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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>, bp@suse.de
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com,
	joro@8bytes.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, x86@kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	srutherford@google.com, seanjc@google.com,
	venu.busireddy@oracle.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 09/12] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2021 11:39:15 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <faf98f6d-3f7a-978b-5705-614e4e692bfb@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f2340642c5b8d597a099285194fca8d05c9843bd.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>

On 15/04/21 17:57, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> 
> Invoke a hypercall when a memory region is changed from encrypted ->
> decrypted and vice versa. Hypervisor needs to know the page encryption
> status during the guest migration.

Boris, can you ack this patch?

Paolo

> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Cc: x86@kernel.org
> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
> Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h       | 10 +++++
>   arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h |  2 +
>   arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c            |  1 +
>   arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c             | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>   arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c          |  7 ++++
>   5 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h
> index 4abf110e2243..efaa3e628967 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h
> @@ -84,6 +84,12 @@ static inline void paravirt_arch_exit_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
>   	PVOP_VCALL1(mmu.exit_mmap, mm);
>   }
>   
> +static inline void page_encryption_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int npages,
> +						bool enc)
> +{
> +	PVOP_VCALL3(mmu.page_encryption_changed, vaddr, npages, enc);
> +}
> +
>   #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL
>   static inline void load_sp0(unsigned long sp0)
>   {
> @@ -799,6 +805,10 @@ static inline void paravirt_arch_dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *oldmm,
>   static inline void paravirt_arch_exit_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
>   {
>   }
> +
> +static inline void page_encryption_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
> +{
> +}
>   #endif
>   #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
>   #endif /* _ASM_X86_PARAVIRT_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h
> index de87087d3bde..69ef9c207b38 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h
> @@ -195,6 +195,8 @@ struct pv_mmu_ops {
>   
>   	/* Hook for intercepting the destruction of an mm_struct. */
>   	void (*exit_mmap)(struct mm_struct *mm);
> +	void (*page_encryption_changed)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages,
> +					bool enc);
>   
>   #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL
>   	struct paravirt_callee_save read_cr2;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c
> index c60222ab8ab9..9f206e192f6b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c
> @@ -335,6 +335,7 @@ struct paravirt_patch_template pv_ops = {
>   			(void (*)(struct mmu_gather *, void *))tlb_remove_page,
>   
>   	.mmu.exit_mmap		= paravirt_nop,
> +	.mmu.page_encryption_changed	= paravirt_nop,
>   
>   #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL
>   	.mmu.read_cr2		= __PV_IS_CALLEE_SAVE(native_read_cr2),
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index ae78cef79980..fae9ccbd0da7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
>   #include <linux/kernel.h>
>   #include <linux/bitops.h>
>   #include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
> +#include <linux/kvm_para.h>
>   
>   #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
>   #include <asm/fixmap.h>
> @@ -29,6 +30,7 @@
>   #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
>   #include <asm/msr.h>
>   #include <asm/cmdline.h>
> +#include <asm/kvm_para.h>
>   
>   #include "mm_internal.h"
>   
> @@ -229,6 +231,47 @@ void __init sev_setup_arch(void)
>   	swiotlb_adjust_size(size);
>   }
>   
> +static void set_memory_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages,
> +					bool enc)
> +{
> +	unsigned long sz = npages << PAGE_SHIFT;
> +	unsigned long vaddr_end, vaddr_next;
> +
> +	vaddr_end = vaddr + sz;
> +
> +	for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = vaddr_next) {
> +		int psize, pmask, level;
> +		unsigned long pfn;
> +		pte_t *kpte;
> +
> +		kpte = lookup_address(vaddr, &level);
> +		if (!kpte || pte_none(*kpte))
> +			return;
> +
> +		switch (level) {
> +		case PG_LEVEL_4K:
> +			pfn = pte_pfn(*kpte);
> +			break;
> +		case PG_LEVEL_2M:
> +			pfn = pmd_pfn(*(pmd_t *)kpte);
> +			break;
> +		case PG_LEVEL_1G:
> +			pfn = pud_pfn(*(pud_t *)kpte);
> +			break;
> +		default:
> +			return;
> +		}
> +
> +		psize = page_level_size(level);
> +		pmask = page_level_mask(level);
> +
> +		kvm_sev_hypercall3(KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS,
> +				   pfn << PAGE_SHIFT, psize >> PAGE_SHIFT, enc);
> +
> +		vaddr_next = (vaddr & pmask) + psize;
> +	}
> +}
> +
>   static void __init __set_clr_pte_enc(pte_t *kpte, int level, bool enc)
>   {
>   	pgprot_t old_prot, new_prot;
