From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
keescook@chromium.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, scott.branden@broadcom.com,
weiyongjun1@huawei.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com,
ardb@kernel.org,
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>,
lszubowi@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
pjones@redhat.com,
"konrad.wilk@oracle.com" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
Patrick Uiterwijk <patrick@puiterwijk.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 00/12] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 2021 20:51:39 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cedc77fefdf22b2cec086f3e0dd9cc698db9bca2.camel@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e7e251000432cf7c475e19c56b0f438b92fec16e.camel@linux.ibm.com>
On Thu, 2021-08-19 at 13:32 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2021-08-19 at 09:23 -0600, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > > On Aug 19, 2021, at 7:10 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Thu, 2021-08-19 at 14:38 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > On Wed, 2021-08-18 at 20:20 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > > > > Downstream Linux distros try to have a single signed kernel for each
> > > > > architecture. Each end-user may use this kernel in entirely different
> > > > > ways. Some downstream kernels have chosen to always trust platform keys
> > > > > within the Linux trust boundary for kernel module signing. These
> > > > > kernels have no way of using digital signature base IMA appraisal.
> > > > >
> > > > > This series introduces a new Linux kernel keyring containing the Machine
> > > > > Owner Keys (MOK) called .mok. It also adds a new MOK variable to shim.
> > > >
> > > > I would name it as ".machine" because it is more "re-usable" name, e.g.
> > > > could be used for similar things as MOK. ".mok" is a bad name because
> > > > it binds directly to a single piece of user space software.
> > >
> > > Nayna previously said,
> > > "I believe the underlying source from where CA keys are loaded might vary
> > > based on the architecture (".mok" is UEFI specific.). The key part is
> > > that this new keyring should contain only CA keys which can be later
> > > used to vouch for user keys loaded onto IMA or secondary keyring at
> > > runtime. It would be good to have a "ca" in the name, like .xxxx-ca,
> > > where xxxx can be machine, owner, or system. I prefer .system-ca."
> > >
> > > The CA keys on the MOK db is simply the first root of trust being
> > > defined, but other roots of trust are sure to follow. For this reason,
> > > I agree naming the new keyring "mok" should be avoided.
> >
> > As I said previously, I’m open to renaming, I just would like to have an
> > agreement on the new name before changing everything. The current proposed
> > names I have heard are “.machine" and ".system-ca". Is there a preference
> > the maintainers feel is appropriate? If so, please let me know and I’ll
> > rename it. Thanks.
> >
>
> Jarkko, I think the emphasis should not be on "machine" from Machine
> Owner Key (MOK), but on "owner". Whereas Nayna is focusing more on the
> "_ca" aspect of the name. Perhaps consider naming it
> "system_owner_ca" or something along those lines.
What do you gain such overly long identifier? Makes no sense. What
is "ca aspect of the name" anyway?
/Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-08-23 17:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-08-19 0:20 [PATCH v4 00/12] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:20 ` [PATCH v4 01/12] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring for the Machine Owner Key (MOK) Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:20 ` [PATCH v4 02/12] integrity: Do not allow mok keyring updates following init Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:21 ` [PATCH v4 03/12] KEYS: CA link restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:21 ` [PATCH v4 04/12] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MOK to restrict_link_by_ca Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:21 ` [PATCH v4 05/12] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:21 ` [PATCH v4 06/12] KEYS: add a reference to mok keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:21 ` [PATCH v4 07/12] KEYS: Introduce link restriction to include builtin, secondary and mok keys Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:21 ` [PATCH v4 08/12] KEYS: integrity: change link restriction to trust the mok keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:21 ` [PATCH v4 09/12] KEYS: link secondary_trusted_keys to mok trusted keys Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:21 ` [PATCH v4 10/12] integrity: store reference to mok keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:21 ` [PATCH v4 11/12] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 0:21 ` [PATCH v4 12/12] integrity: Only use mok keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 11:38 ` [PATCH v4 00/12] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-19 13:10 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-08-19 15:23 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 17:32 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-08-23 17:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2021-08-23 20:48 ` Nayna
2021-08-24 14:34 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-08-25 22:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-25 22:27 ` James Bottomley
2021-08-27 20:44 ` Nayna
2021-08-30 17:39 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-01 0:52 ` Nayna
2021-09-01 1:51 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-02 10:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-01 4:34 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-01 4:36 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-01 4:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-23 17:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-23 17:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-23 17:48 ` Eric Snowberg
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