From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
tony.luck@intel.com, npmccallum@redhat.com,
brijesh.ksingh@gmail.com, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 16/40] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command when SNP is enabled
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 2021 13:35:52 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210707183616.5620-17-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210707183616.5620-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the SNP firmware
is in the INIT state. When SNP is in INIT state, all the SEV-legacy
commands that cause the firmware to write to memory must be in the
firmware state before issuing the command..
A command buffer may contains a system physical address that the firmware
may write to. There are two cases that need to be handled:
1) system physical address points to a guest memory
2) system physical address points to a host memory
To handle the case #1, map_firmware_writeable() helper simply
changes the page state in the RMP table before and after the command is
sent to the firmware.
For the case #2, the map_firmware_writeable() replaces the host system
physical memory with a pre-allocated firmware page, and after the command
completes, the unmap_firmware_writeable() copies the content from
pre-allocated firmware page to original host system physical.
The unmap_firmware_writeable() calls a __sev_do_cmd_locked() to clear
the immutable bit from the memory page. To support the nested calling,
a separate command buffer is required. Allocate a backup command buffer
and keep reference count of it. If a nested call is detected then use the
backup cmd_buf to complete the command submission.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 349 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h | 12 ++
2 files changed, 351 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
index bb07c68834a6..16f0d9211739 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
@@ -265,12 +265,300 @@ void snp_free_firmware_page(void *addr)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(snp_free_firmware_page);
+static int alloc_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev)
+{
+ struct page *page;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) {
+ struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i];
+
+ memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map));
+
+ page = __snp_alloc_firmware_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT,
+ get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE), false);
+ if (!page)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ map->host = page_address(page);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void free_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) {
+ struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i];
+
+ if (map->host) {
+ __snp_free_firmware_pages(virt_to_page(map->host),
+ get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE),
+ false);
+ memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int map_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map)
+{
+ unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ int ret;
+
+ map->active = false;
+
+ if (!paddr || !len)
+ return 0;
+
+ map->paddr = *paddr;
+ map->len = len;
+
+ /* If paddr points to a guest memory then change the page state to firmwware. */
+ if (guest) {
+ struct rmpupdate val = {};
+
+ val.immutable = true;
+ val.assigned = true;
+ ret = snp_set_rmptable_state(*paddr, npages, &val, true, false);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(!map->host))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Check if the pre-allocated buffer can be used to fullfil the request. */
+ if (unlikely(len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Set the paddr to use an intermediate firmware buffer */
+ *paddr = __psp_pa(map->host);
+
+done:
+ map->active = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int unmap_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map)
+{
+ unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!map->active)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* If paddr points to a guest memory then restore the page state to hypervisor. */
+ if (guest) {
+ struct rmpupdate val = {};
+
+ ret = snp_set_rmptable_state(*paddr, npages, &val, true, true);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy the response data firmware buffer to the callers buffer. */
+ memcpy(__va(__sme_clr(map->paddr)), map->host, min_t(size_t, len, map->len));
+ *paddr = map->paddr;
+
+done:
+ map->active = false;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(int cmd)
+{
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS:
+ case SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS:
+ case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START:
+ case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START:
+ case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE:
+ case SEV_CMD_SEND_START:
+ case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA:
+ case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA:
+ case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR:
+ case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT:
+ case SEV_CMD_GET_ID:
+ case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT:
+ return true;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+#define prep_buffer(name, addr, len, guest, map) \
+ func(&((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->addr, ((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->len, guest, map)
+
+static int __snp_cmd_buf_copy(int cmd, void *cmd_buf, bool to_fw, int fw_err)
+{
+ int (*func)(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map);
+ struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
+ struct rmpupdate val = {};
+ bool from_fw = !to_fw;
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * After the command is completed, change the command buffer memory to
+ * hypervisor state.
+ *
+ * The immutable bit is automatically cleared by the firmware, so
+ * no not need to reclaim the page.
+ */
+ if (from_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) {
+ ret = snp_set_rmptable_state(__pa(cmd_buf), 1, &val, true, false);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* No need to go further if firmware failed to execute command. */
+ if (fw_err)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (to_fw)
+ func = map_firmware_writeable;
+ else
+ func = unmap_firmware_writeable;
+
+ /*
+ * A command buffer may contains a system physical address. If the address
+ * points to a host memory then use an intermediate firmware page otherwise
+ * change the page state in the RMP table.
