messages from 2017-04-05 14:36:17 to 2017-04-20 01:50:37 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing
2017-04-20 1:50 UTC (44+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 01/11] bpf: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 02/11] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 04/11] landlock: Add LSM hooks related to filesystem
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 05/11] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp()
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 06/11] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock events per process hierarchy
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 07/11] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 08/11] bpf: Add a Landlock sandbox example
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 09/11] seccomp: Enhance test_harness with an assert step mechanism
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 10/11] bpf,landlock: Add tests for Landlock
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH net-next v6 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN
2017-04-20 0:08 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 0/2] modules:capabilities: automatic module loading restrictions
2017-04-19 23:43 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 1/2] modules:capabilities: automatic module loading restriction
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] powerpc/mm: Add support for runtime configuration of ASLR limits
2017-04-19 18:35 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/18] Introduce struct layout randomization plugin
2017-04-18 17:20 UTC (32+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 01/18] gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 02/18] compiler: Add __designated_init annotation
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 03/18] randstruct: Set designated_init attribute
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 04/18] randstruct: Differentiate bad cast warnings
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 05/18] af_unix: Use designated initializers
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 06/18] NFS: Avoid cross-structure casting
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 07/18] randstruct: Whitelist struct security_hook_heads cast
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 08/18] randstruct: Whitelist UNIXCB cast
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 09/18] randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 10/18] scsi/bfa: use designated initializers
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 11/18] scsi: qedi,qedf: Use "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 12/18] ovl: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 13/18] randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 14/18] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 15/18] randstruct: Enable function pointer struct detection
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 16/18] task_struct: Allow randomized layout
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 17/18] sgi-xp: Use designated initializers
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 18/18] ACPICA: "
[kernel-hardening] Patchset to Restrict Unprivileged TIOCSTI TTY Command Injection
2017-04-18 15:49 UTC (13+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/4] added SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT kernel config
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/4] add tiocsti_restrict variable
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/4] restrict unprivileged TIOCSTI tty ioctl
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/4] added kernel.tiocsti_restrict sysctl
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3] powerpc: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
2017-04-17 4:48 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v2 0/3] security: Add ModAutoRestrict LSM
2017-04-12 20:41 UTC (20+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v2 1/3] LSM: Allow per LSM module per "struct task_struct" blob
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v2 2/3] security: add the ModAutoRestrict Linux Security Module
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v2 3/3] Documentation: add ModAutoRestrict LSM documentation
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/3] security: Add ModAutoRestrict LSM
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v2] Introduce rare_write() infrastructure
2017-04-10 20:27 UTC (48+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2][PATCH 01/11] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2][PATCH 04/11] x86: Implement __arch_rare_write_begin/unmap()
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2][PATCH 08/11] ARM: Implement __arch_rare_write_begin/end()
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
2017-04-10 20:09 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 2/4] x86/syscalls: Architecture specific pre-usermode check
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 3/4] arm/syscalls: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 4/4] arm64/syscalls: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/4] efi: libstub enhancements for cmdline parsing and kaslr
2017-04-10 9:44 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/4] ef/libstub: arm/arm64: randomize the base of the UEFI rt services region
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 0/2] provide check for ro_after_init memory sections
2017-04-07 22:47 UTC (14+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 1/2] module: verify address is read-only
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 2/2] extable: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v5 0/2] provide check for ro_after_init memory sections
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
2017-04-07 16:11 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 4/4] arm64/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] ebpf: verify the output of the JIT
2017-04-06 12:55 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Re: arch: arm: bpf: Converting cBPF to eBPF for arm 32 bit
2017-04-06 12:51 UTC (9+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] bug: further enhance use of CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION
2017-04-05 19:32 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/7] bug: Clarify help text for BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
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