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From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>,
	kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>,
	Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>,
	Alexey Klimov <aklimov@redhat.com>,
	open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:KEYS-TRUSTED" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2020 00:58:04 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <b56dd2e9f3934e24f08005b9c5588c54b4837ff6.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201013002815.40256-4-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>

On Tue, 2020-10-13 at 03:28 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
[...]
> diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
> index 8f4ff39f51e7..f0ebce14d2f8 100644
> --- a/include/linux/tpm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
> @@ -397,6 +397,10 @@ static inline u32 tpm2_rc_value(u32 rc)
>  #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM_MODULE)
>  
>  extern int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip);
> +extern __must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
> +extern void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
> +extern ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct
> tpm_buf *buf,
> +				size_t min_rsp_body_length, const char
> *desc);
>  extern int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
>  			struct tpm_digest *digest);
>  extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
> @@ -410,7 +414,18 @@ static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip
> *chip)
>  {
>  	return -ENODEV;
>  }
> -
> +static inline int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip)
> +{
> +	return -ENODEV;
> +}
> +static inline void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip)
> +{
> +}
> +static inline ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct
> tpm_buf *buf,
> +				       size_t min_rsp_body_length,
> const char *desc)
> +{
> +	return -ENODEV;
> +}
>  static inline int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx,

I don't think we want this, do we?  That's only for API access which
should be available when the TPM isn't selected.  Given that get/put
are TPM critical operations, they should only appear when inside code
where the TPM has already been selected.  If they appear outside TPM
selected code, I think we want the compile to fail, which is why we
don't want these backup definitions.

James

  reply	other threads:[~2020-10-13  0:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20201013002815.40256-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2020-10-13  0:28 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random() Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-13  0:28 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failing Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-13  0:28 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-13  0:58   ` James Bottomley [this message]
2020-10-13  2:39     ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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