messages from 2016-01-22 22:50:48 to 2016-02-16 16:28:46 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 0/4] Improve performance for SLAB_POISON
2016-02-16 16:28 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 1/4] slub: Drop lock at the end of free_debug_processing
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 2/4] slub: Fix/clean free_debug_processing return paths
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 3/4] slub: Convert SLAB_DEBUG_FREE to SLAB_CONSISTENCY_CHECKS
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 4/4] slub: Relax CMPXCHG consistency restrictions
[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 00/42] x86: updated patches for kaslr and setup_data etc for v4.3
2016-02-15 7:29 UTC (2+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] Two interesting papers I've been reading (or, ASLR is not enough)
2016-02-14 23:33 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] arm64: vdso: Mark vDSO code as read-only
2016-02-13 9:00 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/3] Introduce GCC plugin infrastructure
2016-02-11 22:43 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/3] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 2/3] Add Cyclomatic complexity GCC plugin
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/3] Documentation for the GCC plugin infrastructure
[kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 0/2] SROP Mitigation: Signal cookies
2016-02-09 20:45 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 1/2] SROP Mitigation: Architecture independent code for signal cookies
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 2/2] x86: SROP mitigation: implement "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/3] Introduce GCC plugin infrastructure
2016-02-09 19:14 UTC (12+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/3] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/3] Add Cyclomatic complexity GCC plugin
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/3] Documentation for the GCC plugin infrastructure
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/3] GCC plugin infrastructure
2016-02-09 4:20 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] ARM: mm: flip priority of CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
2016-02-05 21:48 UTC (10+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH v2 00/12] Add PAX_REFCOUNT overflow protection
2016-02-04 18:19 UTC (6+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 0/3] Speed up SLUB poisoning + disable checks
2016-02-04 3:23 UTC (17+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 1/3] slub: Drop lock at the end of free_debug_processing
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 2/3] slub: Don't limit debugging to slow paths
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/3] slub: Add option to skip consistency checks
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/3] Speed up SLUB poisoning + disable checks
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 1/2] SROP Mitigation: Architecture independent code for signal cookies
2016-02-02 9:15 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 2/2] x86: SROP mitigation: implement "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ACK for non-fatal SIGSYS
2016-01-31 20:19 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 0/2] Sanitization of buddy pages
2016-01-30 15:30 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 1/2] mm/page_poison.c: Enable PAGE_POISONING as a separate option
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 2/2] mm/page_poisoning.c: Allow for zero poisoning
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 00/22] arm64: implement support for KASLR
2016-01-29 18:49 UTC (31+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 01/22] of/fdt: make memblock minimum physical address arch configurable
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 02/22] arm64: introduce KIMAGE_VADDR as the virtual base of the kernel region
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 03/22] arm64: pgtable: implement static [pte|pmd|pud]_offset variants
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 04/22] arm64: decouple early fixmap init from linear mapping
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 05/22] arm64: kvm: deal with kernel symbols outside of "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 06/22] arm64: add support for ioremap() block mappings
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 07/22] arm64: move kernel image to base of vmalloc area
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 08/22] arm64: add support for module PLTs
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 09/22] extable: add support for relative extables to search and sort routines
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 10/22] arm64: switch to relative exception tables
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 11/22] arm64: avoid R_AARCH64_ABS64 relocations for Image header fields
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 12/22] arm64: avoid dynamic relocations in early boot code
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 13/22] arm64: allow kernel Image to be loaded anywhere in physical memory
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 14/22] arm64: make asm/elf.h available to asm files
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 15/22] scripts/sortextable: add support for ET_DYN binaries
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 16/22] kallsyms: add support for relative offsets in kallsyms address table
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 17/22] arm64: add support for building the kernel as a relocate PIE binary
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 18/22] arm64: add support for kernel ASLR
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 19/22] efi: stub: implement efi_get_random_bytes() based on EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 20/22] efi: stub: add implementation of efi_random_alloc()
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 21/22] efi: stub: use high allocation for converted command line
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 22/22] arm64: efi: invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to supply KASLR randomness
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 00/22] arm64: implement support for KASLR
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 0/2] SROP Mitigation
2016-01-28 23:34 UTC (3+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] sysctl: allow CLONE_NEWUSER to be disabled
2016-01-28 20:17 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/8] introduce post-init read-only memory
2016-01-28 15:17 UTC (18+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 2/8] lib: add "on" and "off" to strtobool
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 3/8] param: convert some "on"/"off" users "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] arm64: make CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA non-optional
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/2] sysctl: allow CLONE_NEWUSER to be disabled
2016-01-28 14:41 UTC (52+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] sysctl: expand use of proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] sysctl: allow CLONE_NEWUSER to be disabled
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 0/2] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 00/21] arm64: implement support for KASLR
2016-01-27 14:31 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 07/21] arm64: move kernel image to base of vmalloc area
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 0/3] Sanitization of buddy pages
2016-01-26 20:34 UTC (14+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 1/3] mm/debug-pagealloc.c: Split out page poisoning from debug page_alloc
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 2/3] mm/page_poison.c: Enable PAGE_POISONING as a separate option
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 3/3] mm/page_poisoning.c: Allow for zero poisoning
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/3] Sanitization of buddy pages
[kernel-hardening] For whoever's looking at memory santizing
2016-01-25 23:33 UTC (4+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 0/1] Adding previous syscall context to seccomp
2016-01-25 11:51 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 1/1] seccomp: provide information about the previous syscall
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