From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 06/14] x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled'
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2021 16:37:00 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210114003708.3798992-7-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210114003708.3798992-1-seanjc@google.com>
Drop the sev_enabled flag and switch its one user over to sev_active().
sev_enabled was made redundant with the introduction of sev_status in
commit b57de6cd1639 ("x86/sev-es: Add SEV-ES Feature Detection").
sev_enabled and sev_active() are guaranteed to be equivalent, as each is
true iff 'sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED' is true, and are only ever
written in tandem (ignoring compressed boot's version of sev_status).
Removing sev_enabled avoids confusion over whether it refers to the guest
or the host, and will also allow KVM to usurp "sev_enabled" for its own
purposes.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 1 -
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 12 +++++-------
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 1 -
3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 2f62bbdd9d12..88d624499411 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
extern u64 sme_me_mask;
extern u64 sev_status;
-extern bool sev_enabled;
void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long encrypted_kernel_vaddr,
unsigned long decrypted_kernel_vaddr,
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index bc0833713be9..b89bc03c63a2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -44,8 +44,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask);
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_enable_key);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enable_key);
-bool sev_enabled __section(".data");
-
/* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
@@ -342,16 +340,16 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
* up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV
* the trampoline area must be encrypted.
*/
-bool sme_active(void)
-{
- return sme_me_mask && !sev_enabled;
-}
-
bool sev_active(void)
{
return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED;
}
+bool sme_active(void)
+{
+ return sme_me_mask && !sev_active();
+}
+
/* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */
bool noinstr sev_es_active(void)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index 6c5eb6f3f14f..0c2759b7f03a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -545,7 +545,6 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */
sme_me_mask = me_mask;
- sev_enabled = true;
physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask;
return;
}
--
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-14 0:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-01-14 0:36 [PATCH v2 00/14] KVM: SVM: Misc SEV cleanups Sean Christopherson
2021-01-14 0:36 ` [PATCH v2 01/14] KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association Sean Christopherson
2021-01-14 15:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-14 17:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-14 20:57 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-01-14 0:36 ` [PATCH v2 02/14] KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails Sean Christopherson
2021-01-14 15:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-14 17:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-14 18:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-14 19:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-14 0:36 ` [PATCH v2 03/14] KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c Sean Christopherson
2021-01-14 19:07 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-14 20:59 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-01-14 0:36 ` [PATCH v2 04/14] x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for AMD mem encryption Sean Christopherson
2021-01-14 11:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-14 17:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-14 17:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-28 15:09 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-01-14 21:17 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-01-14 0:36 ` [PATCH v2 05/14] KVM: x86: Override reported SME/SEV feature flags with host mask Sean Christopherson
2021-01-14 21:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-01-28 15:07 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-01-28 17:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-28 17:25 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-01-14 0:37 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2021-01-14 17:54 ` [PATCH v2 06/14] x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled' Tom Lendacky
2021-01-14 21:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-01-14 0:37 ` [PATCH v2 07/14] KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control variables Sean Christopherson
2021-01-14 21:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-01-14 0:37 ` [PATCH v2 08/14] KVM: SVM: Condition sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Sean Christopherson
2021-01-14 20:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-14 21:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-01-14 0:37 ` [PATCH v2 09/14] KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown() Sean Christopherson
2021-01-14 21:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-14 21:32 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-01-14 0:37 ` [PATCH v2 10/14] KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup() Sean Christopherson
2021-01-14 21:35 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-01-14 21:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-14 0:37 ` [PATCH v2 11/14] KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c Sean Christopherson
2021-01-14 21:37 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-01-14 21:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-14 22:15 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-14 0:37 ` [PATCH v2 12/14] KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper Sean Christopherson
2021-01-14 21:44 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-01-14 22:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-14 0:37 ` [PATCH v2 13/14] KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of sev_flush_asids() Sean Christopherson
2021-01-14 21:45 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-01-14 22:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-14 0:37 ` [PATCH v2 14/14] KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used Sean Christopherson
2021-01-15 15:07 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-15 17:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-28 15:10 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-01-28 16:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-28 16:59 ` Paolo Bonzini
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