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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>,
	viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, chuck.lever@oracle.com,
	jlayton@kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
	dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, dhowells@redhat.com,
	jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
	eparis@parisplace.org, brauner@kernel.org
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	stefanb@linux.ibm.com, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 26/28] evm: Move to LSM infrastructure
Date: Sat, 4 Mar 2023 13:36:00 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <688527a9-c164-581e-ae60-f82bd8ccccad@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230303182602.1088032-4-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>


On 3/3/2023 10:26 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
>
> As for IMA, remove hardcoded EVM function calls from the LSM infrastructure
> and the VFS. Make EVM functions as static (except for
> evm_inode_init_security(), which is exported), and register them as hook
> implementations in init_evm_lsm(), called from integrity_lsm_init().
>
> Finally, switch to the LSM reservation mechanism for the EVM xattr, by
> setting the lbs_xattr field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure, and
> consequently decrement the number of xattrs to allocate in
> security_inode_init_security().
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> ---
>  fs/attr.c                         |   2 -
>  fs/posix_acl.c                    |   3 -
>  fs/xattr.c                        |   2 -
>  include/linux/evm.h               | 116 ------------------------------
>  security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>  security/integrity/iint.c         |   7 ++
>  security/integrity/integrity.h    |   9 +++
>  security/security.c               |  41 +++--------
>  8 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 171 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
> index 406d782dfab..1b911a627fe 100644
> --- a/fs/attr.c
> +++ b/fs/attr.c
> @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@
>  #include <linux/fcntl.h>
>  #include <linux/filelock.h>
>  #include <linux/security.h>
> -#include <linux/evm.h>
>  
>  #include "internal.h"
>  
> @@ -485,7 +484,6 @@ int notify_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
>  	if (!error) {
>  		fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);
>  		security_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
> -		evm_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
>  	}
>  
>  	return error;
> diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c
> index 5b8c92fce0c..608cb0a9f84 100644
> --- a/fs/posix_acl.c
> +++ b/fs/posix_acl.c
> @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@
>  #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h>
>  #include <linux/iversion.h>
>  #include <linux/security.h>
> -#include <linux/evm.h>
>  #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
>  #include <linux/filelock.h>
>  
> @@ -1103,7 +1102,6 @@ int vfs_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
>  	if (!error) {
>  		fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
>  		security_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl);
> -		evm_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl);
>  	}
>  
>  out_inode_unlock:
> @@ -1214,7 +1212,6 @@ int vfs_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
>  	if (!error) {
>  		fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
>  		security_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
> -		evm_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
>  	}
>  
>  out_inode_unlock:
> diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
> index 10c959d9fc6..7708ffdacca 100644
> --- a/fs/xattr.c
> +++ b/fs/xattr.c
> @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@
>  #include <linux/mount.h>
>  #include <linux/namei.h>
>  #include <linux/security.h>
> -#include <linux/evm.h>
>  #include <linux/syscalls.h>
>  #include <linux/export.h>
>  #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
> @@ -535,7 +534,6 @@ __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  	if (!error) {
>  		fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
>  		security_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
> -		evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
>  	}
>  
>  out:
> diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h
> index 8c043273552..61794299f09 100644
> --- a/include/linux/evm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/evm.h
> @@ -21,46 +21,6 @@ extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
>  					     void *xattr_value,
>  					     size_t xattr_value_len,
>  					     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint);
> -extern int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -			     struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
> -extern void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -				   struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid);
> -extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -			      struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
> -			      const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
> -extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> -				    const char *xattr_name,
> -				    const void *xattr_value,
> -				    size_t xattr_value_len,
> -				    int flags);
> -extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -				 struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
> -extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> -				       const char *xattr_name);
> -static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -					     struct dentry *dentry,
> -					     const char *acl_name)
> -{
> -	evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name);
> -}
> -extern int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -			     struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
> -			     struct posix_acl *kacl);
> -static inline int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -				       struct dentry *dentry,
> -				       const char *acl_name)
> -{
> -	return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
> -}
> -static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry,
> -					  const char *acl_name,
> -					  struct posix_acl *kacl)
> -{
> -	return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0);
> -}
> -extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> -				   const struct qstr *qstr,
> -				   struct xattr *xattrs);
>  extern bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name);
>  extern int evm_protected_xattr_if_enabled(const char *req_xattr_name);
>  extern int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer,
> @@ -92,82 +52,6 @@ static inline enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
>  }
>  #endif
>  
> -static inline int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -				    struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
> -{
> -	return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -					  struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
> -{
> -	return;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -				     struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
> -				     const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
> -{
> -	return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> -					   const char *xattr_name,
> -					   const void *xattr_value,
> -					   size_t xattr_value_len,
> -					   int flags)
> -{
> -	return;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -					struct dentry *dentry,
> -					const char *xattr_name)
> -{
