From: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
To: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
KarimAllah Raslan <karahmed@amazon.de>,
Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>,
kvm list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space
Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2020 12:08:40 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <db209cc0-b878-0b5a-eb39-c58670f13a60@amazon.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALMp9eQ4Cvh=071HcmFCHeLbSb0cxQaCr3SMmKYTFdkywMvoYQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 01.08.20 01:36, Jim Mattson wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jul 31, 2020 at 2:50 PM Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> wrote:
>>
>> MSRs are weird. Some of them are normal control registers, such as EFER.
>> Some however are registers that really are model specific, not very
>> interesting to virtualization workloads, and not performance critical.
>> Others again are really just windows into package configuration.
>>
>> Out of these MSRs, only the first category is necessary to implement in
>> kernel space. Rarely accessed MSRs, MSRs that should be fine tunes against
>> certain CPU models and MSRs that contain information on the package level
>> are much better suited for user space to process. However, over time we have
>> accumulated a lot of MSRs that are not the first category, but still handled
>> by in-kernel KVM code.
>>
>> This patch adds a generic interface to handle WRMSR and RDMSR from user
>> space. With this, any future MSR that is part of the latter categories can
>> be handled in user space.
>>
>> Furthermore, it allows us to replace the existing "ignore_msrs" logic with
>> something that applies per-VM rather than on the full system. That way you
>> can run productive VMs in parallel to experimental ones where you don't care
>> about proper MSR handling.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
>>
>> ---
>>
>> v1 -> v2:
>>
>> - s/ETRAP_TO_USER_SPACE/ENOENT/g
>> - deflect all #GP injection events to user space, not just unknown MSRs.
>> That was we can also deflect allowlist errors later
>> - fix emulator case
>>
>> v2 -> v3:
>>
>> - return r if r == X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED
>> - s/KVM_EXIT_RDMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR/g
>> - s/KVM_EXIT_WRMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR/g
>> - Use complete_userspace_io logic instead of reply field
>> - Simplify trapping code
>> ---
>> Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 62 +++++++++++++++++++
>> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 6 ++
>> arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 18 +++++-
>> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>> include/trace/events/kvm.h | 2 +-
>> include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 10 +++
>> 6 files changed, 197 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
>> index 320788f81a05..79c3e2fdfae4 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
>> +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
>
> The new exit reasons should probably be mentioned here (around line 4866):
>
> .. note::
>
> For KVM_EXIT_IO, KVM_EXIT_MMIO, KVM_EXIT_OSI, KVM_EXIT_PAPR and
> KVM_EXIT_EPR the corresponding
>
> operations are complete (and guest state is consistent) only after userspace
> has re-entered the kernel with KVM_RUN. The kernel side will first finish
> incomplete operations and then check for pending signals. Userspace
> can re-enter the guest with an unmasked signal pending to complete
> pending operations.
Great catch, thanks! Updated to also include the two new exit reasons.
>
> Other than that, my remaining comments are all nits. Feel free to ignore them.
>
>> +static int kvm_get_msr_user_space(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index)
>
> Return bool rather than int?
I'm not a big fan of bool returning APIs unless they have an "is" in
their name. In this case, the most readable path forward would probably
be an enum:
enum kvm_msr_user_space_retval {
KVM_MSR_IN_KERNEL,
KVM_MSR_BOUNCE_TO_USER_SPACE,
};
and then use that in the checks. But that adds a lot of boiler plate for
a fully internal, only a few dozen LOC big API. I don't think it's worth it.
>
>> +{
>> + if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.user_space_msr_enabled)
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> + vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR;
>> + vcpu->run->msr.error = 0;
>
> Should we clear 'pad' in case anyone can think of a reason to use this
> space to extend the API in the future?
It can't hurt I guess.
>
>> + vcpu->run->msr.index = index;
>> + vcpu->arch.pending_user_msr = true;
>> + vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_emulated_rdmsr;
>
> complete_userspace_io could perhaps be renamed to
> complete_userspace_emulation (in a separate commit).
I think the complicated part of complete_userspace_io is to know it
exists and understand how it works. Once you grasp these two bits, the
name is just an artifact and IMHO easy enough to apply "beyond I/O".
>
>> +
>> + return 1;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int kvm_set_msr_user_space(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data)
>
> Return bool rather than int?
Same replies as above :). I did get fed up with the amount of
duplication though and created a generalized function in v4 that gets
called by kvm_get/set_msr_user_space() to ensure that all fields are
always set.
>
>> +{
>> + if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.user_space_msr_enabled)
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> + vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR;
>> + vcpu->run->msr.error = 0;
>
> Same question about 'pad' as above.
>
>> + vcpu->run->msr.index = index;
>> + vcpu->run->msr.data = data;
>> + vcpu->arch.pending_user_msr = true;
>> + vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_emulated_wrmsr;
>> +
>> + return 1;
>> +}
>> +
>
> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Thanks a bunch for the review :)
Alex
Amazon Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 149173 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 289 237 879
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-03 10:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-31 21:49 [PATCH v3 0/3] Allow user space to restrict and augment MSR emulation Alexander Graf
2020-07-31 21:49 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space Alexander Graf
2020-07-31 23:36 ` Jim Mattson
2020-08-03 10:08 ` Alexander Graf [this message]
2020-08-03 11:27 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-08-03 11:34 ` Alexander Graf
2020-07-31 21:49 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] KVM: x86: Introduce allow list for MSR emulation Alexander Graf
2020-08-03 11:37 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-08-03 20:50 ` Alexander Graf
2020-08-03 21:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-31 21:49 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] KVM: selftests: Add test for user space MSR handling Alexander Graf
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