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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>, Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Marius Hillenbrand <mhillenb@amazon.de>,
	kvm list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>, Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.de>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC 00/10] Process-local memory allocations for hiding KVM secrets
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 09:20:53 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f1dfbfb4-d2d5-bf30-600f-9e756a352860@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrVRuQb-P7auHCgxzs5L=qA2_qHzVGTtRMAqoMAut0ETFw@mail.gmail.com>

On 6/13/19 9:13 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> It might make sense to use it for kmap_atomic() for debug purposes, as
>> it ensures that other users can no longer access the same mapping
>> through the linear map. However, it does come at quite a big cost, as we
>> need to shoot down the TLB of all other threads in the system. So I'm
>> not sure it's of general value?
> What I meant was that kmap_atomic() could use mm-local memory so that
> it doesn't need to do a global shootdown.  But I guess it's not
> actually used for real on 64-bit, so this is mostly moot.  Are you
> planning to support mm-local on 32-bit?

Do we *do* global shootdowns on kmap_atomic()s on 32-bit?  I thought we
used entirely per-cpu addresses, so a stale entry from another CPU can
get loaded in the TLB speculatively but it won't ever actually get used.
 I think it goes:

kunmap_atomic() ->
__kunmap_atomic() ->
kpte_clear_flush() ->
__flush_tlb_one_kernel() ->
__flush_tlb_one_user() ->
__native_flush_tlb_one_user() ->
invlpg

The per-cpu address calculation is visible in kmap_atomic_prot():

        idx = type + KM_TYPE_NR*smp_processor_id();

  reply	other threads:[~2019-06-13 16:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-06-12 17:08 [RFC 00/10] Process-local memory allocations for hiding KVM secrets Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 17:08 ` [RFC 01/10] x86/mm/kaslr: refactor to use enum indices for regions Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 17:08 ` [RFC 02/10] x86/speculation, mm: add process local virtual memory region Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 17:08 ` [RFC 03/10] x86/mm, mm,kernel: add teardown for process-local memory to mm cleanup Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 17:08 ` [RFC 04/10] mm: allocate virtual space for process-local memory Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 17:08 ` [RFC 05/10] mm: allocate/release physical pages " Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 17:08 ` [RFC 06/10] kvm/x86: add support for storing vCPU state in " Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 17:08 ` [RFC 07/10] kvm, vmx: move CR2 context switch out of assembly path Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 17:08 ` [RFC 08/10] kvm, vmx: move register clearing " Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 17:08 ` [RFC 09/10] kvm, vmx: move gprs to process local memory Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 17:08 ` [RFC 10/10] kvm, x86: move guest FPU state into " Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 18:25 ` [RFC 00/10] Process-local memory allocations for hiding KVM secrets Sean Christopherson
2019-06-13  7:20   ` Alexander Graf
2019-06-13 10:54   ` Liran Alon
2019-06-12 19:55 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-12 20:27   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-12 20:41     ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-12 20:56       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-13  1:30     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-13  1:50       ` Nadav Amit
2019-06-13 16:16         ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-13  7:52       ` Alexander Graf
2019-06-13 16:13         ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-13 16:20           ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2019-06-13 17:29             ` Nadav Amit
2019-06-13 17:49               ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-13 20:05                 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-14 14:21     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-16 22:18       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-16 22:28         ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-17  7:38       ` Alexander Graf
2019-06-17 15:50         ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 15:54           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 16:03             ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 16:14               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 16:53                 ` Nadav Amit
2019-06-17 18:07                   ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 18:45                     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-17 18:49                       ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 18:53                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 18:50                     ` Nadav Amit
2019-06-17 18:55                       ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-13  7:27   ` Alexander Graf
2019-06-13 14:19     ` Dave Hansen

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