> -	return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> -					      const char *xattr_name)
> -{
> -	return;
> -}
> -
> -static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -					     struct dentry *dentry,
> -					     const char *acl_name)
> -{
> -	return;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -				    struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
> -				    struct posix_acl *kacl)
> -{
> -	return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -				       struct dentry *dentry,
> -				       const char *acl_name)
> -{
> -	return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry,
> -					  const char *acl_name,
> -					  struct posix_acl *kacl)
> -{
> -	return;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> -					  const struct qstr *qstr,
> -					  struct xattr *xattrs)
> -{
> -	return 0;
> -}
> -
>  static inline bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name)
>  {
>  	return false;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> index 8b5c472f78b..c45bc97277c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
>  #include <linux/xattr.h>
>  #include <linux/integrity.h>
>  #include <linux/evm.h>
> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
>  #include <linux/magic.h>
>  #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
>  
> @@ -566,9 +567,9 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>   * userspace from writing HMAC value.  Writing 'security.evm' requires
>   * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
>   */
> -int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> -		       const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
> -		       size_t xattr_value_len, int flags)
> +static int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> +			      const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
> +			      size_t xattr_value_len, int flags)
>  {
>  	const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
>  
> @@ -598,8 +599,8 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
>   * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
>   * the current value is valid.
>   */
> -int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> -			  struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
> +static int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> +				 const char *xattr_name)
>  {
>  	/* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
>  	 * there's no HMAC key loaded
> @@ -649,9 +650,11 @@ static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>   * Prevent modifying posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated
>   * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is
>   * valid.
> + *
> + * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure.
>   */
> -int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> -		      const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
> +static int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> +			     const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
>  {
>  	enum integrity_status evm_status;
>  
> @@ -690,6 +693,24 @@ int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
>  	return -EPERM;
>  }
>  
> +/**
> + * evm_inode_remove_acl - Protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
> + * @idmap: idmap of the mount
> + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
> + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
> + *
> + * Prevent removing posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated
> + * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is
> + * valid.
> + *
> + * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure.
> + */
> +static int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> +				const char *acl_name)
> +{
> +	return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
> +}
> +
>  static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode)
>  {
>  	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
> @@ -738,9 +759,11 @@ bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name)
>   * __vfs_setxattr_noperm().  The caller of which has taken the inode's
>   * i_mutex lock.
>   */
> -void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
> -			     const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len,
> -			     int flags)
> +static void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> +				    const char *xattr_name,
> +				    const void *xattr_value,
> +				    size_t xattr_value_len,
> +				    int flags)
>  {
>  	if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
>  		return;
> @@ -756,6 +779,21 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
>  	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
>  }
>  
> +/**
> + * evm_inode_post_set_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
> + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
> + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
> + * @kacl: pointer to the posix acls
> + *
> + * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after setting
> + * posix acls.
> + */
> +static void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
> +				   struct posix_acl *kacl)
> +{
> +	return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0);
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr
>   * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
> @@ -766,7 +804,8 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
>   * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
>   * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex.
>   */
> -void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
> +static void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> +				       const char *xattr_name)
>  {
>  	if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
>  		return;
> @@ -782,6 +821,22 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
>  	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
>  }
>  
> +/**
> + * evm_inode_post_remove_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
> + * @idmap: idmap of the mount
> + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
> + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
> + *
> + * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after
> + * removing posix acls.
> + */
> +static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> +					     struct dentry *dentry,
> +					     const char *acl_name)
> +{
> +	evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name);
> +}
> +
>  static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  			   struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
>  {
> @@ -805,8 +860,8 @@ static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>   * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature,
>   * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature.
>   */
> -int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> -		      struct iattr *attr)
> +static int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> +			     struct iattr *attr)
>  {
>  	unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
>  	enum integrity_status evm_status;
> @@ -853,8 +908,8 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
>   * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
>   * to lock the inode's i_mutex.
>   */
> -void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> -			    int ia_valid)
> +static void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> +				   struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
>  {
>  	if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL))
>  		return;
> @@ -892,7 +947,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
>  	if (!evm_protected_xattrs)
>  		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  
> -	evm_xattr = xattr;
> +	evm_xattr = xattrs + integrity_blob_sizes.lbs_xattr;