+ */
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT:
+ if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, pdh_cert_address,
+ pdh_cert_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
+ goto err;
+ if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, cert_chain_address,
+ cert_chain_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1]))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case SEV_CMD_GET_ID:
+ if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_get_id, address, len,
+ false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR:
+ if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pek_csr, address, len,
+ false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA:
+ if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_data, address, len,
+ true, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA:
+ if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa, address, len,
+ true, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE:
+ if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_measure, address, len,
+ false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET:
+ if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_secret, guest_address, guest_len,
+ true, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT:
+ if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, false,
+ &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT:
+ if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, true,
+ &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT:
+ if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_attestation_report, address, len,
+ false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case SEV_CMD_SEND_START:
+ if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_start, session_address,
+ session_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA:
+ if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, hdr_address, hdr_len,
+ false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
+ goto err;
+ if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, trans_address,
+ trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1]))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA:
+ if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, hdr_address, hdr_len,
+ false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
+ goto err;
+ if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, trans_address,
+ trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1]))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA:
+ if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_data, guest_address,
+ guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA:
+ if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_vmsa, guest_address,
+ guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* The command buffer need to be in the firmware state. */
+ if (to_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) {
+ val.assigned = true;
+ val.immutable = true;
+ ret = snp_set_rmptable_state(__pa(cmd_buf), 1, &val, true, false);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static inline bool need_firmware_copy(int cmd)
+{
+ struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
+
+ /* After SNP is INIT'ed, the behavior of legacy SEV command is changed. */
+ return ((cmd < SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT) && sev->snp_inited) ? true : false;
+}
+
+static int snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(int cmd, void *data)
+{
+ return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, true, 0);
+}
+
+static int snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(int cmd, void *data, int fw_err)
+{
+ return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, false, fw_err);
+}
+
static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret)
{
struct psp_device *psp = psp_master;
struct sev_device *sev;
unsigned int phys_lsb, phys_msb;
unsigned int reg, ret = 0;
+ void *cmd_buf;
int buf_len;
if (!psp || !psp->sev_data)
@@ -290,12 +578,26 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret)
* work for some memory, e.g. vmalloc'd addresses, and @data may not be
* physically contiguous.
*/
- if (data)
- memcpy(sev->cmd_buf, data, buf_len);
+ if (data) {
+ if (unlikely(sev->cmd_buf_active > 2))
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf_active ? sev->cmd_buf_backup : sev->cmd_buf;
+
+ memcpy(cmd_buf, data, buf_len);
+ sev->cmd_buf_active++;
+
+ /*
+ * The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the
+ * SNP firmware is in the INIT state.
+ */
+ if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) && snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(cmd, sev->cmd_buf))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
/* Get the physical address of the command buffer */
- phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0;
- phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0;
+ phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0;
+ phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0;
dev_dbg(sev->dev, "sev command id %#x buffer 0x%08x%08x timeout %us\n",
cmd, phys_msb, phys_lsb, psp_timeout);
@@ -336,15 +638,24 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret)
ret = -EIO;
}
- print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data,
- buf_len, false);
-
/*
* Copy potential output from the PSP back to data. Do this even on
* failure in case the caller wants to glean something from the error.
*/
- if (data)
- memcpy(data, sev->cmd_buf, buf_len);
+ if (data) {
+ /*
+ * Restore the page state after the command completes.
+ */
+ if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) &&
+ snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(cmd, cmd_buf, ret))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ memcpy(data, cmd_buf, buf_len);
+ sev->cmd_buf_active--;
+ }
+
+ print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data,
+ buf_len, false);
return ret;
}
@@ -1219,10 +1530,12 @@ int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp)
if (!sev)
goto e_err;
- sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 0);
+ sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
if (!sev->cmd_buf)
goto e_sev;
+ sev->cmd_buf_backup = (uint8_t *)sev->cmd_buf + PAGE_SIZE;
+
psp->sev_data = sev;
sev->dev = dev;
@@ -1276,6 +1589,12 @@ static void sev_firmware_shutdown(struct sev_device *sev)
sev_es_tmr = NULL;
}
+ /*
+ * The host map need to clear the immutable bit so it must be free'd before the
+ * SNP firmware shutdown.
+ */
+ free_snp_host_map(sev);
+
sev_snp_shutdown(NULL);
}
@@ -1335,6 +1654,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void)
*/
dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP: failed to INIT error %#x\n", error);
}
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate the intermediate buffers used for the legacy command handling.
+ */
+ if (alloc_snp_host_map(sev)) {
+ dev_notice(sev->dev, "Failed to alloc host map (disabling legacy SEV)\n");
+ goto skip_legacy;
+ }
}
/* Obtain the TMR memory area for SEV-ES use */
@@ -1364,12 +1691,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void)
if (rc)
dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV: failed to INIT error %#x\n", error);
+skip_legacy:
dev_info(sev->dev, "SEV%s API:%d.%d build:%d\n", sev->snp_inited ?
