From: Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden@gmail.com>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"Andreas Gruenbacher" <agruenba@redhat.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"David Drysdale" <drysdale@google.com>,
"Eric Paris" <eparis@redhat.com>,
"James Morris" <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
"Jeff Dike" <jdike@addtoit.com>, "Julien Tinnes" <jln@google.com>,
"Michael Kerrisk" <mtk@man7.org>,
"Paul Moore" <pmoore@redhat.com>,
"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Stephen Smalley" <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"Tetsuo Handa" <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
"Will Drewry" <wad@chromium.org>,
"Linux API" <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v1 00/17] seccomp-object: From attack surface reduction to sandboxing
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2016 05:03:10 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAOp4FwTc6C=E2fynp85tVWrZpthMvFpJFmV=HG+czHH_D41OXA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jLModth62F8PsFfNVCL=7PrAd+kT_NEsMP5WwOJvLS8EQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, Mar 24, 2016 at 4:24 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 23, 2016 at 6:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> This series is a proof of concept (not ready for production) to extend seccomp
>> with the ability to check argument pointers of syscalls as kernel object (e.g.
>> file path). This add a needed feature to create a full sandbox managed by
>> userland like the Seatbelt/XNU Sandbox or the OpenBSD Pledge. It was initially
>> inspired from a partial seccomp-LSM prototype [1] but has evolved a lot since :)
>
> This is interesting! I'd really like to get argument inspection
> working. I'm going to spend some time examining this series more
> closely, but my initial reaction is that I'm suspicious of the ToCToU
> checking -- I'd rather there be no race at all. As for the bug-fixes,
> I'll get those pulled in now. Thanks!
>
Personally, I love the OpenBSD pledge() mechanism. It makes it so easy
to apply attack surface reduction. If seccomp moves closer to pledge,
that would be great.
See here:
https://github.com/dimkr/libwaive
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-03-27 5:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-03-24 1:46 [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 00/17] seccomp-object: From attack surface reduction to sandboxing Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 01/17] um: Export the sys_call_table Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 02/17] seccomp: Fix typo Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 03/17] selftest/seccomp: Fix the flag name SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 4:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-03-29 15:35 ` Shuah Khan
2016-03-29 18:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-29 19:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Shuah Khan
2016-03-24 1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 04/17] selftest/seccomp: Fix the seccomp(2) signature Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 4:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-03-29 15:38 ` Shuah Khan
2016-03-29 18:51 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-29 19:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Shuah Khan
2016-03-24 1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 05/17] security/seccomp: Add LSM and create arrays of syscall metadata Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 15:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler
2016-03-24 16:01 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-03-24 21:31 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 06/17] seccomp: Add the SECCOMP_ADD_CHECKER_GROUP command Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 07/17] seccomp: Add seccomp object checker evaluation Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 08/17] selftest/seccomp: Remove unknown_ret_is_kill_above_allow test Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 2:53 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 09/17] selftest/seccomp: Extend seccomp_data until matches[6] Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 2:53 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 10/17] selftest/seccomp: Add field_is_valid_syscall test Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 2:53 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 11/17] selftest/seccomp: Add argeval_open_whitelist test Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 2:53 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 12/17] audit,seccomp: Extend audit with seccomp state Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 2:53 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 13/17] selftest/seccomp: Rename TRACE_poke to TRACE_poke_sys_read Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 2:53 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 14/17] selftest/seccomp: Make tracer_poke() more generic Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 2:54 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 15/17] selftest/seccomp: Add argeval_toctou_argument test Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 2:54 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 16/17] security/seccomp: Protect against filesystem TOCTOU Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 2:54 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 17/17] selftest/seccomp: Add argeval_toctou_filesystem test Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 16:24 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v1 00/17] seccomp-object: From attack surface reduction to sandboxing Kees Cook
2016-03-27 5:03 ` Loganaden Velvindron [this message]
2016-04-20 18:21 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-04-26 22:46 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-28 2:36 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-28 23:45 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-05-21 12:58 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-05-02 22:19 ` James Morris
2016-05-21 15:19 ` Daniel Borkmann
2016-05-22 21:30 ` Mickaël Salaün
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