Please don't do this inline. Convention is to use a function,
intergrity_xattrs() for this.

>  
>  	xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);
>  	if (!xattr_data)
> @@ -952,4 +1007,23 @@ static int __init init_evm(void)
>  	return error;
>  }
>  
> +static struct security_hook_list evm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, evm_inode_setattr),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, evm_inode_post_setattr),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, evm_inode_setxattr),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, evm_inode_set_acl),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_set_acl, evm_inode_post_set_acl),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, evm_inode_remove_acl),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_remove_acl, evm_inode_post_remove_acl),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, evm_inode_removexattr),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_removexattr, evm_inode_post_removexattr),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, evm_inode_init_security),
> +};
> +
> +void __init init_evm_lsm(void)
> +{
> +	security_add_hooks(evm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(evm_hooks), "integrity");
> +}
> +
>  late_initcall(init_evm);
> diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
> index bbadf974b31..952d5ea4e18 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/iint.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
> @@ -179,12 +179,19 @@ static int __init integrity_lsm_init(void)
>  			      0, SLAB_PANIC, init_once);
>  
>  	init_ima_lsm();
> +	init_evm_lsm();
>  	return 0;
>  }
> +
> +struct lsm_blob_sizes integrity_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +	.lbs_xattr = 1,

Really? 1 byte? Don't even think of storing number of elements in lbs_xattr.
The linux_blob_size structure contains sizes of blobs, not number of elements.

> +};
> +
>  DEFINE_LSM(integrity) = {
>  	.name = "integrity",
>  	.init = integrity_lsm_init,
>  	.order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
> +	.blobs = &integrity_blob_sizes,
>  };
>  
>  /*
> diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> index c72d375a356..76e7eda6651 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> @@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
>  #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX		4
>  
>  extern struct dentry *integrity_dir;
> +extern struct lsm_blob_sizes integrity_blob_sizes;
>  
>  struct modsig;
>  
> @@ -199,6 +200,14 @@ static inline void __init init_ima_lsm(void)
>  }
>  #endif
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_EVM
> +void __init init_evm_lsm(void);
> +#else
> +static inline void __init init_evm_lsm(void)
> +{
> +}
> +#endif
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
>  
>  int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 9bc6a4ef758..74abf04feef 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -20,13 +20,13 @@
>  #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
>  #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
>  #include <linux/integrity.h>
> -#include <linux/evm.h>
>  #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
>  #include <linux/mman.h>
>  #include <linux/mount.h>
>  #include <linux/personality.h>
>  #include <linux/backing-dev.h>
>  #include <linux/string.h>
> +#include <linux/xattr.h>
>  #include <linux/msg.h>
>  #include <net/flow.h>
>  
> @@ -1662,8 +1662,8 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
>  	if (!initxattrs)
>  		return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode,
>  				    dir, qstr, NULL);
> -	/* Allocate +1 for EVM and +1 as terminator. */
> -	new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr + 2, sizeof(*new_xattrs),
> +	/* Allocate +1 for terminator. */
> +	new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr + 1, sizeof(*new_xattrs),
>  			     GFP_NOFS);
>  	if (!new_xattrs)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
> @@ -1699,9 +1699,6 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
>  	if (!num_filled_xattrs)
>  		goto out;
>  
> -	ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs);
> -	if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
> -		goto out;
>  	ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
>  out:
>  	for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++)
> @@ -2201,14 +2198,9 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
>  int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  			   struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
>  {
> -	int ret;
> -
>  	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
>  		return 0;
> -	ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr);
> -	if (ret)
> -		return ret;
> -	return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr);
> +	return call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
>  
> @@ -2272,9 +2264,7 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  
>  	if (ret == 1)
>  		ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
> -	if (ret)
> -		return ret;
> -	return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
> +	return ret;
>  }
>  
>  /**
> @@ -2293,15 +2283,10 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
>  			   struct posix_acl *kacl)
>  {
> -	int ret;
> -
>  	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
>  		return 0;
> -	ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name,
> -			    kacl);
> -	if (ret)
> -		return ret;
> -	return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
> +	return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name,
> +			     kacl);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> @@ -2354,14 +2339,9 @@ int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  			      struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
>  {
> -	int ret;
> -
>  	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
>  		return 0;
> -	ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
> -	if (ret)
> -		return ret;
> -	return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
> +	return call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> @@ -2397,7 +2377,6 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
>  	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
>  		return;
>  	call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
> -	evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> @@ -2458,9 +2437,7 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  	ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name);
>  	if (ret == 1)
>  		ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
> -	if (ret)
> -		return ret;
> -	return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
> +	return ret;
>  }
>  
>  /**

