From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.3 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,NICE_REPLY_A, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3E201C4361A for ; Fri, 4 Dec 2020 08:08:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E3AF022573 for ; Fri, 4 Dec 2020 08:08:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728916AbgLDIIB (ORCPT ); Fri, 4 Dec 2020 03:08:01 -0500 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:32762 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728475AbgLDIIB (ORCPT ); Fri, 4 Dec 2020 03:08:01 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098409.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 0B486FB6035734; Fri, 4 Dec 2020 03:07:02 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ibm.com; h=subject : to : cc : references : from : message-id : date : mime-version : in-reply-to : content-type : content-transfer-encoding; s=pp1; bh=OrQsb4G3Mo6zPoHe7oS4IScRnebpdka+gnTXfO5aVEM=; b=Ckd8QqNf9o7QGG3Rq0o9BtjcwnYr4pT1F156RwMx1I07PskW5neLQjtw0m/6d7i1htBV CArH2xvTV6CwMMwFTXl9e3K8fF5VhLZu+QJPXbH+u6DdoZ+pcQoC7oE7Xp3jcQV4omdk E4EbSRf8LgVw2kyI2KVOPWVeI+MOJPhgNl0K1rInJPaUIzbuDyEk7b6PtVRsHQl5bXMk m4kU+OW/jRWpAJSchTuXEz+/392m3zyXC2WeTpwhenXxKSr4IqMI3cRzpCXRVyz3UPrl TLsiIXYFnpIUkDno4WPhs46wUdttXlkroJD93rW62wNEUrgRqAG5BGngMKvEWeVK/ppU Og== Received: from pps.reinject (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 35789ax7cv-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Fri, 04 Dec 2020 03:07:02 -0500 Received: from m0098409.ppops.net (m0098409.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by pps.reinject (8.16.0.36/8.16.0.36) with SMTP id 0B486PjI036689; Fri, 4 Dec 2020 03:07:01 -0500 Received: from ppma04ams.nl.ibm.com (63.31.33a9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [169.51.49.99]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 35789ax79a-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Fri, 04 Dec 2020 03:07:01 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma04ams.nl.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma04ams.nl.ibm.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 0B47wMk4026881; Fri, 4 Dec 2020 08:06:58 GMT Received: from b06cxnps3074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06relay09.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.109.194]) by ppma04ams.nl.ibm.com with ESMTP id 35693xj1k3-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Fri, 04 Dec 2020 08:06:58 +0000 Received: from d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.232]) by b06cxnps3074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 0B486tSW30212432 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Fri, 4 Dec 2020 08:06:55 GMT Received: from d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0A5CB5204E; Fri, 4 Dec 2020 08:06:55 +0000 (GMT) Received: from oc7455500831.ibm.com (unknown [9.171.4.55]) by d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D12665204F; Fri, 4 Dec 2020 08:06:51 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Re: [for-6.0 v5 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models To: David Gibson , pair@us.ibm.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org Cc: Eduardo Habkost , qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, rth@twiddle.net, thuth@redhat.com, berrange@redhat.com, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Marcelo Tosatti , "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Marcel Apfelbaum , david@redhat.com, Richard Henderson , cohuck@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, pasic@linux.ibm.com References: <20201204054415.579042-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> From: Christian Borntraeger Message-ID: Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 09:06:50 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.4.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20201204054415.579042-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.312,18.0.737 definitions=2020-12-04_02:2020-12-04,2020-12-04 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 phishscore=0 impostorscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1011 adultscore=0 priorityscore=1501 mlxlogscore=946 lowpriorityscore=0 bulkscore=0 mlxscore=0 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2009150000 definitions=main-2012040046 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org On 04.12.20 06:44, David Gibson wrote: > A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the > hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order > to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor. > > AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has > its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism > to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection > level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected > execution environment. > > The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each > platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem > ideal for users, or particularly for management layers. > > AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option > "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other > than SEV. > > This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration > for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's > "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a > "securable-guest-memory" property pointing to a platform specific Can we do "securable-guest" ? s390x also protects registers and integrity. memory is only one piece of the puzzle and what we protect might differ from platform to platform.