From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Security Module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>,
"Dmitry V . Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
"J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 4/9] proc: instantiate only pids that we can ptrace on 'hidepid=4' mount option
Date: Sat, 28 Mar 2020 22:23:36 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200328212336.zyj5naxz4jc64tgp@comp-core-i7-2640m-0182e6> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202003281336.8354DB74@keescook>
On Sat, Mar 28, 2020 at 01:40:03PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 27, 2020 at 06:23:26PM +0100, Alexey Gladkov wrote:
> > If "hidepid=4" mount option is set then do not instantiate pids that
> > we can not ptrace. "hidepid=4" means that procfs should only contain
> > pids that the caller can ptrace.
> >
> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
> > ---
> > fs/proc/base.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
> > fs/proc/root.c | 13 ++++++++++---
> > include/linux/proc_fs.h | 1 +
> > 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> > index 43a28907baf9..1ebe9eba48ea 100644
> > --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> > +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> > @@ -701,6 +701,14 @@ static bool has_pid_permissions(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info,
> > struct task_struct *task,
> > int hide_pid_min)
> > {
> > + /*
> > + * If 'hidpid' mount option is set force a ptrace check,
> > + * we indicate that we are using a filesystem syscall
> > + * by passing PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS
> > + */
> > + if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE)
> > + return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
> > +
> > if (fs_info->hide_pid < hide_pid_min)
> > return true;
> > if (in_group_p(fs_info->pid_gid))
> > @@ -3319,7 +3327,14 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
> > if (!task)
> > goto out;
> >
> > + /* Limit procfs to only ptraceable tasks */
> > + if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE) {
> > + if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS))
> > + goto out_put_task;
> > + }
> > +
> > result = proc_pid_instantiate(dentry, task, NULL);
> > +out_put_task:
> > put_task_struct(task);
> > out:
> > return result;
> > diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
> > index 616e8976185c..62eae22403d2 100644
> > --- a/fs/proc/root.c
> > +++ b/fs/proc/root.c
> > @@ -47,6 +47,14 @@ static const struct fs_parameter_spec proc_fs_parameters[] = {
> > {}
> > };
> >
> > +static inline int valid_hidepid(unsigned int value)
> > +{
> > + return (value == HIDEPID_OFF ||
> > + value == HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS ||
> > + value == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE ||
> > + value == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE);
>
> This likely easier to do with a ...MAX value? i.e.
>
> return (value < HIDEPID_OFF || value >= HIDEPID_MAX);
>
> > +}
> > +
> > static int proc_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
> > {
> > struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
> > @@ -63,10 +71,9 @@ static int proc_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
> > break;
> >
> > case Opt_hidepid:
> > + if (!valid_hidepid(result.uint_32))
> > + return invalf(fc, "proc: unknown value of hidepid.\n");
> > ctx->hidepid = result.uint_32;
> > - if (ctx->hidepid < HIDEPID_OFF ||
> > - ctx->hidepid > HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)
> > - return invalfc(fc, "hidepid value must be between 0 and 2.\n");
> > break;
> >
> > default:
> > diff --git a/include/linux/proc_fs.h b/include/linux/proc_fs.h
> > index 7d852dbca253..21d19353fdc7 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/proc_fs.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/proc_fs.h
> > @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ enum {
> > HIDEPID_OFF = 0,
> > HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS = 1,
> > HIDEPID_INVISIBLE = 2,
> > + HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE = 4, /* Limit pids to only ptraceable pids */
>
> This isn't a bit field -- shouldn't this be "3"?
>
> ...
> HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE = 3,
> HIDEPID_MAX
>
> etc?
I decided to choose 4 so that if later we need to be able to make a mask.
I am not sure that this parameter will not have values that cannot be used
together. Since now these parameters are becoming part of the public api,
I decided to add flexibility.
--
Rgrds, legion
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-03-28 21:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-03-27 17:23 [PATCH v10 0/9] proc: modernize proc to support multiple private instances Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-27 17:23 ` [PATCH v10 1/9] proc: rename struct proc_fs_info to proc_fs_opts Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-27 17:23 ` [PATCH v10 2/9] proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace Alexey Gladkov
2020-04-02 15:31 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-04-02 16:32 ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-27 17:23 ` [PATCH v10 3/9] proc: move hide_pid, pid_gid from pid_namespace to proc_fs_info Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-27 17:23 ` [PATCH v10 4/9] proc: instantiate only pids that we can ptrace on 'hidepid=4' mount option Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-28 20:40 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-28 21:23 ` Alexey Gladkov [this message]
2020-03-27 17:23 ` [PATCH v10 5/9] proc: add option to mount only a pids subset Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-27 17:23 ` [PATCH v10 6/9] docs: proc: add documentation for "hidepid=4" and "subset=pid" options and new mount behavior Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-27 17:23 ` [PATCH v10 7/9] proc: move hidepid values to uapi as they are user interface to mount Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-28 20:41 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-28 21:25 ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-28 21:53 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-28 23:00 ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-29 3:17 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-02 16:58 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-04-03 23:59 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-27 17:23 ` [PATCH v10 8/9] proc: use human-readable values for hidehid Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-28 20:28 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-28 21:14 ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-28 21:52 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-28 22:54 ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-30 11:12 ` [PATCH v11 " Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-30 18:33 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-02 16:11 ` Jann Horn
2020-04-02 16:05 ` [PATCH v10 " Eric W. Biederman
2020-04-02 16:51 ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-04-02 17:04 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-04-09 14:32 ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-03-27 17:23 ` [PATCH v10 9/9] proc: use named enums for better readability Alexey Gladkov
2020-04-02 17:00 ` [PATCH v10 0/9] proc: modernize proc to support multiple private instances Eric W. Biederman
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