[PATCH v8 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode

[Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>]

Ensure that a syscall does not return to user-mode with a kernel address
limit. If that happens, a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and
elevate privileges [1].

The CONFIG_ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK option disables the generic check so each
architecture can create optimized versions.

[1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990

Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
---
Based on next-20170426
---
 arch/s390/Kconfig        |  1 +
 include/linux/syscalls.h | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 init/Kconfig             |  6 ++++++
 kernel/sys.c             | 13 +++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index d25435d94b6e..164de1d24e92 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ config S390
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_BH
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQ
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQRESTORE
+	select ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
 	select ARCH_SAVE_PAGE_KEYS if HIBERNATION
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index 980c3c9b06f8..ebde64f1622c 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -191,6 +191,28 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
 	SYSCALL_METADATA(sname, x, __VA_ARGS__)			\
 	__SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__)
 
+
+/*
+ * Called before coming back to user-mode. Returning to user-mode with an
+ * address limit different than USER_DS can allow to overwrite kernel memory.
+ */
+static inline void addr_limit_check_syscall(void)
+{
+	BUG_ON(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS));
+}
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
+#define __CHECK_USERMODE_SYSCALL() \
+	bool user_caller = segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS)
+#define __VERIFY_ADDR_LIMIT() \
+	if (user_caller) addr_limit_check_syscall()
+#else
+#define __CHECK_USERMODE_SYSCALL()
+#define __VERIFY_ADDR_LIMIT()
+asmlinkage void addr_limit_check_failed(void) __noreturn;
+#endif
+
+
 #define __PROTECT(...) asmlinkage_protect(__VA_ARGS__)
 #define __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, name, ...)					\
 	asmlinkage long sys##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__))	\
@@ -199,7 +221,10 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
 	asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__));	\
 	asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__))	\
 	{								\
-		long ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__));	\
+		long ret;						\
+		__CHECK_USERMODE_SYSCALL();				\
+		ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__));	\
+		__VERIFY_ADDR_LIMIT();					\
 		__MAP(x,__SC_TEST,__VA_ARGS__);				\
 		__PROTECT(x, ret,__MAP(x,__SC_ARGS,__VA_ARGS__));	\
 		return ret;						\
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 42a346b0df43..599d9fe30703 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1961,6 +1961,12 @@ config PROFILING
 config TRACEPOINTS
 	bool
 
+config ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
+	bool
+	help
+	  Disable the generic address limit check. Allow each architecture to
+	  optimize how and when the verification is done.
+
 source "arch/Kconfig"
 
 endmenu		# General setup
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 8a94b4eabcaa..a1cbcd715d62 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -2458,3 +2458,16 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info)
 	return 0;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
+/*
+ * Used when an architecture specific implementation detects an invalid address
+ * limit. This function does not return.
+ */
+asmlinkage void addr_limit_check_failed(void)
+{
+	/* Try to fail on the generic address limit check */
+	addr_limit_check_syscall();
+	panic("Invalid address limit before returning to user-mode");
+}
+#endif
-- 
2.13.0.rc0.306.g87b477812d-goog