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From: "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	"luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"keescook@chromium.org" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"tytso@mit.edu" <tytso@mit.edu>
Subject: RE: [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon system call
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2019 13:20:09 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612BA4BB7580@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190208130544.GI32511@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>

> On Fri, Feb 08, 2019 at 02:15:49PM +0200, Elena Reshetova wrote:
> > 1) hackbench -s 4096 -l 2000 -g 15 -f 25 -P
> >     base:           Time: 12.243
> >     random_offset:  Time: 13.411
> 
> >     base:
> >      8.46%  time     [kernel.kallsyms]  [k] crc32c_pcl_intel_update
> >      4.77%  time     [kernel.kallsyms]  [k] ext4_mark_iloc_dirty
> >      4.14%  time     [kernel.kallsyms]  [k] fsnotify
> >
> >     random_offset:
> >      8.35%  time     [kernel.kallsyms]  [k] crc32c_pcl_intel_update
> >      5.61%  time     [kernel.kallsyms]  [k] get_random_u64
> >      4.88%  time     [kernel.kallsyms]  [k] ext4_mark_iloc_dirty
> 
> *ouch*
> 
> >   Notable differences from RANDKSTACK:
> 
> >   - random bits are taken from get_random_long() instead of
> >     rdtsc() for a better randomness. This however has a big
> >     performance impact (see above the numbers) and additionally
> >     if we happen to hit a point when a generator needs to be
> >     reseeded, we might have an issue. Alternatives can be to
> >     make this feature dependent on CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU,
> >     which can solve some issues, but I doubt that all of them.
> >     Of course rdtsc() can be a fallback if there is no way to
> >     make calls for a proper randomness from the trampoline stack.
> 
> http://www.chronox.de/jent/doc/CPU-Jitter-NPTRNG.html

Oh, this seems to be a great write up, I will read this carefully,
thank you for the pointer! 

Yes, I believe RANDKSTACK was using rdtsc() exactly because of
many issues get_random_* brings in addition to horrid performance. 
This patch works with rdtsc() as well just fine, just wanted to show
the *full* randomness option first with the impact it brings. 

> 
> That would seem to suggest that the low bits of rdtsc would in fact be a
> fairly good source of random.
> 
> Still, doing this on sysexit seems painful at best, syscall performance
> matters (and hopefully we'll get rid of meltdown 'soon').

I can measure the impact with rdtsc(), I think it is *very* small. 
Btw, what should be the good measurement test?
I am not that happy with just looping on fopen-fclose, too
much noise. 

> 
> Why can't we change the stack offset periodically from an interrupt or
> so, and then have every later entry use that.

Hm... This sounds more complex conceptually - we cannot touch
stack when it is in use, so we have to periodically probe for a 
good time (when process is in userspace I guess) to change it from an interrupt?
IMO trampoline stack provides such a good clean place for doing it and we
have stackleak there doing stack cleanup, so would make sense to keep
these features operating together.

Best Regards,
Elena.

  reply	other threads:[~2019-02-08 13:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-08 12:15 [RFC PATCH] Early version of thread stack randomization Elena Reshetova
2019-02-08 12:15 ` [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon system call Elena Reshetova
2019-02-08 13:05   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-08 13:20     ` Reshetova, Elena [this message]
2019-02-08 14:26       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-09 11:13         ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-09 18:25           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-11  6:39             ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-11 15:54               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-12 10:16                 ` Perla, Enrico
2019-02-14  7:52                   ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-19 14:47                     ` Jann Horn
2019-02-20 22:20                     ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21  6:37                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-21 13:20                         ` Jann Horn
2019-02-21 15:49                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-20 22:15                   ` Kees Cook
2019-02-20 22:53                     ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21 23:29                       ` Kees Cook
2019-02-27 11:03                         ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-21  9:35                     ` Perla, Enrico
2019-02-21 17:23                       ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21 17:48                         ` Perla, Enrico
2019-02-21 19:18                           ` Kees Cook
2019-02-20 21:51         ` Kees Cook
2019-02-08 15:15       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-09 11:38         ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-09 12:09           ` Greg KH
2019-02-11  6:05             ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-08 16:34   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-20 22:03     ` Kees Cook
2019-02-08 21:28   ` Kees Cook
2019-02-11 12:47     ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-20 22:04   ` Kees Cook

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