messages from 2016-09-14 10:13:33 to 2016-10-05 22:02:39 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 00/22] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing
2016-10-05 22:02 UTC (59+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 03/22] bpf,landlock: Add a new arraymap type to deal with (Landlock) handles
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 07/22] landlock: Handle file comparisons
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` [kernel-hardening] lsm naming dilemma. "
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` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 11/22] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per process hierarchy
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` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 14/22] bpf/cgroup: Make cgroup_bpf_update() return an error code
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` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 16/22] bpf/cgroup,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per cgroup
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 17/22] cgroup: Add access check for cgroup_get_from_fd()
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 18/22] cgroup,landlock: Add CGRP_NO_NEW_PRIVS to handle unprivileged hooks
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` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 19/22] landlock: Add interrupted origin
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 21/22] bpf,landlock: Add optional skb pointer in the Landlock context
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 22/22] samples/landlock: Add sandbox example
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] RE: [RFC v3 00/22] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing
[kernel-hardening] initcall randomization
2016-10-05 21:45 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3
2016-10-05 20:52 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing
2016-10-05 20:30 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 00/13] HARDENING_ATOMIC feature
2016-10-05 16:32 UTC (47+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 01/13] Add architecture independent hardened atomic base
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 02/13] percpu-refcount: leave atomic counter unprotected
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 03/13] kernel: identify wrapping atomic usage
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 04/13] mm: "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 05/13] fs: "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 06/13] net: "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 07/13] net: atm: "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 08/13] security: "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 09/13] drivers: identify wrapping atomic usage (part 1/2)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 10/13] drivers: identify wrapping atomic usage (part 2/2)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 11/13] x86: identify wrapping atomic usage
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 12/13] x86: x86 implementation for HARDENED_ATOMIC
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 13/13] lkdtm: add tests for atomic over-/underflow
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 00/13] HARDENING_ATOMIC feature
[kernel-hardening] Any artists around?
2016-10-05 7:08 UTC (7+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching
2016-09-30 18:42 UTC (25+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 1/7] arm64: Factor out PAN enabling/disabling into separate uaccess_* macros
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 2/7] arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 post-update workaround into a specific asm macro
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable,enable} functionality based on TTBR0_EL1
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 4/7] arm64: Disable TTBR0_EL1 during normal kernel execution
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 5/7] arm64: Handle faults caused by inadvertent user access with PAN enabled
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/3] WX Checking for arm64
2016-09-30 17:16 UTC (16+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/3] arm64: dump: Make ptdump debugfs a separate option
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/3] arm64: dump: Make the page table dumping seq_file optional
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/3] arm64: dump: Add checking for writable and exectuable pages
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v1] kexec/arch/i386: Add support for KASLR memory randomization
2016-09-29 7:43 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Re: Self introduction
2016-09-27 16:46 UTC (5+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] Re: qemu:metag image runtime failure in -next due to 'kthread: allow to cancel kthread work'
2016-09-27 10:19 UTC (12+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v1] kexec/arch/i386: Add support for KASLR memory randomization
2016-09-26 16:53 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY incompatible with /proc/kcore
2016-09-23 20:52 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 0/8] arm64: move thread_info off of the task stack
2016-09-23 17:31 UTC (18+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 1/8] thread_info: include <current.h> for THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 2/8] thread_info: allow custom in-task thread_info
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 3/8] arm64: thread_info remove stale items
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 4/8] arm64: asm-offsets: remove unused definitions
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 5/8] arm64: assembler: introduce ldr_this_cpu
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 6/8] arm64: traps: use task_struct instead of thread_info
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 7/8] arm64: move sp_el0 and tpidr_el1 into cpu_suspend_ctx
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 8/8] arm64: split thread_info from task stack
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 0/8] arm64: move thread_info off of the "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] pty: make ptmx file ops read-only after init
2016-09-21 9:40 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)
2016-09-21 5:32 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] xpfo: Only put previous userspace pages into the hot cache
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] mm: usercopy: Check for module addresses
2016-09-21 3:08 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
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