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From: John Wood <john.wood@gmx.com>
To: kernelnewbies@kernelnewbies.org
Cc: John Wood <john.wood@gmx.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] security: Add LSM hook at the point where a task gets a fatal signal
Date: Sat, 19 Dec 2020 12:46:38 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201219114640.63024-2-john.wood@gmx.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201219114640.63024-1-john.wood@gmx.com>

Add a security hook that allows a LSM to be notified when a task gets a
fatal signal. This patch is a previous step on the way to compute the
task crash period by the "brute" LSM (linux security module to detect
and mitigate fork brute force attack against vulnerable userspace
processes).

Signed-off-by: John Wood <john.wood@gmx.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h     | 4 ++++
 include/linux/security.h      | 4 ++++
 kernel/signal.c               | 1 +
 security/security.c           | 5 +++++
 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 32a940117e7a..21aa120f3965 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, -ENOSYS, task_prctl, int option, unsigned long arg2,
 	 unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_to_inode, struct task_struct *p,
 	 struct inode *inode)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_fatal_signal, const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ipc_permission, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, ipc_getsecid, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
 	 u32 *secid)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index c503f7ab8afb..6b6063fcb4da 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -774,6 +774,10 @@
  *	security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes.
  *	@p contains the task_struct for the task.
  *	@inode contains the inode structure for the inode.
+ * @task_fatal_signal:
+ *	This hook allows security modules to be notified when a task gets a
+ *	fatal signal.
+ *	@siginfo contains the signal information.
  *
  * Security hooks for Netlink messaging.
  *
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 39642626a707..4f3fc487a71e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -418,6 +418,7 @@ int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
 int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 			unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
 void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
+void security_task_fatal_signal(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo);
 int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
 void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
@@ -1140,6 +1141,9 @@ static inline int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2,
 static inline void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
 { }

+static inline void security_task_fatal_signal(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo)
+{ }
+
 static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
 					  short flag)
 {
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index ef8f2a28d37c..e7373e5a0566 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -2735,6 +2735,7 @@ bool get_signal(struct ksignal *ksig)
 		/*
 		 * Anything else is fatal, maybe with a core dump.
 		 */
+		security_task_fatal_signal(&ksig->info);
 		current->flags |= PF_SIGNALED;

 		if (sig_kernel_coredump(signr)) {
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index a28045dc9e7f..4ee45c6ff4a4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1826,6 +1826,11 @@ void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
 	call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode);
 }

+void security_task_fatal_signal(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo)
+{
+	call_void_hook(task_fatal_signal, siginfo);
+}
+
 int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 {
 	return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
--
2.25.1


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  reply	other threads:[~2020-12-19 11:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-12-19 11:46 [PATCH 0/4] Help to debug spinlocks John Wood
2020-12-19 11:46 ` John Wood [this message]
2020-12-19 11:46 ` [PATCH 2/4] security/brute: Define a LSM and manage statistical data John Wood
2020-12-19 11:46 ` [PATCH 3/4] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack John Wood
2020-12-20 11:47 ` [PATCH 0/4] Help to debug spinlocks John Wood
2020-12-20 20:06   ` Valdis Klētnieks
2020-12-21 18:02     ` John Wood

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