Re: [PATCH v2 seccomp 1/6] seccomp: Move config option SECCOMP to arch/Kconfig

[Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>]

On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 10:52:39AM +0100, Geert Uytterhoeven wrote:
> Hi Yifei,
> 
> On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 2:48 PM YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com> wrote:
> > From: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>
> >
> > In order to make adding configurable features into seccomp
> > easier, it's better to have the options at one single location,
> > considering easpecially that the bulk of seccomp code is
> > arch-independent. An quick look also show that many SECCOMP
> > descriptions are outdated; they talk about /proc rather than
> > prctl.
> >
> > As a result of moving the config option and keeping it default
> > on, architectures arm, arm64, csky, riscv, sh, and xtensa
> > did not have SECCOMP on by default prior to this and SECCOMP will
> > be default in this change.
> >
> > Architectures microblaze, mips, powerpc, s390, sh, and sparc
> > have an outdated depend on PROC_FS and this dependency is removed
> > in this change.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1YWz9cnp08UZgeieYRhHdqh-ch7aNwc4JRBnGyrmgfMg@mail.gmail.com/
> > Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>
> 
> Thanks for your patch. which is now commit 282a181b1a0d66de ("seccomp:
> Move config option SECCOMP to arch/Kconfig") in v5.10-rc1.
> 
> > --- a/arch/Kconfig
> > +++ b/arch/Kconfig
> > @@ -458,6 +462,23 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
> >             results in the system call being skipped immediately.
> >           - seccomp syscall wired up
> >
> > +config SECCOMP
> > +       def_bool y
> > +       depends on HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
> > +       prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
> > +       help
> > +         This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
> > +         that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
> > +         execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
> > +         the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
> > +         syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
> > +         their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
> > +         enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled
> > +         and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
> > +         defined by each seccomp mode.
> > +
> > +         If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
> > +
> 
> Please tell me why SECCOMP is special, and deserves to default to be
> enabled.  Is it really that critical, given only 13.5 (half of sparc
> ;-) out of 24
> architectures implement support for it?

That's an excellent point; I missed this in my review as I saw several
Kconfig already marked "def_bool y" but failed to note it wasn't _all_
of them. Okay, checking before this patch, these had them effectively
enabled:

via Kconfig:

parisc
s390
um
x86

via defconfig, roughly speaking:

arm
arm64
sh

How about making the default depend on HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER?

These have SECCOMP_FILTER support:

arch/arm/Kconfig:       select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER if AEABI && !OABI_COMPAT
arch/arm64/Kconfig:     select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
arch/csky/Kconfig:      select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
arch/mips/Kconfig:      select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
arch/parisc/Kconfig:    select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
arch/powerpc/Kconfig:   select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
arch/riscv/Kconfig:     select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
arch/s390/Kconfig:      select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
arch/sh/Kconfig:        select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
arch/um/Kconfig:        select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
arch/x86/Kconfig:       select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
arch/xtensa/Kconfig:    select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER

So the "new" promotions would be:

csky
mips
powerpc
riscv
xtensa

Which would leave only these two:

arch/microblaze/Kconfig:        select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
arch/sparc/Kconfig:     select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP if SPARC64

At this point, given the ubiquity of seccomp usage (e.g. systemd), I
guess it's not unreasonable to make it def_bool y?

I'm open to suggestions!

-- 
Kees Cook
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