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From: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2016 11:44:28 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1470325468.22643.95.camel@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160804141109.GM6879@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net>

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On Thu, 2016-08-04 at 16:11 +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 04, 2016 at 09:45:23AM -0400, Daniel Micay wrote:
> > 
> > Qualcomm's perf driver is out-of-tree along with most of their other
> > drivers. 
> 
> 
> So you're asking us to maim upstream perf for some out of tree junk?
> Srously? *plonk*

This feature doesn't come from Android. The perf events subsystem in the
mainline kernel is packed full of vulnerabilities too. The problem is so
bad that pointing one of the public fuzzers at it for a short period of
time is all that's required to start finding them.

Qualcomm's drivers might be lower quality than core kernel code, but
they're way above the baseline set by mainline kernel drivers...

Shining the same light on mainline drivers wouldn't be pretty. The work
going into hardening the Qualcomm drivers isn't happening upstream to
any comparable extent.

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  reply	other threads:[~2016-08-04 15:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-07-27 14:45 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open Jeff Vander Stoep
2016-07-27 20:43 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-02  9:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-02 13:04   ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-08-02 13:10     ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-02 13:16   ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-02 19:04   ` Kees Cook
2016-08-02 20:30     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-02 20:51       ` Kees Cook
2016-08-02 21:06         ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2016-08-03  8:28         ` Ingo Molnar
2016-08-03 12:28           ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-03 12:53             ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-03 13:36             ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-03 14:41         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-03 15:42           ` Schaufler, Casey
2016-08-03 17:25         ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-08-03 18:53           ` Kees Cook
2016-08-03 21:44             ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-04  2:50               ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-08-04  9:11                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-04 15:13                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-08-04 15:37                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-03 19:36           ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-04 10:28             ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-04 13:45               ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-04 14:11                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-04 15:44                   ` Daniel Micay [this message]
2016-08-04 15:55                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-04 16:10                     ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-04 16:32                       ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-04 17:09                         ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-04 17:36                           ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-02 21:16       ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2016-10-17 13:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-10-17 14:54   ` Daniel Micay
2016-10-19  9:41     ` Mark Rutland
2016-10-19 15:16       ` Daniel Micay
2016-10-18 20:48   ` Kees Cook
2016-10-18 21:15     ` Daniel Micay
2016-10-19  9:56       ` Mark Rutland
2016-10-19 10:01       ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-19 10:26         ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-10-19 10:40           ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-19 15:39           ` Daniel Micay

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