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From: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@gmail.com>
Cc: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>,
	Ahmed Soliman <ahmedsoliman@mena.vt.edu>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] __wr_after_init: rodata_test: test __wr_after_init
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 01:27:47 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5b674df65263831006ea27edce2c08fd70ddd6b1.1549927666.git.igor.stoppa@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1549927666.git.igor.stoppa@huawei.com>

The write protection of the __wr_after_init data can be verified with the
same methodology used for const data.

Signed-off-by: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com>

CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
CC: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
CC: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
CC: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
CC: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
CC: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CC: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
CC: Ahmed Soliman <ahmedsoliman@mena.vt.edu>
CC: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
CC: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
CC: linux-mm@kvack.org
CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
---
 mm/rodata_test.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/rodata_test.c b/mm/rodata_test.c
index e1349520b436..a669cf9f5a61 100644
--- a/mm/rodata_test.c
+++ b/mm/rodata_test.c
@@ -16,8 +16,23 @@
 
 #define INIT_TEST_VAL 0xC3
 
+/*
+ * Note: __ro_after_init data is, for every practical effect, equivalent to
+ * const data, since they are even write protected at the same time; there
+ * is no need for separate testing.
+ * __wr_after_init data, otoh, is altered also after the write protection
+ * takes place and it cannot be exploitable for altering more permanent
+ * data.
+ */
+
 static const int rodata_test_data = INIT_TEST_VAL;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PRMEM
+static int wr_after_init_test_data __wr_after_init = INIT_TEST_VAL;
+extern long __start_wr_after_init;
+extern long __end_wr_after_init;
+#endif
+
 static bool test_data(char *data_type, const int *data,
 		      unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
 {
@@ -59,7 +74,13 @@ static bool test_data(char *data_type, const int *data,
 
 void rodata_test(void)
 {
-	test_data("rodata", &rodata_test_data,
-		  (unsigned long)&__start_rodata,
-		  (unsigned long)&__end_rodata);
+	if (!test_data("rodata", &rodata_test_data,
+		       (unsigned long)&__start_rodata,
+		       (unsigned long)&__end_rodata))
+		return;
+#ifdef CONFIG_PRMEM
+	    test_data("wr after init data", &wr_after_init_test_data,
+		      (unsigned long)&__start_wr_after_init,
+		      (unsigned long)&__end_wr_after_init);
+#endif
 }
-- 
2.19.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-02-11 23:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-11 23:27 [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] hardening: statically allocated protected memory Igor Stoppa
2019-02-11 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] __wr_after_init: Core and default arch Igor Stoppa
2019-02-12  2:39   ` Matthew Wilcox
2019-02-12  7:20     ` Igor Stoppa
2019-02-11 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/12] __wr_after_init: x86_64: memset_user() Igor Stoppa
2019-02-11 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/12] __wr_after_init: x86_64: randomize mapping offset Igor Stoppa
2019-02-11 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] __wr_after_init: x86_64: enable Igor Stoppa
2019-02-11 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/12] __wr_after_init: arm64: memset_user() Igor Stoppa
2019-02-11 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/12] __wr_after_init: arm64: enable Igor Stoppa
2019-02-11 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] __wr_after_init: Documentation: self-protection Igor Stoppa
2019-02-11 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] __wr_after_init: lkdtm test Igor Stoppa
2019-02-11 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] __wr_after_init: rodata_test: refactor tests Igor Stoppa
2019-02-11 23:27 ` Igor Stoppa [this message]
2019-02-11 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/12] __wr_after_init: test write rare functionality Igor Stoppa
2019-02-11 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] IMA: turn ima_policy_flags into __wr_after_init Igor Stoppa
2019-02-12  0:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] hardening: statically allocated protected memory Kees Cook
2019-02-12  0:37   ` Igor Stoppa
2019-02-12  0:46     ` Kees Cook
2019-02-12  1:08       ` igor.stoppa
2019-02-12  1:26         ` Kees Cook
2019-02-12  7:09           ` Igor Stoppa
2019-02-12 22:39             ` Kees Cook

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