  reply	other threads:[~2023-03-04 21:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-03-03 18:18 [PATCH 00/28] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 01/28] ima: Align ima_inode_post_setattr() definition with " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 16:46   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 02/28] ima: Align ima_post_path_mknod() " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 16:52   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 03/28] ima: Align ima_post_create_tmpfile() " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 16:53   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-08 15:15   ` Mimi Zohar
2023-03-09  9:11     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 04/28] ima: Align ima_file_mprotect() " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 16:56   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 05/28] ima: Align ima_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 16:57   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 06/28] ima: Align ima_inode_removexattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 16:58   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 07/28] ima: Align ima_post_read_file() " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 16:59   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 08/28] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 17:00   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 09/28] evm: Align evm_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 17:01   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 10/28] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 17:02   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 11/28] evm: Complete description of evm_inode_setattr() Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 17:04   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-07  8:58     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 12/28] fs: Fix description of vfs_tmpfile() Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 10:28   ` Christian Brauner
2023-03-06 10:31     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 13/28] security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM Roberto Sassu
2023-03-05  0:42   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-03-06 17:06   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 14/28] security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 17:08   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-08 15:19   ` Mimi Zohar
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 15/28] security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 19:17   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-08 15:43   ` Mimi Zohar
2023-03-09 13:07     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-08-30  9:31     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-08-30  9:53       ` Christian Brauner
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 16/28] security: Introduce file_post_open hook Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 19:24   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 17/28] security: Introduce file_pre_free_security hook Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 19:26   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 18/28] security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 19:29   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-08 15:47   ` Mimi Zohar
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 19/28] security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 19:35   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 20/28] security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 19:45   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 21/28] security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 15:22   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-06 15:34     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-06 16:16       ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-06 16:50         ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-03 18:18 ` [PATCH 22/28] security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook Roberto Sassu
2023-03-07 17:48   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-08 15:49   ` Mimi Zohar
2023-03-03 18:25 ` [PATCH 23/28] security: Introduce LSM_ORDER_LAST Roberto Sassu
2023-03-07 18:04   ` Stefan Berger
2023-03-08  8:06     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-08 13:13   ` Mimi Zohar
2023-03-08 13:26     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-08 14:00       ` Mimi Zohar
2023-03-08 14:35         ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-08 15:52           ` Mimi Zohar
2023-03-03 18:25 ` [PATCH 24/28] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2023-03-03 18:25 ` [PATCH 25/28] ima: Move IMA-Appraisal " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-03 18:26 ` [PATCH 26/28] evm: Move " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-04 21:36   ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2023-03-06  9:21     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-07 16:54       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-03-07 16:57         ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-03 18:26 ` [PATCH 27/28] integrity: Move integrity functions to the " Roberto Sassu
2023-03-03 18:26 ` [PATCH 28/28] integrity: Switch from rbtree to LSM-managed blob for integrity_iint_cache Roberto Sassu
2023-03-08 15:14 ` [PATCH 00/28] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Mimi Zohar
2023-03-08 16:23   ` Roberto Sassu

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