messages from 2017-03-09 01:24:55 to 2017-03-28 23:46:50 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing
2017-03-28 23:46 UTC (12+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 01/11] bpf: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 02/11] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 03/11] bpf: Define handle_fs and add a new helper bpf_handle_fs_get_mode()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 04/11] landlock: Add LSM hooks related to filesystem
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 05/11] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 06/11] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock events per process hierarchy
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 07/11] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 08/11] bpf: Add a Landlock sandbox example
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 09/11] seccomp: Enhance test_harness with an assert step mechanism
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 10/11] bpf,landlock: Add tests for Landlock
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 11/11] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/3] arm64: usercopy: Implement stack frame object validation
2017-03-28 22:34 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] arch: arm: bpf: Converting cBPF to eBPF for arm 32 bit
2017-03-28 20:49 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 0/4] Introduce the initify gcc plugin
2017-03-28 20:31 UTC (11+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 1/4] gcc-plugins: Add "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3] powerpc: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
2017-03-28 19:45 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/2] provide check for ro_after_init memory sections
2017-03-27 18:42 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 1/2] module: verify address is read-only
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 2/2] extable: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC] mm: enable sanitizing via CONFIG
2017-03-27 10:54 UTC (4+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 0/2] provide check for ro_after_init memory sections
2017-03-25 1:59 UTC (10+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 1/2] module: verify address is read-only
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 2/2] extable: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] ARM: ptdump: Add domain to output
2017-03-24 22:56 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] lkdtm: add bad USER_DS test
2017-03-24 17:51 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] lkdtm: add bad USER_DS test
2017-03-24 17:46 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/4] efi: libstub enhancements for cmdline parsing and kaslr
2017-03-24 14:15 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/4] efi/libstub: fix harmless command line parsing bug
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/4] efi/libstub: unify command line param parsing
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/4] efi/libstub: arm/arm64: disable debug prints on 'quiet' cmdline arg
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/4] ef/libstub: arm/arm64: randomize the base of the UEFI rt services region
[kernel-hardening] Re: [lkp-robot] [refcount] 2bf8784489: kernel_BUG_at_lib/refcount.c
2017-03-24 2:45 UTC (2+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [ANNOUNCE] Linux Security Summit 2017 - CFP
2017-03-24 1:26 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
2017-03-23 20:38 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 3/4] arm/syscalls: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 4/4] arm64/syscalls: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
2017-03-23 15:40 UTC (11+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 3/4] arm/syscalls: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 4/4] arm64/syscalls: "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 00/11] arm64: mmu: avoid W+X mappings and re-enable PTE_CONT for kernel
2017-03-23 14:12 UTC (15+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 01/11] arm: kvm: move kvm_vgic_global_state out of .text section
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 02/11] arm64: mmu: move TLB maintenance from callers to create_mapping_late()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 03/11] arm64: alternatives: apply boot time fixups via the linear mapping
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 04/11] arm64: mmu: map .text as read-only from the outset
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 05/11] arm64: mmu: apply strict permissions to .init.text and .init.data
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 06/11] arm64/mmu: align alloc_init_pte prototype with pmd/pud versions
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 07/11] arm64/mmu: ignore debug_pagealloc for kernel segments
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 08/11] arm64/mmu: add contiguous bit to sanity bug check
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 09/11] arm64/mmu: replace 'page_mappings_only' parameter with flags argument
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 10/11] arm64/mm: remove pointless map/unmap sequences when creating page tables
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 11/11] arm64: mm: set the contiguous bit for kernel mappings where appropriate
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v6 00/11] arm64: mmu: avoid W+X mappings and re-enable PTE_CONT for kernel
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3] refcount: add refcount_t API kernel-doc comments
2017-03-23 14:06 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
2017-03-22 21:11 UTC (21+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 3/4] arm/syscalls: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 4/4] arm64/syscalls: "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/6] bug: further enhance use of BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
2017-03-22 19:55 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/6] notifiers: Use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION() on checks
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 6/6] refcount: Check bad states with CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] gcc-plugins: update architecture list in documentation
2017-03-22 12:02 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH tip v2] x86/mm: Correct fixmap header usage on adaptable MODULES_END
2017-03-21 16:01 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 1/3] x86/mm: Adapt MODULES_END based on Fixmap section size
2017-03-17 7:34 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 2/3] x86: Remap GDT tables in the Fixmap section
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 3/3] x86: Make the GDT remapping read-only on 64-bit
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 1/3] x86/mm: Adapt MODULES_END based on Fixmap section size
[kernel-hardening] stackleak plugin port to upstream kernel
2017-03-14 21:43 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/5] irq: set {msi_domain,syscore}_ops as __ro_after_init
2017-03-14 19:24 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/5] pci: set msi_domain_ops "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 1/3] x86/mm: Adapt MODULES_END based on Fixmap section size
2017-03-13 19:24 UTC (14+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 2/3] x86: Remap GDT tables in the Fixmap section
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [Xen-devel] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 3/3] x86: Make the GDT remapping read-only on 64-bit
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] refcount: add refcount_t API kernel-doc comments
2017-03-10 7:25 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 00/10] arm64: mmu: avoid W+X mappings and re-enable PTE_CONT for kernel
2017-03-09 19:40 UTC (17+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 01/10] arm: kvm: move kvm_vgic_global_state out of .text section
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 02/10] arm64: mmu: move TLB maintenance from callers to create_mapping_late()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 03/10] arm64: alternatives: apply boot time fixups via the linear mapping
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 04/10] arm64: mmu: map .text as read-only from the outset
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 05/10] arm64: mmu: apply strict permissions to .init.text and .init.data
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 06/10] arm64/mmu: align alloc_init_pte prototype with pmd/pud versions
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 07/10] arm64/mmu: ignore debug_pagealloc for kernel segments
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 08/10] arm64/mmu: add contiguous bit to sanity bug check
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 09/10] arm64/mmu: replace 'page_mappings_only' parameter with flags argument
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 10/10] arm64: mm: set the contiguous bit for kernel mappings where appropriate
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
2017-03-09 17:41 UTC (22+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/4] arm/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 4/4] arm64/syscalls: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
[kernel-hardening] Ahoy!
2017-03-09 17:31 UTC (5+ messages)
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