
2021-04-08  1:06   ` Eric Biggers
2021-04-08 16:22     ` Jeff Layton
2021-03-26 17:32 ` [RFC PATCH v5 03/19] fscrypt: export fscrypt_fname_encrypt and fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size Jeff Layton
2021-04-08  1:19   ` Eric Biggers
2021-03-26 17:32 ` [RFC PATCH v5 04/19] fscrypt: add fscrypt_context_for_new_inode Jeff Layton
2021-04-08  1:21   ` Eric Biggers
2021-04-08 16:27     ` Jeff Layton
2021-03-26 17:32 ` [RFC PATCH v5 05/19] ceph: crypto context handling for ceph Jeff Layton
2021-03-26 17:32 ` [RFC PATCH v5 06/19] ceph: implement -o test_dummy_encryption mount option Jeff Layton
2021-03-26 17:32 ` [RFC PATCH v5 07/19] ceph: preallocate inode for ops that may create one Jeff Layton
2021-03-26 17:32 ` [RFC PATCH v5 08/19] ceph: add routine to create fscrypt context prior to RPC Jeff Layton
2021-03-26 17:32 ` [RFC PATCH v5 09/19] ceph: make ceph_msdc_build_path use ref-walk Jeff Layton
2021-03-26 17:32 ` [RFC PATCH v5 10/19] ceph: add encrypted fname handling to ceph_mdsc_build_path Jeff Layton
2021-03-26 17:32 ` [RFC PATCH v5 11/19] ceph: decode alternate_name in lease info Jeff Layton
2021-03-26 17:32 ` [RFC PATCH v5 12/19] ceph: send altname in MClientRequest Jeff Layton
2021-03-26 17:32 ` [RFC PATCH v5 13/19] ceph: properly set DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME flag in lookup Jeff Layton
2021-03-26 17:32 ` [RFC PATCH v5 14/19] ceph: make d_revalidate call fscrypt revalidator for encrypted dentries Jeff Layton
2021-03-26 17:32 ` [RFC PATCH v5 15/19] ceph: add helpers for converting names for userland presentation Jeff Layton
2021-03-26 17:32 ` [RFC PATCH v5 16/19] ceph: add fscrypt support to ceph_fill_trace Jeff Layton
2021-03-26 17:32 ` [RFC PATCH v5 17/19] ceph: add support to readdir for encrypted filenames Jeff Layton
2021-03-26 17:32 ` [RFC PATCH v5 18/19] ceph: create symlinks with encrypted and base64-encoded targets Jeff Layton
2021-03-26 17:32 ` [RFC PATCH v5 19/19] ceph: add fscrypt ioctls Jeff Layton
2021-04-06 15:38   ` Luis Henriques
2021-04-06 16:03     ` Jeff Layton
2021-04-06 16:24       ` Luis Henriques
2021-04-06 17:27         ` Jeff Layton
2021-04-06 18:04           ` Luis Henriques [this message]
2021-04-07 12:47             ` Jeff Layton
2021-03-26 18:38 ` [RFC PATCH v5 00/19] ceph+fscrypt: context, filename and symlink support Jeff Layton
2021-03-31 20:35 ` [RFC PATCH v5 20/19] ceph: make ceph_get_name decrypt filenames Jeff Layton
2021-04-01 11:14   ` Luis Henriques
2021-04-01 12:15     ` Jeff Layton
2021-04-01 13:05       ` Luis Henriques
2021-04-01 13:12         ` Jeff Layton

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