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From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: "kirill@shutemov.name" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	"Christopherson, Sean J" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	"vkuznets@redhat.com" <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: "kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	"wad@chromium.org" <wad@chromium.org>,
	"Kleen, Andi" <andi.kleen@intel.com>,
	"luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"aarcange@redhat.com" <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	"keescook@chromium.org" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"wanpengli@tencent.com" <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	"kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com"
	<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	"joro@8bytes.org" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"jmattson@google.com" <jmattson@google.com>,
	"Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	"rientjes@google.com" <rientjes@google.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC 02/16] x86/kvm: Introduce KVM memory protection feature
Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2020 02:09:51 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <0cd53be8abede7e82a68c32b1d8b0e4ca6f24a05.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87eer56abe.fsf@vitty.brq.redhat.com>

On Wed, 2020-05-27 at 10:39 +0200, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:
> Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> writes:
> 
> > On Mon, May 25, 2020 at 06:15:25PM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > > On Mon, May 25, 2020 at 04:58:51PM +0200, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:
> > > > > @@ -727,6 +734,15 @@ static void __init kvm_init_platform(void)
> > > > >  {
> > > > >  	kvmclock_init();
> > > > >  	x86_platform.apic_post_init = kvm_apic_init;
> > > > > +
> > > > > +	if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_MEM_PROTECTED)) {
> > > > > +		if (kvm_hypercall0(KVM_HC_ENABLE_MEM_PROTECTED)) {
> > > > > +			pr_err("Failed to enable KVM memory
> > > > > protection\n");
> > > > > +			return;
> > > > > +		}
> > > > > +
> > > > > +		mem_protected = true;
> > > > > +	}
> > > > >  }
> > > > 
> > > > Personally, I'd prefer to do this via setting a bit in a KVM-specific
> > > > MSR instead. The benefit is that the guest doesn't need to remember if
> > > > it enabled the feature or not, it can always read the config msr. May
> > > > come handy for e.g. kexec/kdump.
> > > 
> > > I think we would need to remember it anyway. Accessing MSR is somewhat
> > > expensive. But, okay, I can rework it MSR if needed.
> > 
> > I think Vitaly is talking about the case where the kernel can't easily get
> > at its cached state, e.g. after booting into a new kernel.  The kernel would
> > still have an X86_FEATURE bit or whatever, providing a virtual MSR would be
> > purely for rare slow paths.
> > 
> > That being said, a hypercall plus CPUID bit might be better, e.g. that'd
> > allow the guest to query the state without risking a #GP.
> 
> We have rdmsr_safe() for that! :-) MSR (and hypercall to that matter)
> should have an associated CPUID feature bit of course.
> 
> Yes, hypercall + CPUID would do but normally we treat CPUID data as
> static and in this case we'll make it a dynamically flipping
> bit. Especially if we introduce 'KVM_HC_DISABLE_MEM_PROTECTED' later.

Not sure why is KVM_HC_DISABLE_MEM_PROTECTED needed?

> 
> > > Note, that we can avoid the enabling algother, if we modify BIOS to deal
> > > with private/shared memory. Currently BIOS get system crash if we enable
> > > the feature from time zero.
> > 
> > Which would mesh better with a CPUID feature bit.
> > 
> 
> And maybe even help us to resolve 'reboot' problem.

IMO we can ask Qemu to call hypercall to 'enable' memory protection when
creating VM, and guest kernel *queries* whether it is protected via CPUID
feature bit.


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-06-03  2:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-22 12:51 [RFC 00/16] KVM protected memory extension Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:51 ` [RFC 01/16] x86/mm: Move force_dma_unencrypted() to common code Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 02/16] x86/kvm: Introduce KVM memory protection feature Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 14:58   ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-25 15:15     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-27  5:03       ` Sean Christopherson
2020-05-27  8:39         ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-27  8:52           ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-03  2:09           ` Huang, Kai [this message]
2020-06-03 11:14             ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 03/16] x86/kvm: Make DMA pages shared Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 04/16] x86/kvm: Use bounce buffers for KVM memory protection Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 05/16] x86/kvm: Make VirtIO use DMA API in KVM guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 06/16] KVM: Use GUP instead of copy_from/to_user() to access guest memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 15:08   ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-25 15:17     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-06-01 16:35       ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-06-02 13:33         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-26  6:14   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-05-26 21:56     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-29 15:24   ` Kees Cook
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 07/16] KVM: mm: Introduce VM_KVM_PROTECTED Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-26  6:15   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-05-26 22:01     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-26  6:40   ` John Hubbard
2020-05-26 22:04     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 08/16] KVM: x86: Use GUP for page walk instead of __get_user() Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 09/16] KVM: Protected memory extension Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 15:26   ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-25 15:34     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-06-03  1:34       ` Huang, Kai
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 10/16] KVM: x86: Enabled protected " Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 15:26   ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-26  6:16   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-05-26 21:58     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 11/16] KVM: Rework copy_to/from_guest() to avoid direct mapping Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 12/16] x86/kvm: Share steal time page with host Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 13/16] x86/kvmclock: Share hvclock memory with the host Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 15:22   ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-25 15:25     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 15:42       ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 14/16] KVM: Introduce gfn_to_pfn_memslot_protected() Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 15/16] KVM: Handle protected memory in __kvm_map_gfn()/__kvm_unmap_gfn() Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-22 12:52 ` [RFC 16/16] KVM: Unmap protected pages from direct mapping Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-26  6:16   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-05-26 22:10     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25  5:27 ` [RFC 00/16] KVM protected memory extension Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 13:47 ` Liran Alon
2020-05-25 14:46   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2020-05-25 15:56     ` Liran Alon
2020-05-26  6:17   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-05-26 10:16     ` Liran Alon
2020-05-26 11:38       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-05-27 15:45         ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-27 21:22           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-06-04 15:15 ` Marc Zyngier
2020-06-04 15:48   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-04 16:27     ` Marc Zyngier
2020-06-04 16:35     ` Will Deacon
2020-06-04 19:09       ` Nakajima, Jun
2020-06-04 21:03         ` Jim Mattson
2020-06-04 23:29           ` Nakajima, Jun

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