"-SNP" : "", sev->api_major, sev->api_minor, sev->build);
return;
err:
+ free_snp_host_map(sev);
psp_master->sev_data = NULL;
}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h
index 186ad20cbd24..fe5d7a3ebace 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h
@@ -29,11 +29,20 @@
#define SEV_CMDRESP_CMD_SHIFT 16
#define SEV_CMDRESP_IOC BIT(0)
+#define MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS 2
+
struct sev_misc_dev {
struct kref refcount;
struct miscdevice misc;
};
+struct snp_host_map {
+ u64 paddr;
+ u32 len;
+ void *host;
+ bool active;
+};
+
struct sev_device {
struct device *dev;
struct psp_device *psp;
@@ -52,8 +61,11 @@ struct sev_device {
u8 build;
void *cmd_buf;
+ void *cmd_buf_backup;
+ int cmd_buf_active;
bool snp_inited;
+ struct snp_host_map snp_host_map[MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS];
};
int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp);
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-07-07 18:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 178+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-07-07 18:35 [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 00/40] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 01/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Brijesh Singh
2021-07-14 20:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-15 7:39 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-15 13:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-07-15 15:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-15 17:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 02/40] KVM: SVM: Provide the Hypervisor Feature support VMGEXIT Brijesh Singh
2021-07-14 20:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-14 21:00 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 03/40] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 04/40] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Brijesh Singh
2021-07-14 21:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-14 22:02 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-14 22:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-14 22:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2022-06-02 11:47 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-06-06 11:42 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 05/40] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Brijesh Singh
2021-07-15 18:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-15 19:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 17:22 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-20 22:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-20 23:10 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 06/40] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Brijesh Singh
2021-07-12 18:44 ` Peter Gonda
2021-07-12 19:00 ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-15 18:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-15 19:08 ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-15 19:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 07/40] x86/sev: Split the physmap when adding the page in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-07-14 22:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-15 17:05 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-15 17:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-15 18:14 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-15 18:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-15 19:38 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-15 22:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-15 22:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-30 11:31 ` Vlastimil Babka
2021-07-30 16:10 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 08/40] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Brijesh Singh
2021-07-15 19:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-15 19:16 ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 09/40] x86/fault: Add support to dump RMP entry on fault Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 19:21 ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-08 15:02 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-08 15:30 ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-08 16:48 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-08 16:58 ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-08 17:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-08 17:15 ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 10/40] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address Brijesh Singh
2021-07-08 16:16 ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-12 15:43 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-12 16:00 ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-12 16:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-12 16:15 ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-12 16:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-12 16:29 ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-12 16:49 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-15 21:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-30 16:00 ` Vlastimil Babka
2021-07-30 16:31 ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 11/40] crypto:ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 12/40] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 13/40] crypto: ccp: Shutdown SNP firmware on kexec Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 14/40] crypto:ccp: Provide APIs to issue SEV-SNP commands Brijesh Singh
2021-07-08 18:56 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 15/40] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-07-14 13:22 ` Marc Orr
2021-07-14 16:45 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-14 18:14 ` Marc Orr
2021-07-15 23:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-16 12:55 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 15:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-16 15:47 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 17/40] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 18/40] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{SET,GET}_EXT_CONFIG command Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 19/40] crypto: ccp: provide APIs to query extended attestation report Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 20/40] KVM: SVM: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Brijesh Singh
2021-07-14 13:35 ` Marc Orr
2021-07-14 16:47 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-20 18:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-08-03 14:38 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 21/40] KVM: SVM: Add initial SEV-SNP support Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 18:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-16 18:46 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 19:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-16 21:03 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 22/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 19:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-16 21:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 20:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 23/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Brijesh Singh
2021-07-12 18:45 ` Peter Gonda
2021-07-16 19:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-16 21:42 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 24/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 20:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-16 22:00 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 20:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-19 21:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 21:36 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 25/40] KVM: SVM: Reclaim the guest pages when SEV-SNP VM terminates Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 20:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-16 22:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-17 0:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-19 12:55 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 17:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-19 18:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 19:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-19 19:14 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-19 19:37 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-20 16:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-20 18:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 26/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 20:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-16 22:48 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 16:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-19 18:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 19:14 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-19 19:49 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 20:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-21 17:53 ` Marc Orr
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 27/40] KVM: X86: Add kvm_x86_ops to get the max page level for the TDP Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 19:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-16 20:41 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-20 19:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-20 20:06 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 28/40] KVM: X86: Introduce kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page() for use by SEV Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 18:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 29/40] KVM: X86: Introduce kvm_mmu_get_tdp_walk() for SEV-SNP use Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 30/40] KVM: X86: Define new RMP check related #NPF error bits Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 20:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-17 0:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 31/40] KVM: X86: update page-fault trace to log the 64-bit error code Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 20:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-17 0:35 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 32/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 20:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-17 0:44 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 20:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 33/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 21:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-19 14:19 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 18:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-19 19:15 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-13 16:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 34/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle " Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 21:14 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-19 14:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 35/40] KVM: Add arch hooks to track the host write to guest memory Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 23:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-20 15:15 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 36/40] KVM: X86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 37/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle the RMP nested page fault Brijesh Singh
2021-07-20 0:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-20 17:55 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-20 22:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-20 23:53 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-21 20:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 38/40] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 22:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-20 14:37 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-20 16:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-20 18:21 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-20 22:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 39/40] KVM: SVM: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Brijesh Singh
2021-07-21 0:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-21 16:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 40/40] KVM: SVM: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Brijesh Singh
2021-07-21 0:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-21 17:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-07-21 19:52 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-08-20 14:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-07-08 15:40 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 00/40] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Dave Hansen
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