Re: [PATCH v1 00/11] KVM: s390: pv: implement lazy destroy

[Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>]

On 18.05.21 18:31, Claudio Imbrenda wrote:
> On Tue, 18 May 2021 18:22:42 +0200
> David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> wrote:
> 
>> On 18.05.21 18:19, Claudio Imbrenda wrote:
>>> On Tue, 18 May 2021 18:04:11 +0200
>>> Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> wrote:
>>>    
>>>> On Tue, 18 May 2021 17:36:24 +0200
>>>> Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>>>>   
>>>>> On Tue, 18 May 2021 17:05:37 +0200
>>>>> Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>       
>>>>>> On Mon, 17 May 2021 22:07:47 +0200
>>>>>> Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>>>>   
>>>>>>> This means that the same address space can have memory
>>>>>>> belonging to more than one protected guest, although only one
>>>>>>> will be running, the others will in fact not even have any
>>>>>>> CPUs.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Are those set-aside-but-not-yet-cleaned-up pages still possibly
>>>>>> accessible in any way? I would assume that they only belong to
>>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>> in case of reboot: yes, they are still in the address space of the
>>>>> guest, and can be swapped if needed
>>>>>       
>>>>>> 'zombie' guests, and any new or rebooted guest is a new entity
>>>>>> that needs to get new pages?
>>>>>
>>>>> the rebooted guest (normal or secure) will re-use the same pages
>>>>> of the old guest (before or after cleanup, which is the reason of
>>>>> patches 3 and 4)
>>>>
>>>> Took a look at those patches, makes sense.
>>>>   
>>>>>
>>>>> the KVM guest is not affected in case of reboot, so the userspace
>>>>> address space is not touched.
>>>>
>>>> 'guest' is a bit ambiguous here -- do you mean the vm here, and the
>>>> actual guest above?
>>>>   
>>>
>>> yes this is tricky, because there is the guest OS, which terminates
>>> or reboots, then there is the "secure configuration" entity,
>>> handled by the Ultravisor, and then the KVM VM
>>>
>>> when a secure guest reboots, the "secure configuration" is
>>> dismantled (in this case, in a deferred way), and the KVM VM (and
>>> its memory) is not directly affected
>>>
>>> what happened before was that the secure configuration was
>>> dismantled synchronously, and then re-created.
>>>
>>> now instead, a new secure configuration is created using the same
>>> KVM VM (and thus the same mm), before the old secure configuration
>>> has been completely dismantled. hence the same KVM VM can have
>>> multiple secure configurations associated, sharing the same address
>>> space.
>>>
>>> of course, only the newest one is actually running, the other ones
>>> are "zombies", without CPUs.
>>>    
>>
>> Can a guest trigger a DoS?
> 
> I don't see how
> 
> a guest can fill its memory and then reboot, and then fill its memory
> again and then reboot... but that will take time, filling the memory
> will itself clean up leftover pages from previous boots.

In essence this guest will then synchronously wait for the page to be
exported and reimported, correct?
> 
> "normal" reboot loops will be fast, because there won't be much memory
> to process
> 
> I have actually tested mixed reboot/shutdown loops, and the system
> behaved as you would expect when under load.

I guess the memory will continue to be accounted to the memcg? Correct?