From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v5 10/10] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation for Landlock
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2017 08:43:36 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b56c6abf-c8a5-d926-dcf7-0f0a6aa1334f@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrXzL0VH_=QYHGXk1Y5P_yLyXdyTD-JVHVKTFf8F-AhYnw@mail.gmail.com>
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On 22/02/2017 06:21, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 21, 2017 at 5:26 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
>> This documentation can be built with the Sphinx framework.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
>> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
>> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
>> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
>> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
>> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
>> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
>> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
>
>
>> +
>> +Writing a rule
>> +--------------
>> +
>> +To enforce a security policy, a thread first needs to create a Landlock rule.
>> +The easiest way to write an eBPF program depicting a security rule is to write
>> +it in the C language. As described in *samples/bpf/README.rst*, LLVM can
>> +compile such programs. Files *samples/bpf/landlock1_kern.c* and those in
>> +*tools/testing/selftests/landlock/rules/* can be used as examples. The
>> +following example is a simple rule to forbid file creation, whatever syscall
>> +may be used (e.g. open, mkdir, link...).
>> +
>> +.. code-block:: c
>> +
>> + static int deny_file_creation(struct landlock_context *ctx)
>> + {
>> + if (ctx->arg2 & LANDLOCK_ACTION_FS_NEW)
>> + return 1;
>> + return 0;
>> + }
>> +
>
> Would it make sense to define landlock_context (or at least a prefix
> thereof) in here? Also, can't "arg2" have a better name?
arg2 is a generic name. Its meaning depends on the Landlock event, here
it is an action bitfield (FS event).
>
> Can you specify what the return value means? Are 0 and 1 the only
> choices? Would "KILL" be useful? How about "COREDUMP"?
This is explained thereafter and in the kernel Q&A section. I need to
briefly introduce that here.
>
>> +File system action types
>> +------------------------
>> +
>> +Flags are used to express actions. This makes it possible to compose actions
>> +and leaves room for future improvements to add more fine-grained action types.
>> +
>> +.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
>> + :doc: landlock_action_fs
>> +
>> +.. flat-table:: FS action types availability
>> +
>> + * - flags
>> + - since
>> +
>> + * - LANDLOCK_ACTION_FS_EXEC
>> + - v1
>> +
>> + * - LANDLOCK_ACTION_FS_WRITE
>> + - v1
>> +
>> + * - LANDLOCK_ACTION_FS_READ
>> + - v1
>> +
>> + * - LANDLOCK_ACTION_FS_NEW
>> + - v1
>> +
>> + * - LANDLOCK_ACTION_FS_GET
>> + - v1
>> +
>> + * - LANDLOCK_ACTION_FS_REMOVE
>> + - v1
>> +
>> + * - LANDLOCK_ACTION_FS_IOCTL
>> + - v1
>> +
>> + * - LANDLOCK_ACTION_FS_LOCK
>> + - v1
>> +
>> + * - LANDLOCK_ACTION_FS_FCNTL
>> + - v1
>
> What happens if you run an old program on a new kernel? Can you get
> unexpected action types?
The old flags will still make sense, the new ones should be ignored by
the rule.
>
>> +
>> +
>> +Ability types
>> +-------------
>> +
>> +The ability of a Landlock rule describes the available features (i.e. context
>> +fields and helpers). This is useful to abstract user-space privileges for
>> +Landlock rules, which may not need all abilities (e.g. debug). Only the
>> +minimal set of abilities should be used (e.g. disable debug once in
>> +production).
>> +
>> +
>> +.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
>> + :doc: landlock_subtype_ability
>> +
>> +.. flat-table:: Ability types availability
>> +
>> + * - flags
>> + - since
>> + - capability
>> +
>> + * - LANDLOCK_SUBTYPE_ABILITY_WRITE
>> + - v1
>> + - CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>> +
>> + * - LANDLOCK_SUBTYPE_ABILITY_DEBUG
>> + - v1
>> + - CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>> +
>
> What do "WRITE" and "DEBUG" mean in this context? I'm totally lost.
>
> Hmm. Reading below, "WRITE" seems to mean "modify state". Would that
> be accurate?
That is correct, but handling a state in a safe way imply more than only
the ability to "write" outside bpfland (e.g. sequential execution).
>
>> +
>> +Helper functions
>> +----------------
>> +
>> +See *include/uapi/linux/bpf.h* for functions documentation.
>> +
>> +.. flat-table:: Generic functions availability
>> +
>
>> +
>> + * - bpf_get_current_comm
>> + - v1
>> + - LANDLOCK_SUBTYPE_ABILITY_DEBUG
>
> What would this be used for?
To get more information about the process which trigger an action?
>
>> + * - bpf_get_trace_printk
>> + - v1
>> + - LANDLOCK_SUBTYPE_ABILITY_DEBUG
>> +
>
> This is different from the other DEBUG stuff in that it has side
> effects. I wonder if it should have a different flag.
I think the debug flag is a clear warning to not ship a rule using this
ability. Maybe a sub-flag LANDLOCK_SUBTYPE_ABILITY_DEBUG_PRINT would fit
here?
Mickaël
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-02-22 7:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-02-22 1:26 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 00/10] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing Mickaël Salaün
2017-02-22 1:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 01/10] bpf: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier Mickaël Salaün
2017-02-22 1:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 02/10] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock Mickaël Salaün
2017-02-22 1:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 03/10] bpf: Define handle_fs and add a new helper bpf_handle_fs_get_mode() Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-01 9:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2017-03-01 22:20 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-02-22 1:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 04/10] landlock: Add LSM hooks related to filesystem Mickaël Salaün
2017-02-22 1:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 05/10] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp() Mickaël Salaün
2017-02-22 1:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 06/10] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock events per process hierarchy Mickaël Salaün
2017-02-28 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2017-03-01 22:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-01 22:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-03-01 23:28 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-02 16:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-03-03 0:48 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-03 0:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-03-03 1:05 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-02 10:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2017-03-03 0:54 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-02-22 1:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 07/10] bpf: Add a Landlock sandbox example Mickaël Salaün
2017-02-23 22:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2017-02-22 1:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 08/10] seccomp: Enhance test_harness with an assert step mechanism Mickaël Salaün
2017-02-22 1:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 09/10] bpf,landlock: Add tests for Landlock Mickaël Salaün
2017-02-22 1:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 10/10] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation " Mickaël Salaün
2017-02-22 5:21 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2017-02-22 7:43 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
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