From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Security Module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>,
"Dmitry V . Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
"J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 08/11] proc: instantiate only pids that we can ptrace on 'hidepid=4' mount option
Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2020 16:05:16 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200210150519.538333-9-gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200210150519.538333-1-gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
If "hidepid=4" mount option is set then do not instantiate pids that
we can not ptrace. "hidepid=4" means that procfs should only contain
pids that the caller can ptrace.
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
fs/proc/root.c | 14 +++++++++++---
include/linux/proc_fs.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 24b7c620ded3..49937d54e745 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -699,6 +699,14 @@ static bool has_pid_permissions(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info,
struct task_struct *task,
int hide_pid_min)
{
+ /*
+ * If 'hidpid' mount option is set force a ptrace check,
+ * we indicate that we are using a filesystem syscall
+ * by passing PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS
+ */
+ if (proc_fs_hide_pid(fs_info) == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACABLE)
+ return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
+
if (proc_fs_hide_pid(fs_info) < hide_pid_min)
return true;
if (in_group_p(proc_fs_pid_gid(fs_info)))
@@ -3271,7 +3279,14 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
if (!task)
goto out;
+ /* Limit procfs to only ptracable tasks */
+ if (proc_fs_hide_pid(fs_info) == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACABLE) {
+ if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS))
+ goto out_put_task;
+ }
+
result = proc_pid_instantiate(dentry, task, NULL);
+out_put_task:
put_task_struct(task);
out:
return result;
diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
index e2bb015da1a8..5e27bb31f125 100644
--- a/fs/proc/root.c
+++ b/fs/proc/root.c
@@ -52,6 +52,15 @@ static const struct fs_parameter_description proc_fs_parameters = {
.specs = proc_param_specs,
};
+static inline int
+valid_hidepid(unsigned int value)
+{
+ return (value == HIDEPID_OFF ||
+ value == HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS ||
+ value == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE ||
+ value == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACABLE);
+}
+
static int proc_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
{
struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
@@ -68,10 +77,9 @@ static int proc_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
break;
case Opt_hidepid:
+ if (!valid_hidepid(result.uint_32))
+ return invalf(fc, "proc: unknown value of hidepid.\n");
ctx->hidepid = result.uint_32;
- if (ctx->hidepid < HIDEPID_OFF ||
- ctx->hidepid > HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)
- return invalf(fc, "proc: hidepid value must be between 0 and 2.\n");
break;
default:
diff --git a/include/linux/proc_fs.h b/include/linux/proc_fs.h
index f307940f8311..6822548405a7 100644
--- a/include/linux/proc_fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/proc_fs.h
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ enum {
HIDEPID_OFF = 0,
HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS = 1,
HIDEPID_INVISIBLE = 2,
+ HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACABLE = 4, /* Limit pids to only ptracable pids */
};
struct proc_fs_info {
--
2.24.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-02-10 15:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 85+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-10 15:05 [PATCH v8 00/11] proc: modernize proc to support multiple private instances Alexey Gladkov
2020-02-10 15:05 ` [PATCH v8 01/11] proc: Rename struct proc_fs_info to proc_fs_opts Alexey Gladkov
2020-02-10 15:05 ` [PATCH v8 02/11] proc: add proc_fs_info struct to store proc information Alexey Gladkov
2020-02-10 15:05 ` [PATCH v8 03/11] proc: move /proc/{self|thread-self} dentries to proc_fs_info Alexey Gladkov
2020-02-10 18:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-12 15:00 ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-02-10 15:05 ` [PATCH v8 04/11] proc: move hide_pid, pid_gid from pid_namespace " Alexey Gladkov
2020-02-10 15:05 ` [PATCH v8 05/11] proc: add helpers to set and get proc hidepid and gid mount options Alexey Gladkov
2020-02-10 18:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-12 14:57 ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-02-10 15:05 ` [PATCH v8 06/11] proc: support mounting procfs instances inside same pid namespace Alexey Gladkov
2020-02-10 15:05 ` [PATCH v8 07/11] proc: flush task dcache entries from all procfs instances Alexey Gladkov
2020-02-10 17:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-02-10 19:23 ` Al Viro
2020-02-11 1:36 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-11 4:01 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-12 14:49 ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-02-12 14:59 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-12 17:08 ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-02-12 18:45 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-02-12 19:16 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-12 19:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-02-12 20:03 ` Al Viro