> @@ -286,12 +329,13 @@ static void __init __set_clr_pte_enc(pte_t *kpte, int level, bool enc)
>   static int __init early_set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long vaddr,
>   					   unsigned long size, bool enc)
>   {
> -	unsigned long vaddr_end, vaddr_next;
> +	unsigned long vaddr_end, vaddr_next, start;
>   	unsigned long psize, pmask;
>   	int split_page_size_mask;
>   	int level, ret;
>   	pte_t *kpte;
>   
> +	start = vaddr;
>   	vaddr_next = vaddr;
>   	vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
>   
> @@ -346,6 +390,8 @@ static int __init early_set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long vaddr,
>   
>   	ret = 0;
>   
> +	set_memory_enc_dec_hypercall(start, PAGE_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT,
> +					enc);
>   out:
>   	__flush_tlb_all();
>   	return ret;
> @@ -481,6 +527,15 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
>   	if (sev_active() && !sev_es_active())
>   		static_branch_enable(&sev_enable_key);
>   
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
> +	/*
> +	 * With SEV, we need to make a hypercall when page encryption state is
> +	 * changed.
> +	 */
> +	if (sev_active())
> +		pv_ops.mmu.page_encryption_changed = set_memory_enc_dec_hypercall;
> +#endif
> +
>   	print_mem_encrypt_feature_info();
>   }
>   
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> index 16f878c26667..3576b583ac65 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
>   #include <asm/proto.h>
>   #include <asm/memtype.h>
>   #include <asm/set_memory.h>
> +#include <asm/paravirt.h>
>   
>   #include "../mm_internal.h"
>   
> @@ -2012,6 +2013,12 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
>   	 */
>   	cpa_flush(&cpa, 0);
>   
> +	/* Notify hypervisor that a given memory range is mapped encrypted
> +	 * or decrypted. The hypervisor will use this information during the
> +	 * VM migration.
> +	 */
> +	page_encryption_changed(addr, numpages, enc);
> +
>   	return ret;
>   }
>   
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2021-04-20  9:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-04-15 15:52 [PATCH v13 00/12] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Ashish Kalra
2021-04-15 15:53 ` [PATCH v13 01/12] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command Ashish Kalra
2021-04-20  8:50   ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-15 15:53 ` [PATCH v13 02/12] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2021-04-15 15:54 ` [PATCH v13 03/12] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2021-04-15 15:54 ` [PATCH v13 04/12] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command Ashish Kalra
2021-04-20  8:38   ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-20  9:18     ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-15 15:55 ` [PATCH v13 05/12] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2021-04-20  8:40   ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-20  8:43     ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-15 15:55 ` [PATCH v13 06/12] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2021-04-15 15:56 ` [PATCH v13 07/12] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3 Ashish Kalra
2021-04-15 15:57 ` [PATCH v13 08/12] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall Ashish Kalra
2021-04-20 11:10   ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-20 17:24     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-04-15 15:57 ` [PATCH v13 09/12] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed Ashish Kalra
2021-04-20  9:39   ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2021-04-21 10:05   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-21 12:00     ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-21 14:09       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-21 12:12     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-04-21 13:50       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-21 13:52       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-15 15:58 ` [PATCH v13 10/12] KVM: x86: Introduce new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature & Custom MSR Ashish Kalra
2021-04-19 23:06   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-04-20 10:49     ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-20  9:47   ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-15 15:58 ` [PATCH v13 11/12] EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID Ashish Kalra
2021-04-15 16:01 ` [PATCH v13 12/12] x86/kvm: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature Ashish Kalra
2021-04-20 10:52   ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-21 14:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-21 15:22     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-04-21 15:32       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-21 15:38     ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-21 18:48       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-04-21 19:19         ` Ashish Kalra
2021-04-16 21:43 ` [PATCH v13 00/12] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Steve Rutherford
2021-04-19 14:40   ` Ashish Kalra
2021-04-20 11:11 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-20 18:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-20 19:08     ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-20 20:28       ` Borislav Petkov

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