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From: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, mpe@ellerman.id.au,
	npiggin@gmail.com, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/7] powerpc/mm: Add a framework for Kernel Userspace Access Protection
Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 11:11:49 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3ee891ded467e1fd473c9b075658b959e091e8f6.camel@russell.cc> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190221144818.GI33673@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com>

On Thu, 2019-02-21 at 14:48 +0000, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 11:46:06AM +0100, Christophe Leroy wrote:
> > 
> > Le 21/02/2019 à 10:35, Russell Currey a écrit :
> > > From: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
> > > 
> > > This patch implements a framework for Kernel Userspace Access
> > > Protection.
> > > 
> > > Then subarches will have to possibility to provide their own
> > > implementation by providing setup_kuap() and
> > > lock/unlock_user_access()
> > > 
> > > Some platform will need to know the area accessed and whether it
> > > is
> > > accessed from read, write or both. Therefore source, destination
> > > and
> > > size and handed over to the two functions.
> > 
> > Should we also consider adding user_access_begin() and the 3 other
> > associated macros ?
> > 
> > See x86 for details.
> 
> As a heads-up, there are some potential issues with
> user_access_{begin,end}() that may affect PPC. There's a long thread
> starting at:
> 
> https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547560709-56207-4-git-send-email-julien.thierry@arm.com/

I'd say we should look at adding those macros, but as follow-up work
after this series (and after we know what's going on with those issues)

- Russell

> 
> Thanks,
> Mark.

  reply	other threads:[~2019-02-22  0:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-21  9:35 [PATCH 0/7] Kernel Userspace Protection for radix Russell Currey
2019-02-21  9:35 ` [PATCH 1/7] powerpc: Add framework for Kernel Userspace Protection Russell Currey
2019-02-21  9:35 ` [PATCH 2/7] powerpc: Add skeleton for Kernel Userspace Execution Prevention Russell Currey
2019-02-21  9:35 ` [PATCH 3/7] powerpc/mm: Add a framework for Kernel Userspace Access Protection Russell Currey
2019-02-21 10:46   ` Christophe Leroy
2019-02-21 14:48     ` Mark Rutland
2019-02-22  0:11       ` Russell Currey [this message]
2019-02-21 12:56   ` kbuild test robot
2019-02-21  9:35 ` [PATCH 4/7] powerpc/64: Setup KUP on secondary CPUs Russell Currey
2019-02-21  9:35 ` [PATCH 5/7] powerpc/mm/radix: Use KUEP API for Radix MMU Russell Currey
2019-02-21  9:36 ` [PATCH 6/7] powerpc/lib: Refactor __patch_instruction() to use __put_user_asm() Russell Currey
2019-02-21  9:36 ` [PATCH 7/7] powerpc/64s: Implement KUAP for Radix MMU Russell Currey
2019-02-22  5:14   ` Nicholas Piggin
2019-02-21 16:07 ` [PATCH 0/7] Kernel Userspace Protection for radix Kees Cook
2019-02-22  0:09   ` Russell Currey
2019-02-22  0:16     ` Kees Cook
2019-02-22  3:46       ` Michael Ellerman

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