2020-02-12 20:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-02-12 20:38 ` Al Viro
2020-02-12 20:41 ` Al Viro
2020-02-12 21:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-02-12 21:46 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-13 0:48 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-02-13 4:37 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-13 5:55 ` Al Viro
2020-02-13 21:30 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-02-13 22:23 ` Al Viro
2020-02-13 22:47 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-02-14 14:15 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-14 3:48 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-20 20:46 ` [PATCH 0/7] proc: Dentry flushing without proc_mnt Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-20 20:47 ` [PATCH 1/7] proc: Rename in proc_inode rename sysctl_inodes sibling_inodes Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-20 20:48 ` [PATCH 2/7] proc: Generalize proc_sys_prune_dcache into proc_prune_siblings_dcache Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-20 20:49 ` [PATCH 3/7] proc: Mov rcu_read_(lock|unlock) in proc_prune_siblings_dcache Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-20 22:33 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-02-20 20:49 ` [PATCH 4/7] proc: Use d_invalidate " Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-20 22:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-02-20 22:54 ` Al Viro
2020-02-20 23:00 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-02-20 23:03 ` Al Viro
2020-02-20 23:39 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-20 20:51 ` [PATCH 5/7] proc: Clear the pieces of proc_inode that proc_evict_inode cares about Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-20 20:52 ` [PATCH 6/7] proc: Use a list of inodes to flush from proc Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-20 20:52 ` [PATCH 7/7] proc: Ensure we see the exit of each process tid exactly once Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-21 16:50 ` Oleg Nesterov
2020-02-22 15:46 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-20 23:02 ` [PATCH 0/7] proc: Dentry flushing without proc_mnt Linus Torvalds
2020-02-20 23:07 ` Al Viro
2020-02-20 23:37 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-24 16:25 ` [PATCH v2 0/6] " Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-24 16:26 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] proc: Rename in proc_inode rename sysctl_inodes sibling_inodes Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-24 16:27 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] proc: Generalize proc_sys_prune_dcache into proc_prune_siblings_dcache Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-24 16:27 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] proc: In proc_prune_siblings_dcache cache an aquired super block Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-24 16:28 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] proc: Use d_invalidate in proc_prune_siblings_dcache Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-24 16:28 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] proc: Clear the pieces of proc_inode that proc_evict_inode cares about Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-24 16:29 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] proc: Use a list of inodes to flush from proc Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-28 20:17 ` [PATCH 0/3] proc: Actually honor the mount options Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-28 20:18 ` [PATCH 1/3] uml: Don't consult current to find the proc_mnt in mconsole_proc Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-28 20:18 ` [PATCH 2/3] uml: Create a private mount of proc for mconsole Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-28 20:30 ` Christian Brauner
2020-02-28 21:28 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-28 21:59 ` Christian Brauner
2020-02-28 20:19 ` [PATCH 3/3] proc: Remove the now unnecessary internal mount of proc Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-28 20:39 ` Christian Brauner
2020-02-28 21:40 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-28 22:34 ` [PATCH 4/3] pid: Improve the comment about waiting in zap_pid_ns_processes Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-29 2:59 ` Christian Brauner
2020-02-14 3:49 ` [PATCH v8 07/11] proc: flush task dcache entries from all procfs instances Eric W. Biederman
2020-02-12 19:47 ` Al Viro
2020-02-11 22:45 ` Al Viro
2020-02-12 14:26 ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-02-10 15:05 ` Alexey Gladkov [this message]
2020-02-10 16:29 ` [PATCH v8 08/11] proc: instantiate only pids that we can ptrace on 'hidepid=4' mount option Jordan Glover
2020-02-12 14:34 ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-02-10 15:05 ` [PATCH v8 09/11] proc: add option to mount only a pids subset Alexey Gladkov
2020-02-10 15:05 ` [PATCH v8 10/11] docs: proc: add documentation for "hidepid=4" and "subset=pidfs" options and new mount behavior Alexey Gladkov
2020-02-10 18:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-12 16:03 ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-02-10 15:05 ` [PATCH v8 11/11] proc: Move hidepid values to uapi as they are user interface to mount Alexey Gladkov
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